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This dissertation attempts to answer the question Why do some adolescents 
pursue college while others do not? In attempting to answer this question my focus is 
on what I call college-encouraging preferences and perceptions, which are 
preferences and perceptions that make adolescents more likely to pursue college. The 
model I develop engages the rational choice literature in both economics and 
sociology, but it deals primarily with considerations outside the scope of traditional 
rational choice models. I deal with preferences and perceptions but not only those 
relating to pecuniary costs and benefits. Also, unlike most rational choice 
perspectives, I focus on interpersonal variation in preferences and perceptions and 
how this variation affects college entry decisions.  
 I analyze two preferences and two perceptions: preferences for academic 
activities, preferences for various labor-market outcomes, perceptions of the ability to 
complete college, and perceptions of the effect of education on labor-market 
outcomes. Using both propensity-score matching and regression estimators, I find that 
preferences for academic activities increase educational expectations, preferences for 
labor-market outcomes that education improves increase educational expectations and 
college entry, and that the subjective probability of college completion conditional 
upon college entry increases college entry.  
 Regarding perceptions of the effect of education on labor-market outcomes, I 
turn away from the maximization assumption of traditional human capital approaches 
and develop a simple satisficing model. Consistent with predictions of the model, 
results show that the more education an adolescent believes is required to enter the 
  
occupation they expect, the more likely they are to enter college. Examination of 
reverse causality (i.e., educational decisions affect occupational decisions) found only 
weak effects.  
 Analysis of the determinants of preferences and perceptions shows that 
cognitive skill and parental education are both positively related to most college-
encouraging preferences and perceptions. Blacks, Hispanics, and Asians have more 
college-encouraging preferences and perceptions than whites of comparable cognitive 
skill and family background. Multilevel models also suggest that high schools 
influence the preferences and perceptions of the students within them. 
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CHAPTER 1. SUBJECTIVE RATIONALITY AND 
POSTSECONDARY SCHOOLING DECISIONS  
 
This dissertation attempts to answer the question Why do some adolescents 
pursue college while others do not? In attempting to answer this question my focus is 
on what I call college-encouraging preferences and perceptions, which are 
preferences and perceptions that make adolescents more likely to pursue college. The 
model I develop engages the rational choice literature in both sociology and 
economics, but it deals primarily with considerations outside the scope of traditional 
rational choice models. I consider nonpecuniary costs and benefits, and I focus on 
interpersonal variation in preferences and perceptions and how this variation affects 
college entry decisions.  
In this introductory chapter I justify my theoretical approach, outline the 
methods I use, and provide a brief overview of the subsequent chapters.  
 
WHY DO SOME PEOPLE GET MORE EDUCATION THAN OTHERS?  
The relationship that postsecondary education has with a variety of outcomes 
makes it among the most important issues in the study of social inequality. Most 
commonly cited is the effect of postsecondary education on earnings. Estimation of 
the causal effects of schooling on earnings has proven surprisingly difficult, with 
ability bias and measurement error in self-reported schooling representing formidable 
obstacles to credible estimation. Despite these difficulties a near consensus has formed 
among labor economists that education pays handsomely at the individual level and is 
well worth the investment (Card 1999). Education appears to have beneficial effects 
on other labor-market outcomes including employment (versus unemployment) and 
working conditions (Jencks, Perman, and Rainwater 1988; Duncan 1976). Evidence 
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also suggests that postsecondary education affects a range of nonmarket outcomes 
including health, attitudes, and marriage duration (Wolfe and Zuvekas 1997; Kingston 
et al. 2003). 
Largely because of its centrality in the development and maintenance of the 
stratification order, considerable effort has gone into understanding why some 
adolescents obtain more education than others. Research is conducted across most of 
the social sciences, but the most influential theoretical perspectives for understanding 
educational decisions have been developed in sociology and economics. Status 
attainment modelsespecially the Wisconsin Model of status attainmenthave 
been highly influential in sociology (often as a foil). Investment models are dominant 
in economics. It is useful to begin with early formulations of the Wisconsin Model and 
investment models because their simplicity and familiarity provide a useful point of 
departure to introduce developments after their original formulations, including the 
themes I wish to develop. 
 
THE WISCONSIN MODEL OF STATUS ATTAINMENT 
Blau and Duncan (1967) formulated a basic model of intergenerational status 
attainment linking family background to occupational attainment. In it, educational 
attainment mediates the relationship between family background and adult 
occupational attainment. Family background influences educational attainment, and 
educational attainment in turn influences occupational attainment. 
A major development in the status attainment tradition occurred only two years 
later with the publication of Sewell, Haller, and Portess (1969) Wisconsin Model of 
status attainment, so named because a sample of Wisconsin high school seniors was 
used in the empirical analysis. The objective of the research was to postulate and 
empirically examine the role of social psychological constructs that linked exogenous 
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variablesfamily background and cognitive skillto educational and occupational 
attainment. Figure 1.1 presents the path model describing the proposed causal 
relationships among the variables. As Figure 1.1 shows, educational and occupational 
aspirations, which are assumed to represent underlying motivation, are the proximate 
causes of educational and occupational attainment. Based on social psychological 
findings showing the importance of others in the definition of the situation (e.g., 
Sherif 1935) and the influence of others expectations on ones own aspirations, 
aspirations are assumed to be caused by the expectations of significant others, such as 
the expectations of parents, teachers, and peers. Significant others expectations are 
primarily caused by adolescents grades and family background. In theoretical 
elaborations significant others expectations influence adolescents educational 
aspirations through the combined forces of self-reflection, imitation, and adoption 
(Haller 1982), but focus has traditionally been on the most straightforward 
socialization model in which adolescents simply adopt significant others 
expectations. Because aspirations are the proximate cause of attainment, it is proposed 
that manipulation of aspirations may influence later attainment.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1.1 The Wisconsin Model of Status Attainment.  
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Subsequent research questioned the omission of several paths, such as the path 
leading from mental ability to significant others influence (Sewell, Haller, and 
Ohlendorf 1970). However, most evidence is consistent with the Wisconsin Model, 
and the original study has been replicated with numerous datasets that all reach the 
same basic conclusion that the effects specified in Figure 1.1 are all fairly strong.  
 
INVESTMENT MODELS OF SCHOOLING DECISIONS 
Human capital and signaling theory dominate theory and research on 
educational attainment in labor economics. Human capital consists of inalienable 
personal assets that can be rented out in the form of labor to result in an income stream 
in the form of wages. If a person chooses to increase their human capital they must 
make investments that allow them to rent out their labor at a higher wage. Education is 
seen as an investment made to increase human capital. Signaling theory assumes that 
productivity differences across educational attainment levels exist before schooling 
differences. For example, those with a college degree are on average more productive 
than those with high school diplomas, but schooling did not cause these differences. 
Schooling does affect earnings, however, because it provides probabilistic information 
about these unobservable, preexisting productivity differences to potential employers.  
For present purposes, the mechanism through which schooling affects earnings 
is unimportant. The essential point is that adolescents see schooling as an investment. 
Adolescents weigh the costs and benefits of schooling and their other alternatives 
(which could include labor market activity, leisure, domestic labor, criminal activity, 
and parenthood) and decide to continue their schooling if its net benefits are higher 
than those of their other alternatives. Schoolings benefits are primarily conceived of 
as higher future wages, but nonpecuniary labor-market outcomes may be considered 
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as well. Schoolings costs include direct costs (e.g., tuition, books), opportunity costs 
(i.e., forgone earnings), and psychic costs (e.g., the disutility of studying).  
Evidence is generally consistent with predictions of investment models. An 
abundant literature on the causal effect of schooling on wages concludes that 
postsecondary schooling increases earnings (for a review see Card 1999), and trends in 
enrollment and educational expectations in the 1970s and 1980s suggest that 
adolescents respond to changes in the returns to education (Morgan 1998). Evidence 
also supports the importance of costs. Net direct costs, often defined as tuition minus 
financial aid, lower enrollment (for a review see Ehrenberg 2004). Less compelling 
evidence suggests that opportunity costs are important as well. Higher wages in local 
labor markets lower the probability of attending college (Venti and Wise 1983) as 
does a low rate of unemployment (Rivkin 1995). Psychic costs have generally been 
ignored except when they are inferred from behavior using the logic of revealed 
preferences (Lazear 1977; Cunha, Heckman, and Navarro 2006). 
Some research has begun to look at adolescents perceptions of the costs and 
benefits of college because perceptionsnot information at researchers disposal
should determine investment decisions. Avery and Kane (2004:382, Table 8.15) 
provide information from Boston-area high school students who estimated both tuition 
at several nearby colleges and the effect that a bachelors degree would have on their 
own earnings. Avery and Kane used this information in conjunction with assumptions 
about discount rates to calculate the implied present value of a bachelors degree for 
each student relative to working immediately after high school. They found that about 
85 percent of students whose implied present value of a bachelors degree was positive 
(i.e., it was higher than the present value of working immediately after high school 
graduation) planned to obtain bachelors degrees. However, they also found that 
almost 70 percent of high school students whose implied present value was negative 
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planned to obtain a bachelors degree and that 95 percent of students from affluent 
neighborhoods whose implied present value was negative planned to obtain bachelors 
degrees. These findings led Avery and Kane to conclude that subjective beliefs about 
the payoffs to college are only weakly related to students plans for college (385). 
Rouse (2004) also provides evidence that higher perceived returns are only weakly 
related to college plans.  
What about the perceived ability to finance college? Avery and Kane (2004) 
found that the more a student thought college would cost, the less likely they were to 
plan to attend; however, the relationship was very weak.1  
 
SHORTCOMINGS OF THE WISCONSIN AND INVESTMENT MODELS 
Theoretical and empirical shortcomings have prevented widespread acceptance 
of either the Wisconsin Model or investment models, including the many variations of 
these models that have been developed. Most important among these shortcomings 
have been conceptual issues raised by critics, inattention to structural forces in the 
educational attainment process, and the inability of the models to explain some 
puzzling empirical findings.  
 
CONCEPTUAL ISSUES. A good deal of research framed explicitly within the 
status attainment tradition was conducted in the 1970s and early 1980s, but concerns 
about key constructs led to a sharp decline after this period. The emphasis on 
aspirations and expectations was harshly criticized. Bourdieu (1973) questioned the 
claim that aspirations and expectations caused educational attainment and argued that 
expectations were largely statements of known probabilities that are determined by 
                                                
1 Strangely, the more a student thought college would cost, the more likely they were to think that they 
could afford it. This was true even among poorer students. 
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class background. Alexander and Cook (1979) convincingly showed that educational 
expectations do not always represent motivation. Using data on students surveyed in 
their senior year of high school, they found that some adolescents expectations were 
essentially extemporaneous responses representing no real commitment to the stated 
outcome. That expectations are not necessarily goals that adolescents strive for is also 
apparent in the absurdly high educational expectations that have been recorded, 
especially recently (e.g., Reynolds et al. 2006). 
Furthermore, developers of the Wisconsin Model showed a concern for the 
effects of education on occupational attainment in their models, but their models 
assume that adolescents dont share this concern. Labor-market goals play no role 
whatsoever in educational expectations or attainment, and the theory fails indicate 
why anyone would go to college to begin with. Even if the socialization story is 
accepted we do not really know why significant others might expect anyone to 
continue their education.  
 Rational choice theory has at times received a cool reception in sociology. 
Some argue that it is masculinist (England and Kilbourne 1990), not self-sufficient 
(i.e., it must be supplemented with other theories to explain all of what sociologists 
want to explain) (Wrong 1997), and not the domain of sociology its explanatory merits 
notwithstanding (Blau 1997). Investment models in economics have been developed 
largely within what I would call a strict rational choice framework, and the most 
common criticisms are leveled at the unrealistic assumptions that accompany strict 
rational choice models. The strictest variants make several logical assumptions about 
preferences, such as transitivity, which experiments reveal to often be false. More 
often criticized are the motivational and cognitive assumptions, such as the 
assumptions that actors seek to maximize their material self-interest and that they 
 8
possess all of the information and cognitive capacity necessary to select the course of 
action that maximizes their material self-interest. 
 
STRUCTURAL FORCES. Both the Wisconsin Model and investment models have 
been criticized for ignoring structural factors that may operate as barriers to 
educational attainment, such as grade retention and tracking. This line of criticism 
(e.g., Kerckhoff 1976) led to research focusing on the structure of schools and the 
allocation of students to different positions within this structure. A large and growing 
body of school effects literature seeks to understand how different schools affect 
students differently (Sørensen and Morgan 2000).  
Research taking this structural perspective, as I term it, shows the 
importance of structural factors. Those in the academic track (also known as the 
college preparatory track) in high school appear to experience greater gains in 
cognitive skill than those in the general or vocational track (Gamoran and Mare 1989) 
and are much more likely to attend four-year colleges. Most of the literature suggests 
that the net effect of grade retention is harmful because it leads to higher dropout rates, 
but its role as a motivation for achievement is questionable (Hauser 2004).  
The so-called Coleman Report (1966) concluded that school resources have 
small effects on learning. Since the Coleman Report, numerous studies have 
confirmed that some factorssuch as homework, graduation requirements, and 
disciplinethat one might assume would affect learning also have little or no effect 
(Chubb and Moe 1990). Other studies have shown that some school characteristics are 
important for some outcomes. Coleman and associates found that more learning 
occurs in Catholic schools (Coleman, Hoffer, and Kilgore 1982), perhaps because 
Catholic schools have a larger percentage of students in college preparatory tracks. 
Characteristics of schools, such as their racial-ethnic mix, have been found to affect a 
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range of outcomes such as dropout rates and aspirations (Goldsmith 2004). Some 
research points to the importance of school size. Wicker (1969) found that students in 
small high schools participated more and felt they were serving important roles. 
Others argue that small school size creates an inviting atmosphere (Meier 1995; 
Morgan and Alwin 1980). 
  
UNEXPLAINED EMPIRICAL FINDINGS. Another line of criticism concerns 
empirical findings that neither the Wisconsin Model nor investment models have 
explained satisfactorily. Most troubling have been findings of minority-white 
differences in the educational attainment process. Conditional on family background 
and cognitive skill, blacks (Morgan 1996; Hout and Morgan 1975; Bennett and Xie 
2003) and Asians (Goyette and Xie 1999) college plans, enrollment, and attainment 
are higher than those of whites plans, enrollment, and attainment. Results are not as 
well documented for Hispanic-white differences, but the weight of the evidence 
suggests that Hispanics conditional plans and attainment are higher than whites plans 
and attainment as well (Kao and Tienda 1998).  
Because the Wisconsin Model specifies that aspirations and attainment are 
ultimately determined by family background and cognitive skill, it cannot account for 
the high expectations and attainment of minorities that exist conditional on these 
factors. Investment modelsat least traditional models that focus narrowly on 
pecuniary costs and benefitshave also been unable to explain minority-white 
differences. The evidence suggests that education has roughly the same returns for 
blacks, whites, and Hispanics (Barrow and Rouse 2006; Ashenfelter and Rouse 2000) 
and that blacks, whites, and Hispanics have roughly the same perceptions of the costs 
and benefits of postsecondary education (Avery and Kane 2004).  
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 Alongside enduring minority-white differences, a new group difference puzzle 
has developed. The educational expectations and attainment of females have 
historically been below those of males, but a long-term, strong, upward trend has led 
to females having higher expectations and attainment than males (National Center for 
Education Statistics 2006:159; Buchmann and DiPrete 2006).2 The secular trend in 
females expectations relative to males is unsurprising given the rise of female labor 
force participation, but the Wisconsin Model cannot explain higher expectations and 
attainment among females because males and females have essentially identical test 
scores and family resources. Investment models also poorly explain sex differences 
becausealthough there is some evidence of higher returns for females (Jacob 2002; 
DiPrete and Buchman 2006)education appears to have roughly the same return for 
males and females.  
I also argue that the Wisconsin Model and investment models provide 
unsatisfactory accounts of the effects of cognitive skill and family background on 
educational attainment. The Wisconsin Model specifies that cognitive skill affects 
grades, which affect significant others expectations, which affect students attainment 
(see Figure 1.1). However, a fairly strong relationship between cognitive skill and 
educational attainment remains net of both grades and significant others expectations. 
Human capital oriented researchers often suggest that cognitive skill increases 
schoolings returns (e.g., Frank 1985:211; Herrnstein and Murray 1994) or lowers 
schoolings psychic costs (Cunha, Heckman, and Navarro 2006; Garen 1985), but 
these claims have not been empirically demonstrated.  
Despite the centrality of family background in the Wisconsin Model, it is never 
clearly spelled out why significant others of those with advantaged family 
                                                
2 This net-female advantage is now so great that some administrators are considering affirmative 
action admission policies for male applicants (Green and Green 2004, cited in Buchmann and DePrite 
2006). 
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backgrounds have high educational expectations. Family income should be related to 
the ability to comfortably finance college (or finance it at all), but other measures of 
family background have strong relationships with educational attainment conditional 
on family income. Most notably, estimation always suggests that parents education 
has a large effect on adolescent educational attainment conditional on family finances 
and other predictors of educational attainment. It is sometimes vaguely suggested that 
well-educated parents value the cultural or symbolic benefits of college (Raftery and 
Hout 1993; Boudon 1974; Ellwood and Kane 2000), but this has not been shown. 
Returns to education do not seem to vary systematically with family background 
(Altonji and Dunn 1996), which leaves traditional investment models unable to 
explain family background effects that exist conditional on the ability to finance 
college.  
 
SUBJECTIVE RATIONALITY AND SCHOOLING DECISIONS 
I propose a synthetic framework focusing on college entry and drawing on 
what I perceive to be the strengths of the Wisconsin Model and investment models. 
My explanatory framework adopts the basic structure and explanatory agenda of the 
Wisconsin Model. In the Wisconsin Model, interpersonal variation in educational 
attainment is explained by interpersonal variation in social psychological constructs, 
namely aspirations. My approach also posits that interpersonal variation in social 
psychological constructs causes variation in educational outcomes, but in my model 
these psychological constructs are preferences and perceptions rather than aspirations. 
While drawing on the status attainment tradition, my approach could fairly be 
characterized as rational choice theory because adolescents are ultimately seen as 
making their schooling decisions in a purposive, goal-oriented manner. I pursue a 
rational choice strategy because, although other forces doubtlessly come into play, this 
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is exactly where we should expect people to think somewhat strategically: college 
entry is a major decision involving potentially large costs and benefits.  
I mentioned earlier that rational choice theory has received at times a cool 
reception in sociology. Before laying out more of the specifics of my approach it is 
useful to defend at the outset against common criticisms of rational choice 
perspectives because doing so helps position my approach in broader debates in the 
literature.  
Some criticize the unrealistic assumption of rational choice models, such as the 
assumption that actors possess complete information, act only in their self-interest, 
care only about material well-being, and so on. Rational choice theory is now 
considered more a family of theories (Hechter and Kanazawa 1997) than a single 
theory with a single set of assumptions. Several approaches, such as bounded 
rationality (Simon 1982), subjective rationality (Boudon 1989), and inclusive or 
thick modeling (Mansbridge 1990) have been offered as more realistic alternatives. 
The approach I offer is firmly within this realistic tradition.3  
Yet some sociologists object even to these more realistic models because 
rational choice has no place in sociology (e.g., Blau 1997). I concur with Goldthorpes 
(2007:166) position that such sociologists take an unduly partial view of what 
constitutes the sociological tradition because the means-ends logic of rational choice 
theory represents a major portion of the work that mainstream sociologists engage in, 
including work performed by rational choice theorys detractors (Heckathorn 1997; 
Hechter and Kanazawa 1997).  
                                                
3 I find the arguments against rational choice theory generally unpersuasive and often unreasonable, but 
I note that uncharitable critiques run in both directions. When rational choice proponents criticize 
over-socialized actor models they characterize these models in ways that I think only a small minority 
of advocates of socialization models would accept as realistic. Just as rational choice researchers 
emphasize rationality without thinking that actors are thoroughly rational, I suspect that socialization-
oriented researchers emphasize socialization without thinking that actors never make decisions. 
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Some important sociological traditions do downplay the role of subjectivity.4 
But at the same time, a major current in sociology has always been the importance of 
subjectivity, and sociology has long stressed the importance of beliefs, perceptions, 
social constructions, the definition of the situation, and related concepts on the 
supposition that subjectivity is crucial to understanding human behavior (Weber 1978; 
Thomas 1923; Mead 1934). Indeed, subjectively rational action is emphasized in 
Webers well-known types of social action framework (Weber 1978:2426) as the 
most promising route to understanding social behavior. The rational choice approach 
taken here could fairly be called an interpretive approach in the spirit of Webers 
sociology because it calls for beginning the analysis by understanding others way of 
seeing the worldor in this case their way of seeing a particular decisionand then 
determining how their perspective affects their behavior.5, 6  
I argue that rational choice research in education has concentrated too much on 
models without empirical content and that more empirical analysis is needed. 
However, my first step is to discuss in abstraction aspects of schooling decisions to 
develop a model that I believe captures much of adolescents thinking when making 
these decisions. I build this model using utility functions. This is not strictly necessary, 
but utility functions provide a useful framework for the unambiguous communication 
of ideas. I begin with a traditional investment framework representative of the most 
                                                
4 For example, the Marxian tradition downplays consciously held beliefs on the assumption they are 
epiphenomena that do not themselves motivate or explain behavior. Important pieces of Durkheims 
work also argue against appeals to the thought processes of individuals. Most famously, Durkeim warns 
that Every time that a social phenomenon is directly explained by a psychological phenomenon, we 
may be sure that the explanation is false (Durkheim 1966:104). He does not mean to exclude 
psychology and he did some backtracking in subsequent editions of the Rules of the Sociological 
Method. Nonetheless, Durkheim certainly downplayed individuals subjectivity as a cause of behavior. 
5 My perspective is also in the spirit of Webers types of social action schema in thatwhile I focus 
narrowly on rational action for the research at handI do not believe that all social action is rational. I 
believe that social action can sometimes be more fairly characterized as nonrational and oftentimes be 
more realistically characterized as a blend of the various ideal types of social action that Weber 
describes. The approach I offer is a one-sided exaggeration that focuses on a certain group of factors. 
6 In this spirit, Kiser and Hechter (1998:798) have referred to a variant of rational choice theory as 
analytical Weberianism.   
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basic investment models to provide a clear and explicit system through which I 
introduce changes. I do so by relaxing and changing the assumptions to arrive at the 
flexible model I take as my empirical point of departure. The model is not 
parsimonious by most standards, and much of the framework has already been 
outlined by others (Morgan 2005; Breen and Goldthorpe 1997; Xie and Goyette 2003), 
it must be granted. What is valuable is that the model outlines an empirically testable 
agenda.  
 
BASIC INVESTMENT MODEL. Taking only four-year colleges into 
consideration, in a basic investment framework students should enroll in college if:  
 
( ) ( )HSHSBABA CBCB −>−  
 
Where BBA are the benefits of a bachelors degree, CBA are the costs of a bachelors 
degree, BHS are the benefits of a high school diploma, CHS are the costs of a high 
school diploma, and all costs and benefits are pecuniary in nature. 
  
UTILITY FUNCTIONS. Many models equate earnings with utility; doubling 
earnings doubles utility, tripling earnings triples utility, and so on. In all probability, 
however, earnings has diminishing utility; doubling earnings, for example, will 
increase utility but it will less than double it. This point is important in understanding 
choice under conditions of uncertainty where people are often found to be risk-averse 
(von Neumann and Morgenstern 1944). Regardless of the exact function, the notion 
here is that utility is a function of earnings and not necessarily a linear function. 
Now the costs and benefits are the arguments of utility functions, and the 
decision rule is enroll if: 
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)()( HSHSBABA CBUCBU −>−  
 
Or equivalently: 
 
)()()()( HSHSBABA CUBUCUBU −>−  
 
INVESTMENT WITH UNCERTAINTY. Comay, Melnik, and Pollatschek (1973) 
were the first to systematically treat postsecondary education decisions as choice 
under conditions of uncertainty and incorporate the probability of completing an 
educational stage into the decision of whether or not to commence that stage. An 
adolescent may not know, for example, if their current work habits are sufficient for 
graduation or if they can substantially improve them if they are not. This is important 
in the decision to pursue a postsecondary degree because labor market outcomes are 
contingent on the acquisition of educational credentials (Kane and Rouse 1995; Faia 
1981), and most adolescents probably know this. Consequently, the decision of 
whether or not to enter college depends on the probability of graduation. Following 
convention, the probability of graduation is denoted π. Now the decision rule is enroll 
if: 
 
( ) ( ) ( ))()()()()1()()( HSHSSCSCBABA CUBUCUBUCUBU −>−−+− ππ  
 
Where the subscript SC stands for Some College and indicates that the 
adolescent entered college but did not graduate. The meaning of Some college can 
range from withdrawing immediately after enrollment to withdrawing immediately 
before graduation, but for my purposes these differences are unimportant. 
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NONPECUNIARY COSTS AND BENEFITS. We know surprisingly little about what 
motivates investments in postsecondary education. Despite the decades old tradition of 
treating education as an investment made to improve earnings, there is little direct 
evidence that earnings in particular motivate noncompulsory schooling. The basic 
argument, generally unstated, is simply: everybody wants high earnings; schooling 
appears to increase earnings; therefore, people go to school to increase their earnings.  
The only real supporting evidence is that trends in returns are followed by 
trends in college enrollment (Ehrenberg and Smith 2000:301302) and educational 
expectations (Morgan 1998). It is worthwhile to examine these trends because those 
who have offered them as evidence have ignored alternative nonpecuniary 
explanations. Figure 1.2A presents trends in the proportion of 18 to 24 year olds 
enrolled in college for the years 1968 to 1999 and trends in the college earnings 
premium, which is the ratio of the earnings of those with bachelors degrees and the 
earnings of those with high school diplomas. The college premium declined in the 
early 1970s and has increased steadily beginning around 1980. Enrollment in college 
appears to have tracked this trend, especially from 1980 onwards. However, female 
enrollment in college has been increasing steadily for decades, likely as a result of 
changing gender role attitudes and changes in the role females play in the labor 
market. Figure 1.2B shows that among females trends in college earnings premiums 
and college enrollment do not track one another well and that female college 
enrollment was increasing through the period of declining college premiums from 
1975 to 1980. Figure 1.2C shows the trends for males, which do seem to follow one 
another somewhat closely. 
Just as a college premium can be generated for earnings, college premiums can 
also be generated for nonpecuniary labor-market outcomes. Ratios of some 
nonpecuniary outcomes are problematic because they have no clearly defined zero 
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point, but the difficulties can be ignored to generate some simple trends.7 Figure 1.3 
shows the percentage of 18 to 24 year old males enrolled in college and college 
premiums for six nonpecuniary labor-market outcomes measured using characteristics 
of the occupations respondents report. Occupational characteristics are taken from 
O*NET98. The O*NET98 data and variables will be described in greater detail in 
Chapter 4, but self-explanatory variable names should be sufficient for now. Just as 
Figure 1.2C showed that the college earnings premium could have caused the increase 
in male college enrollment, especially beginning around 1980, Figure 1.3 shows that 
college premiums in nonpecuniary outcomes could also have caused the increase. 
Specifically, Figure 1.3 shows that college premiums in job security, occupational 
status, work that satisfies Investigative interests (such as abstract problem solving), 
and work that involves decision-making and ability utilization (the use of ones skills) 
have all followed roughly the same trends as college enrollment.  
Figure 1.3 also shows that the college premium increased for deductive 
reasoning requirements as well. Deductive reasoning requirements are not normally 
thought of as desirable nonpecuniary benefits, but they probably are sought after by 
many people. The trend in deductive reasoning requirements illustrates the more 
general trend that anything strongly related to cognitive skill (such as Investigative 
interests, occupational prestige, and so on) shows the same basic trend as college 
enrollment. (This is not true for females, but other factors were probably driving 
female trends in enrollment.) 
It is unclear whether the trends in Figures 1.2 and 1.3 should be interpreted as 
evidence of pecuniary motives or nonpecuniary motives, but the broader evidence that 
nonpecuniary job characteristics are important is unequivocal. Studies find that job 
                                                
7 A less problematic approach would be to estimate changes in the effect of education as changes in the 
differences in nonpecuniary outcomes between those with bachelors degrees and high school diplomas. 
Results based on differences yield nearly identical results. 
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satisfaction is only weakly affected by earnings (Gruenberg 1980). Research on 
compensating differentials shows that workers will forgo higher earnings for more 
pleasant and safer jobs. Jencks, Perman, and Rainwater (1988) developed an Index of 
Job Desirability using the rankings people gave of their own jobs in conjunction with 
their descriptions of their own jobs. While they found that earnings were the single 
strongest determinant of a jobs desirability, other factors (such as autonomy, full-time 
employment, vacation time, on-the-job training, job security, variety, cleanliness, and 
unionization) were collectively twice as important as earnings. People care about 
having an interesting job, a safe job, a respectable job, and so on (Jencks, Perman, and 
Rainwater 1988; Johnson and Elder 2002), and it is reasonable to think that 
adolescents go to school to obtain these outcomes. Permitting nonpecuniary costs and 
benefits, the decision rule is enroll if: 
 
( ) ( ) ( ))()()()()1()()( jHSjHSjSCjSCjBAjBA CUBUCUBUCUBU •••••• −>−−+− ππ  
 
Now costs and benefits are indexed by j, which indicates that multiple types of costs 
and benefitspecuniary and nonpecuniaryare permitted. 
 
HETEROGENEOUS UTILITY FUNCTIONS. Thus far preferences have been 
assumed to be homogeneous across adolescents, which is not uncommon in rational 
choice models. This is one point at which investment models and the Wisconsin 
Model have diverged sharply. In the Wisconsin Model adolescents have different 
goals. Some adolescents want to go to college and others do not; some adolescents 
want to be plumbers and others want to be engineers. These differences in aspirations 
and expectations drive differences in attainment. In contrast, many investment models 
assume that all adolescents possess identical preferences or permit preferences to vary 
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interpersonally but infer them after-the-fact from behavior (e.g., random utility 
models) rather than measuring them before analysis for their predictive value. 
Utility functions need not be the same for everyone. Surely most people want 
high earnings, but the subjective value of earnings just as surely varies from person to 
person. If education is believed to increase earnings, then a preference for earnings 
could increase the utility of schooling. The literature on job values, which is reviewed 
in Chapter 4, supports the notion that interpersonal differences in the conversion of 
earnings into utility are both considerable and directly measurable. These differences 
in preferences also appear to have consequences; for example, Long (1995) shows that 
self-reports of the importance of financial success predict annual income conditional 
on a range of covariates.  
Of course adolescents also vary in their preferences for nonpecuniary 
outcomes and these too may affect postsecondary schooling decisions. Now the 
decision rule is enroll if: 
 
( ) ( ) ( ))()()()()1()()( jHSijHSijSCijSCijBAijBAi CUBUCUBUCUBU •••••• −>−−+− ππ  
 
Where the subscript i has been added to indicate that preferences are allowed to vary 
interpersonally across adolescents. 
Permitting heterogeneous utility functions deserves special attention because 
many rational choice proponents strongly object to it. Surprising though it may seem, 
there are those who have argued that utility functions are essentially invariant 
interpersonally (Becker and Stigler 1977; Becker 1976; Freidman 1953). Most rational 
choice proponents do concede that preferences vary interpersonally, but they caution 
against making models more realistic by permitting preferences to vary because the 
cure is worse than the disease. Allowing interpersonal variations in preferences, it is 
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Figure 1.2. Trends in College Enrollment among 1824 Year-Olds and the College 
Earnings Premium. CPS 19681999.  
Notes. Enrollment data are from the October CPS. Earnings data are from the March CPS. Trends are 
three-year moving averages.  
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Figure 1.3. Trends in Male College Enrollment and Trends in Possible Incentives for 
College Enrollment. March CPS 19711999. 
Notes. Enrollment data are from the October CPS. Earning data are from the March CPS. Trends are 
three-year moving averages. See text (the section titled Data) for details on the occupational 
characteristics. 
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argued, destroys the predictive value of rational choice models. For example, if 
someone decided not to go to college and I simply asserted They must not like 
school then critics would object that preferences can explain everything, therefore 
they explain nothing. I think this is not a criticism of preferences at all. It is a 
criticism of post-hoc explanations based upon no data. It should be just as 
objectionable if I claimed without evidence that Their net pecuniary gain must be 
low. The problem is dealt with by measuring preferences not by precluding the use of 
preferences because they seem common in post-hoc explanations.8  
A second criticism is that troubling measurement issues cast doubt on the 
validity of self-reported preferences (Hechter 1992; Fischhoff 1991). Therefore, even 
when preferences are measured, it is argued, they often should not be used by 
researchers. Measuring preferences is difficult, but so is measuring any concept with 
self-reports. If we excluded all variables with considerable measurement error we 
would have to exclude a great many variables indeed. Included among them, I would 
imagine, would be many of the variables used with rational choice models that assume 
homogeneous utility functions. If preferences are measured as poorly as many suggest 
then they should have no predictive power, but this has not been shown. The value of 
measured preferences should be examined rather than dismissed before empirical 
inquiry.  
I argue that self-reported preferences are valuable, but I concede that 
unconscious mechanisms sometimes shape self-reported preferences in such a way 
that they appear to have explanatory power when they in fact do not. Consider the case 
of interpersonal differences in preferences for different occupations. Someone who 
                                                
8 Based on my own reading of the literature I would add that the explanations based on unmeasured 
preferences that some criticize so harshly are rare, and explanations invoking interpersonal differences 
in preferences are typically made on the basis of some evidence or are merely presented as possibilities. 
Appeals to unmeasured costs are probably just as common. 
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initially wanted to become a physician may realize that they lack the ability or 
motivation to complete the training required to meet this goal. They may subsequently 
disparage the goal and argue that becoming a physician is actually an undesirable 
outcome that they do not want for themselves. This is the theory of adaptive 
preference formation of Rokeach (1973) or the sour grapes mechanism discussed by 
Elster (1983) in which values change to preserve a positive self-concept. I take this 
mechanism seriously and attempt to address it where I can. I generally cannot address 
it in a completely satisfactory manner, but I do discuss the direction of bias that would 
be expected if the sour grapes mechanism was operating. 
Critics of heterogeneous preferences explanations also claim that the cure is 
worse than the disease because the disease is not as bad as it seems. Hechter (1994) 
distinguishes between immanent values and instrumental values. Immanent values 
are commodities that rational actors derive utility from. Instrumental values are the 
commodities that rational actors use to produce immanent values. Hechter argues that 
it is reasonable to assume that instrumental values (e.g., money) are important to 
everyone because they can be used in the pursuit of immanent values, including 
altruism. Conversely, the importance of many immanent values should be randomly 
distributed. Therefore, while they may be essential to understanding an individuals 
behavior, they will be unimportant in understanding the behavior of aggregates 
because they will tend to cancel out leaving group behavior explained strictly with 
instrumental values. This is the defense of the so-called typical values assumption: 
only those values that are typical in the population will predict the behavior of 
aggregates.  
The argument that almost all people value money seems quite sensible to me, 
and it may be productive to make this assumption in many situations. I argue that 
college entry decisions are not one of those situations. I seek to understand why some 
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individuals enter college and others do not, and I need interpersonal variation in 
something to explain interpersonal variation in college entry. For reasons of their own, 
economists have traditionally focused on interpersonal variation in budget constraints 
and pecuniary costs and benefits, but these seem unable to explain a considerable 
portion of interpersonal differences in schooling decisions. We know that immanent 
values differboth in kind and in intensityand there is every possibility that these 
differences affect schooling decisions. Perhaps interpersonal variation in preferences 
can be ignored when trying to predict the effect of tuition changes on enrollment but 
not when trying to understand why some adolescents enter college and others do not.  
 
PERCEPTIONS ARE PERMITTED. As discussed, traditional rational choice 
models typically assume complete information, but this assumption is dropped with 
increasing regularity in the literature (e.g., Morgan 2005; Rouse 2004; Dominitz and 
Manski 1996; Avery and Kane 2004; Wilson, Wolfe, and Haveman 2005). It is 
dropped here, and decisions are assumed to be based on perceptions (or equivalently 
on beliefs). For example, I look at students perceptions of their ability to complete 
college rather than at more objective measures, such as grades, test scores, and so on. 
No notation is introduced to designate that perceptions are permitted, and it is to be 
understood that all costs and benefits are perceived.  
In the college context much cannot be known with certainty because it is in the 
future. There is no way for an adolescent to determine, for example, what the returns 
to education will be over the course of their career, what their actual probability of 
future college completion is, and so on. Strictly speaking the distinction made here is 
not between perceptions and facts but between rational forecasts and irrational 
forecasts. Rational forecasts are reasoned predictions of future outcomes based on 
available evidence about the past and present. Irrational forecasts ignore available 
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evidence or use it unwisely. Irrational forecasts are permitted here, and they are an 
important part of the empirical analyses. 
 
SATISFICING BEHAVIOR. Sometimes the effect that perceptions have on college 
entry is straightforward. For example, higher perceived ability to complete college 
should increase the probability of college entry and higher perceived psychic costs 
should lower the probability of college entry. It seems almost universally to have been 
assumed that perceptions of the effect of education on labor-market outcomes are 
another straightforward case, and that adolescents who believe that postsecondary 
schoolings effects are high should be more likely to pursue postsecondary education 
because they are more apt to conclude that its benefits outweigh its costs (Becker 
1993; Gambetta 1987; Morgan 2005).  
This conclusion is based on the assumption that adolescents are maximizers or 
that they act like maximizers (such as would be the case if nonmaximizers imitated 
maximizers). Herbert Simon (1957) suggests that across a range of contexts actors are 
satisficers rather than maximizers, by which he meant that they set goals and devise 
and pursue strategies to meet them. Satisficers are satisfied if their goals are met even 
if maximization has not been achieved or if it is not known if maximization has been 
achieved.  
I propose that satisficing models apply to schooling decisions. Adolescents 
form labor-market goals based on their preferences and then make postsecondary 
schooling decisions with the objective of meeting these goals. I propose that, in 
Simons (1955) language, adolescents have mental mapping functions that relate 
educational attainment to occupational attainment. For example, an adolescent may 
perceive the mapping function presented in Table 1.1, which shows an adolescent who 
believes that with a high school diploma they can become a hospital orderly, with a 
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bachelors degree they can become a registered nurse working in a hospital, and so on. 
Table 1.1 uses occupations, but it is possible to also think of adolescents beliefs about 
more general occupational characteristicssuch as earnings, authority, prestige, and 
so onobtainable at different education levels. The approach taken here assumes that 
adolescents select an occupational goal and subsequently select educational attainment 
levels that will allow them to reach their occupational goals. 
 
Table 1.1. Hypothetical Mapping Function Relating Educational Attainment to the 
Occupation it will Result In. 
Educational Attainment  Occupational Attainment 
High school dropout  → Hospital custodian 
High school graduate → Hospital orderly 
Some college → Practical Nurse 
Bachelors degree → Registered Nurse in a hospital 
Masters degree → Head Nurse at a hospital 
PhD → Medical Researcher 
Professional degree → Physician 
 
While this way of modeling decisions seems sensible and realistic to many 
people, critics would object that it is not sensible to select an occupational goal 
without consideration of the schooling costs it entails. They would argue instead that 
educational and occupational goals develop simultaneously and that occupational 
goals are influenced by the type and amount of education an adolescent is willing to 
obtain. For example, an adolescent may ideally want to become a physician but may 
decide to set a different goal when they realize how much education is required for 
this occupation. 
Furthermore, critics could object that the introduction of a satisficing model 
jeopardizes the logical coherence of my entire undertaking. The model is initially 
developed within a utility maximization framework, but then a satisficing decision 
rule is added. This is not an issue of doctrinal purity alone because it could be argued 
that if adolescents really are satisficers then the psychic costs of schooling should be 
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irrelevant to schooling decisions because occupational expectations must be met at all 
costs. As I have framed the decision, if an adolescent has decided that they want to 
become a registered nurse then nothing will stop them, including very high psychic 
costs of schooling and very low probabilities of college completion. This argument 
correctly accuses me of accusing adolescents of a degree of logical inconsistency. 
However, the empirical results presented in Chapter 2 through 5 support a model that 
blends utility maximizing and satisficing because they show that the perceived ability 
to complete college does increase the probability of entering college, the psychic costs 
of schooling do lower the expectation that college will be entered, and higher 
perceived education requirements do increase the probability of college entry. 
 
SOURCES OF PREFERENCES AND PERCEPTIONS. The proximate causes of 
college entry are my primary interest, but I also engage in analyses that attempt to 
locate the sources of college-encouraging preferences and perceptions. These analyses 
focus on family background, cognitive skill, gender, and race and ethnicity. I also 
address the role of the structure of schools and the placement of adolescents in 
different schools. 
 
ESTIMATING CAUSAL EFFECTS 
 Much of the empirical analysis in subsequent chapters involves estimating 
causal effects, such as the effect of the perceived ability to complete college on college 
entry, and matching estimators are used to estimate many of the effects. The logic and 
virtues of matching estimators are best expressed in the language and concepts of the 
counterfactual model of causality. I do not present a complete overview of the 
counterfactual model, which can be found elsewhere (Morgan and Winship 2007). 
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Instead, the presentation is stylized to convey my own understanding of the logic and 
value of matching estimators. 
Consider estimating the causal effect of a binary variable D on an outcome 
variable Y. Individuals are either exposed to the causal variable (D=1) or are not 
exposed to it (D=0). Adopting the language of experiments, in the counterfactual 
model respondents who are exposed to the causal variable are said to be exposed to the 
treatment and belong to the treatment group; those not exposed to the causal 
variable are said to be in the control group and are called the controls.  
Suppose that the data on the relationship between D and Y were generated in 
an experiment using random treatment assignment. The average treatment effect of D 
on Y, which is denoted δ, could be estimated as the difference between the expected 
values of the outcome of the treatment and control groups: 
 
]0|[]1|[ =−== DYEDYEδ  
 
Suppose now that the data are from an observational study in which data has 
been generated by something other than a randomized experiment, such as a survey. 
One obvious way to estimate the average treatment effect is with the same estimator 
used in experimental studies. When used with observational studies this estimator is 
often called the naïve estimator:  
 
]0|[]1|[ =−== DYEDYENAIVEδ  
 
In observational studies the naïve estimator is subject to two potential sources 
of bias. First, naïve estimators ignore possible initial differences between the treatment 
and control groups on pretreatment variables that may affect the outcome. Morgan 
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and Winship (2007) refer to the bias that these initial differences cause as baseline 
bias. Second, naïve estimators ignore the possibility that D affects members of the 
treatment group differently than it affects members of the control group. Morgan and 
Winship (2007:46) call this differential treatment effect bias. If the treatment and 
control groups differed on neither baseline values nor on the effect of the treatment we 
would be unconcerned with these biases, and we could use the naïve estimator to 
produce unbiased estimates of the average treatment effect of the treatment D. 
To avoid these two sources of bias, ideally we would observe the expected 
value of the outcome Y of the treatment group under the control state; in other words, 
we would like to know what the outcomes of the treatment group would have been if it 
had not received the treatment. This is a counterfactual or potential outcome that we 
cannot observe and does not actually exist. In the counterfactual model it is useful to 
conceive of such an average counterfactual outcome, which is denoted as: 
 
]1|[ 0 =DYE  
 
Where the superscript 0 on the outcome Y indicates the control state. If we 
had this value, we could then estimate the average treatment effect for the treated:  
 
]1|[]1|[ 01 =−== DYEDYEATTδ  
 
Where the superscript 1 on Y indicates the treatment state. The subscript 
ATT on the treatment effect signifies that we are estimating the average treatment 
effect for the treated, which is commonly abbreviated as ATT. This notation is 
necessary because differential treatment effects permit the possibility that the 
treatment effect for the treated differs from the treatment effect for the controls and 
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necessitates that researchers specify which causal effect they seek to estimate.9 I focus 
on the ATT in this overview because it facilitates the introduction of key concepts and 
terminology.  
According to two of its proponents in sociology the counterfactual model is 
valuable precisely because it helps researchers to stipulate assumptions, evaluate 
alternative data analysis techniques, and think carefully about the process of causal 
exposure (Morgan and Winship 2007:7). From my perspective the counterfactual 
model is valuable because it makes researchers think carefully about who should be 
compared to whom to estimate a particular causal effect. I cannot compare the treated 
under the treatment state to the treated under the control state because the latter data 
do not exist. I thus seek a control group that I believe is a good stand-in for the 
treatment group in the control state. Specifically, I want a control group with the same 
expected value of the outcome that the treatment group would have in the control 
state. The principle aim of matching algorithms is the construction of control groups 
against which the treatment group can reasonably be compared to estimate the causal 
effect of D on Y. 
When matching to estimate the ATT, observations in the control group are 
matched to observations in the treatment group on pretreatment variables believed to 
be important both in selection into the treatment and in determining the outcome. For 
each member of the treatment group, we search the control group for a person who has 
the same values for all of the pretreatment variables. In exact matching, cases that 
have no match are excluded from the analysis. More commonly some sort of a 
nearest neighbor algorithm, such as Mahalanobis matching or calipers (Althuauser 
                                                
9 As later chapters discuss, it is often difficult to decide which causal effect should be estimated. 
Nonetheless, it is better to realize that a multiplicity of causal effects exists and to sometimes make a 
questionable decision which effect to estimate than to always estimate a causal effect with no concrete 
meaning as has long been the common practice when modeling the outcome with regression. 
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and Rubin 1971) can be used to allow imperfect matches but ensure that matches are 
close. However, when the number of variables on which the match is to be made 
increases, satisfactory matches can become unlikely even when imperfect matches are 
allowed. The result is that many observations in the treatment group must be excluded 
from the analyses.  
In their seminal article, Rosenbaum and Rubin (1983) proposed that matches 
could be made on a scalar summary of the covariatesthe propensity scoreinstead 
of on the matching variables themselves. Again, imperfect matches are typically 
allowed. True propensity scores are unavailable in observational studies, but they can 
be estimated based on observed variables and an appropriate model of the treatment 
selection process, such as a logit or probit model, that predicts selection into the 
treatment group with the pretreatment variables.  
Rather than trying to match each person in the treatment group to a particularly 
similar person from the control group, in propensity score matching the goal is to 
balance the samples on the pretreatment variables. Samples are said to be balanced 
when they have the same distributions of pretreatment variables. This is different than 
finding a perfect or near-perfect match for each member of the treatment group. Pairs 
of observations matched on propensity scores may not be particularly similar on the 
pretreatment variables because the same propensity score can arise from different 
combinations of values for the pretreatment variables. Indeed, the reason we use 
propensity scores is that we often cannot match individuals on the covariates. Thus, 
propensity score matching is much like randomization in experiments where the goal 
is to have similar control and treatment groups, not to have pairs of identical people 
split into treatment and control groups. 
Balancing addresses baseline bias by ensuring that the treatment group is 
compared to a control group with the same baseline values on important pretreatment 
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variables. What about differential treatment effect bias? The balancing process is 
believed to deal with differential treatment effect bias as well because causal effect 
size is likely related to pretreatment variables. For example, the effect that education 
has on earnings may be related to cognitive skill, so Cunha, Heckman, and Navarro 
(2006) estimated the effect of education on earnings separately for those who 
completed college and those who did not because these two groups have somewhat 
different distributions of cognitive skill.  
Many matching algorithms exist (see Morgan and Winship 2007:107109). 
Morgan and Harding (2006) show that these various matching estimators can be 
thought of and generalized as weighting estimators, in which the matching algorithm 
generates a set of weights for the control group that makes the control group similar to 
the treatment group on the pretreatment variables. For example, in exact or nearest 
neighbor matching without replacement, observations from the control group that are 
matched to observations in the treatment group are given a weight of one; observations 
that are not matched to cases in the treatment group are given a weight of zero. In 
exact or nearest neighbor matching with replacement, observations from the control 
group are given weights according to how many times they are matched to 
observations in the treatment group.  
I favor presentation and discussion using the logic of weighting because I think 
in terms of weighting, and working within a weighting framework facilitates 
introduction of an innovation I introduce to improve balance. In what follows, I 
present the weighting estimator I use in much of the empirical analyses in subsequent 
chapters as a series of steps in the context of a particular analysis. As an example, I 
look at the so-called net-black advantage in college entry (i.e., the finding that 
blacks have higher college entry rates than whites net of cognitive skill and family 
background) using data from High School and Beyond, which is described in greater 
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detail in Chapter 2. I begin by attempting to answer the counterfactual question What 
would the black-white difference in college entry be if the cognitive skill, parental 
education, and family background of whites were similar to those of blacks? Thus the 
treatment is being black, whites are the controls, and I seek to generate weights for 
whites that will result in whites having the same distribution of cognitive skill, 
parental education, and family income as blacks. Thinking of being black as a 
treatment that a person may or may not have been exposed to may seem unusual, but it 
is not unusual in the context of the counterfactual model (e.g., Morgan and McKerrow 
2004), which sees all efforts to estimate causal effects as efforts to conceive of and 
estimate potential outcomes. Note that this is merely a demonstration of the procedure 
and that I pay little attention to the substantive issues involved. 
 
Step one: Estimate the probability of selection into the treatment group. It is first 
necessary to model the treatment selection mechanism, which I do with a logistic 
regression model. Based on the results of a model that regresses black on cognitive 
skill, family income, and parental education I estimate the probability of selection into 
the treatment group (B=1) conditional on cognitive skill (Cog), parental education 
(Epar), and family income (Inc):10 
 
),,|1Pr( IncEparCogB =  
 
                                                
10 This is effective for balancing on means. To balance on higher moments of the distributions of the 
pretreatment variables quadratics and higher order functions of the pretreatment variables should be 
included in the model. Interaction terms can be included to balance also on the covariance structure of 
the treatment group. For example, if you want the correlation between cognitive skill and parental 
education for whites to be the same as it is for blacks, then a cognitive skill-by-parental education 
interaction term should be included in the model. I have typically found the inclusion of these higher 
order and interaction terms unnecessary for the analyses performed in this example or the other analyses 
performed in subsequent chapters. I therefore exclude interaction terms and higher-order terms.   
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The objective is to produce a set of weights that balance the control group to 
the treatment group. As will be shown, I generate several sets of these weights. It is 
useful to introduce notation to indicate which weights I use in particular steps. To 
begin, the HS&B data supplies sampling weights, which I have named wgt. To denote 
that I am using the variable wgt as a sampling weight I write:  
 
wgtIncEparCogB ),,|1Pr( =  
 
It is not essential that the data initially be weighted. If the data are unweighted 
then the variable wgt is simply a column of ones. 
 
Step two: Generate balancing weights. For each respondent i in the control group 
(whites), generate an adjustment factor, f1, which is the odds of that respondent 
being in the treatment group (i.e., being black): 
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These adjustment factors are then multiplied by the sampling weights wgt to 
generate a new set of weights, wgt1, that are intended to achieve balance across 
treatment and control groups: 
 
11 fwgtwgt ⋅=  
 
These new sampling weights are then used as sampling weights for whites. 
(The original sampling weights are used for blacks.) Because they are intended to 
achieve balance I refer to them as balancing weights. 
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Step three: Check for balance. When the balancing weights are used as sampling 
weights for whites, the distributions of pretreatment variables for whites will be very 
similar to the corresponding distributions for blacks. However, steps one and two do 
not ensure that the samples are perfectly balanced on the matching variables, and it is 
advisable to examine the balance for each matching variable. There is no consensus on 
how balance should be assessed or on what level of balance is acceptable for a given 
method of assessment. A simple and common measure of balance is the standardized 
bias, which measures how much the samples differ on the pretreatment variables in 
standard deviations of the variable in question. For each pretreatment variable X the 
standardized bias SB is calculated as: 
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Column 1 of Table 1.2 presents standardized bias values for the three 
pretreatment variables before steps one and two have been performed. The results 
show large differences between blacks and whites on all three measures. Column 2 
shows standardized biases after steps one and two have been performed (i.e., the 
balancing weights are used in Column 2). The results show that the mean values for 
the matching variables for whites weighted to resemble blacks are similar to the mean 
values for blacks. Balance is poorest for family income, but even here blacks and 
whites are only about .06 standard deviations apart. 
 
Step four: Iterate through steps one and two to improve balance. If the standardized 
biases that remain are of this magnitude analysis typically proceeds on the assumption  
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Table 1.2. Standardized Bias Values for Black-white differences in Pretreatment 
Variables. HS&B 1980. 
 (1) 
Before 
balancing 
(2) 
1st  
Iteration 
(3) 
2nd 
Iteration 
(4) 
3rd  
Iteration 
(5) 
4th  
Iteration 
Family income .732 .059 .015 .004 .001 
Parental Education .468 .028 .006 .001 .000 
Cognitive skill 1.235 .016 .005 .001 .000 
 
that they are low enough. Suppose here that we find these remaining standardized 
biases unacceptably large. To attempt to improve balance, the standard approach is to 
respecify the treatment selection model in the hopes that the weights that the new 
model produces will improve balance. In other words, the strategy is to discard the 
original treatment selection model in the hopes that a new one will do better.11 These 
new models often add higher-order terms of the pretreatment variables or other 
transformations. For example, one might introduce the logarithm of family income 
and/or family income squared to the model presented in step one.  
I propose an innovation I believe to be superior to abandoning the initial 
treatment selection model. After the balancing weights are generated and used, the 
situation is that we have an unbalanced set of samples and we want to improve the 
balance. This is essentially the same scenario we started with before we generated the 
balancing weights. The difference is that before steps one and two the samples were 
badly unbalanced, but now they are only slightly unbalanced. To further improve 
balance, it thus seems logical to simply iterate through steps one and two each time 
using the newly created balancing weights when estimating probabilities in step one.  
For example, if I am unsatisfied with the standardized biases in Column 2 of 
Table 1.2, I re-estimate the same treatment selection model but I use the balancing 
weight I created (wgt1) rather than the original sampling weight: 
                                                
11 Another strategy is to use the balancing weights in conjunction with regression analysis. For example, 
a regression model predicting the outcome is estimated using the balancing weights and including the 
pretreatment variables as regressors. 
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1),,|1Pr( wgtIncEparCogB =  
 
Following through the steps, I create a new set of adjustment factors f2 and a 
new set of balancing weights wgt2: 
 
212 fwgtwgt ⋅=  
 
Now wgt2 is used as a sampling weight to balance the control group to the 
treatment group. Column 3 shows that the new balancing weight reduces standardized 
biases even further. It is possible to iterate through steps one and two again and again 
to continue to improve balance. Columns 4 and 5 of Table 1.2 show the standardized 
biases that remain after a third and fourth iteration. The results show that the 
standardized bias is nearly zero after four iterations, although this cannot be 
generalized to all scenarios. In the analyses I perform in subsequent chapters I always 
perform 10 iterations, which I have found to be more than sufficient to attain 
essentially perfect balance.  
 
Step five: Compare treated and weighted controls on outcomes. Estimates are based 
on these balanced samples. Table 1.3 presents estimates using the balancing weights 
generated in the 10th iteration. First, however, Column 1 of Table 1.3 considers 
unadjusted college entry rates for whites and blacks. Column 1 shows that by the 1986 
interview about 58 percent of blacks have entered college and that about 65 percent of 
whites have entered college. The naïve estimate, which is about .06, is reported 
below the entry rates in Column 1. This is simply the black college entry rate minus 
the white college entry rate. Column 2 presents results using the balancing weights to 
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make the sample of whites resemble the sample of blacks. The first entry for blacks is 
the same as the entry for blacks in Column 1. This illustrates the point that nothing has 
been done to the black sample. However, the entry rate for whites is reduced to 39 
percent, so now blacks are almost 19 percent more likely than whites to enter college. 
This is the so-called net-black advantage in college entry. I have estimated the effect 
for the counterfactual condition in which whites have the same distribution of 
cognitive skill, family income, and parental education as blacks. However, I could just 
as easily have matched blacks to whites or have specified some other set of 
distributions and matched both blacks and whites to them. Indeed, I focus on average 
treatment effects, which are explained in Chapter 2 when they are first used, in my 
empirical analyses. 
 
Table 1.3. The Proportion of Whites and Blacks Entering College. HS&B 1980.  
 (1) Unadjusted 
results 
(2) Matching 
results 
 ENTRY RATES 
 Unadjusted  Matching 
(1) Blacks 
 
.580 
(.011) 
.580 
(.011) 
(2) Whites 
 
.646 
(.008) 
.392 
(.008) 
   
 EFFECTS 
 Naïve estimate 
 
δNAIVE 
Matching 
estimate 
δATT 
(2)  (1) .066 
(.019) 
.188 
(.013) 
Notes. N=5,900. Bootstrap standard errors in parentheses. 
 
Estimates will be biased if variables related to both selection into the treatment 
group and the outcome are excluded from the pretreatment variables to be balanced 
(unless other pretreatment variables happen to completely capture their effects). Often 
this type of bias is referred to as omitted variable bias in regression, but slightly 
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different terms are used in the counterfactual model and with matching estimators. If a 
researcher believes that all of the systematic determinants of selection that are related 
to the outcome have been balanced they claim that treatment selection is ignorable 
or that selection is on the observables. If they do not believe this they claim that 
treatment selection is nonignorable or that selection is on the unobservables.  
I believe that selection is on the unobservables; specifically, I believe that 
selection is also on college-encouraging preferences and perceptions. My efforts to 
explain the net-black advantage (Chapter 6) consist of adding measures of college-
encouraging preferences and perceptions to the group of pretreatment variables to be 
balanced. 
 
Step six: Variance estimation. There is little agreement on how best to estimate the 
variability of matching estimators (Morgan and Winship 2007:118121), and I offer 
no insight about how standard errors should be estimated for the weighting estimator 
outlined in steps one through five. When using matching estimation I therefore use 
bootstrapped standard errors.12 I have read claims that matching estimators are more 
efficient than regression estimators (Harding 2003), but this has not been my 
experience. When I have compared bootstrap standard errors from regression 
estimators to bootstrap standard errors from the weighting estimator I have described, 
the standard errors for the former are usually slightly lower.  
 Thus far, I have presented matching estimators as a natural solution to 
problems raised by the counterfactual model of causality. It is worthwhile also to 
compare matching estimators directly and explicitly to regression models of outcomes 
                                                
12 Specifically, using Statas bs command I generate a bootstrap sample, and then perform steps 1 
through 5 to generate an estimate of the effect or statistic of interest. I do this 1000 times and use the 
standard deviation of the 1000 estimates as the standard error of the original estimate based on the 
actual sample. 
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because to favor matching estimators we should surely want them to have advantages 
over the most widely used and understood body of approaches used in quantitative 
sociology, especially if they are less efficient. Unlike regression models of outcomes, 
matching estimators do not impose parametric restrictions, except in the process of 
attaining balance.13 Traditional regression analysis also ignores differential treatment 
effect bias. Lastly, matching estimators are more intuitive than regression estimators. I 
concede that this last point is for me the greatest attraction of matching estimators. 
Matching estimators are a formalization of the way I think about estimating causal 
effects in a way that regression modeling of outcomes has never been.14 
This is not to say that regression modeling of outcomes lacks attractive 
properties. A problem with matching methods vis-à-vis regression is that they are 
data-hungry. Indeed, the turning away from matching techniques to regression was 
caused by data sparseness, although propensity score matching has helped 
tremendously with this issue. However, there are scenarios where even propensity 
scores seem incapable of dealing with sample size issues, such as when I attempt to 
estimate the effects of individual job values on educational expectations in Chapter 4. 
Here I turn to modeling the outcome with regression. The estimation of school effects 
is another case in point because school based surveys contain only a handful of 
students within each school. To estimate school effects I use multilevel regression 
models. Unlike matching estimators, multilevel models are widely used in sociology, 
and it is thus unnecessary to review them here.  
                                                
13 Due to the flexibility of regression (e.g., entry of nonlinear transformations of regressors and 
multiplicative models) its parametric restrictions are not as limiting as many people believe. 
Nonetheless, there are often times when no such assumptions need to be made and therefore should not 
be made. 
14 The value of the intuitiveness of matching estimators need not be restricted to researchers. As 
Rosenbaum and Rubin (1985) have said: One virtue, not the least important, of matched sampling is 
that the nontechnical audiences often find that matching, when successful, is a persuasive method of 
adjusting for imbalances in observed covariates. 
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SUMMARY OF THE SUCCEEDING CHAPTERS 
The rational choice model outlined earlier represents an ambitious research 
agenda and a formidable operationalization challenge. Although I cannot be said to 
have a strictly nonpecuniary focus, I definitely do not have a narrowly pecuniary 
focus, and I ignore some of the more traditional foci like perceived tuition costs. I 
examine perceptions of the ability to complete college (Chapter 2); preferences for 
academic activities (Chapter 3); preferences relating to occupations (Chapter 4); and 
perceptions of the effects of schooling on occupational outcomes (Chapter 5).  
Before outlining the chapters it is first necessary to make a few remarks about 
the selection of the data used in the empirical analyses. I use numerous datasets, 
sometimes more than one per chapter, because the best available measures of the 
preferences and perceptions I consider are not contained in a single dataset. I have 
chosen to favor better data over newer data. For example, I use the National 
Longitudinal Survey of Young Men, 1966whose base year was some 42 years ago
to estimate a single model because it contains a combination of variables unavailable 
in any other dataset. Despite my best efforts, however, the measures I use are often far 
from ideal, and better (not only newer) data are desirable. The measures I use 
represent an improvement, however, over the conventional approaches to ignore 
interpersonal differences in preferences and perceptions or surmise that they are 
present and drive empirical results without any resort to measurement. 
Chapters 2 through 5, which each focus on a specific perception or preference, 
follow the same basic format. I first document interpersonal variation in the preference 
or perception that is the chapters focus. Some assert that there is little interpersonal 
variation in preferences and many act as though there is little interpersonal variation in 
preferences or perceptions, so this is an important first step. I then estimate the effect 
of the preference or perception on college entry. Sometimes I focus on the expectation 
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of a four-year degree because measures of college entry are unavailable. Lastly, I turn 
to estimation of the determinants of the preference or perception in question. 
Chapter 2 examines the perceived ability to complete college using a question 
in the High School & Beyond data asking students directly how certain they are that 
they have the ability to complete college. Analysis shows that most adolescents are 
certain or fairly certain that they could complete college if they chose to, but a sizable 
minority is much less confident. Beliefs about the ability to complete college have 
strong effects on college entry. Results also show that the perceived ability to 
complete college is strongly related to cognitive skill, grades, and other performance 
measures. Conditional on cognitive skill and family background the perceived ability 
to complete college is much higher among blacks, Hispanics, and Asians than among 
whites.  
Chapter 3 addresses the nonpecuniary costs of schooling, which are conceived 
as psychic costs, using the Educational Longitudinal Survey of 2002. Unfortunately, 
the data contain no information on students beliefs about the psychic costs of college. 
Only more general questions about preferences related to reading, solving problems, 
finding academic material interesting, and finding schoolwork satisfying are asked. 
Although the measures are thus somewhat unsatisfactory, they do permit estimation 
and examination of several conjectures made in the literature. Results show that 
psychic costs do reduce educational expectations, but the effect is much smaller than 
one might suspect and smaller than others have suggested. Results suggest that 
psychic costs are lower for females than for males, and that psychic costs are lower for 
blacks, Hispanics, and Asians than for whites. Unexpectedly, psychic costs are 
unrelated to family background.  
Chapter 4 addresses preferences relating to labor-market outcomes. It uses data 
from Monitoring the Future to examine self-reported job values and occupational 
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expectations and data from the National Longitudinal Survey of Youth, 1979 to 
examine occupational aspirations.  
The results provide evidence of considerable interpersonal variation in 
occupational preferences. The results also show that preferences related to 
employment have fairly strong effects on college entry. Effects appear much stronger 
when measured as occupational expectations or aspirations than when measured as 
self-reported job values. Gender appears to be the strongest determinant of 
occupational preferences. 
Chapter 5 examines adolescents perceptions of the effects of education on 
occupational outcomes and how these perceptions influence college entry. The 
NELS88 is used to examine adolescents beliefs about the schooling requirements 
necessary to obtain occupations they expect at age 30. Results show considerable 
variation in adolescents beliefs about the education they will need and that these 
beliefs have fairly strong effects on college entry. I use the National Longitudinal 
Survey of Young Men, 1966 to address the possibility of reverse causality (i.e., the 
possibility that educational decisions influence occupational expectation) and find 
evidence for only very weak effects of educational expectations on occupational 
expectations.  
The results show that among respondents with the same occupational 
expectations, respondents with higher cognitive skill and more advantaged family 
backgrounds believe that the occupation they expect requires more education. Asians 
perceive higher requirements than whites, and blacks and Hispanics perceive higher 
educational requirements than whites conditional on cognitive skill and family 
background.  
 Chapter 6 estimates the extent to which the college-encouraging preferences 
and perceptions covered in Chapters 2 through 5 can help us understand the empirical 
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puzzles discussed earlier in this Chapter. These puzzles are minority-white and male-
female differences in college entry, as well as the effects of cognitive skill and family 
background on college entry that exist net of family income.  
Chapter 7 summarizes the empirical findings and concludes with directions for 
future research. 
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CHAPTER 2. THE PERCEIVED ABILITY TO COMPLETE COLLEGE 
 
This chapter studies students perceptions of their ability to complete college 
and the effect that these perceptions have on college entry. The perceived ability to 
complete college is almost certainly an important consideration when making the 
decision to enroll. Those estimating a low probability of college completion 
conditional on college entrybecause they predict disliking the required schoolwork, 
they fear they are incapable of completing the required schoolwork, and so onare 
probably less likely to enroll than those without similar misgivings. And yet, almost 
all investment models ignore the fact that graduation is uncertain at the time of 
enrollment and that adolescents making enrollment decisions are aware of this fact.  
Perhaps many economists who study schooling decisions ignore the 
probability of graduation because they do not believe in degree effects, which are 
the effects of obtaining academic credentials that exceed the effects of formal 
schooling not resulting in academic credentials. The importance of the perceived 
ability to complete college is largely dependent on the extent to which adolescents see 
college as a gamble. If adolescents believed that one, two, and three years of a four-
year degree would have one-quarter, half, and three-quarters the effect on labor market 
outcomes as would a four-year degree, then they may be willing to enroll in college 
even if their subjective probability of completion is low. Conversely, if they believed 
that the effects of years of college completed had little effect on labor market 
outcomes if a degree is not obtained, then they would be less willing to enroll. 
Although some economists claim that degree effects are small, the best available 
evidence shows large degree effects for completion of a bachelors degree (Kane and 
Rouse 1995). More limited evidence on nonpecuniary outcomes also suggests 
substantial degree effects on occupational prestige (Faia 1980). 
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There is little direct evidence on adolescents beliefs about degree effects, 
which I argue are more important in understanding their schooling decisions. 
Dominitz and Manski (1996) and Rouse (2004) collect data that could be used to 
describe adolescents beliefs about degree effects on earnings, but the information 
supplied in their papers is insufficient to determine if adolescents believe in these 
effects. I argue in Chapter 4 that education is an investment made largely for its effects 
on nonpecuniary labor-market outcomes, so beliefs about the types of jobs one can get 
with and without a degree may be more important than beliefs about earnings. 
However, I know of no data that could be used to describe these beliefs.  
The lack of hard evidence on adolescents beliefs notwithstanding, it seems 
reasonable to proceed on the assumption that adolescents believe in degree effects. 
They appear to actually exist, and my experience suggests that most adolescents 
believe that years of schooling that do not lead to educational credentials have small 
effects on labor-market outcomes. Even if they do not believe in degree effects, doubts 
about the ability to successfully conclude plans with uncertain outcomes often 
dissuade their initiation. Even without degree effects, many adolescents would 
consider failing to obtain a degree a type of failure, which they would want to avoid if 
it seemed highly probable. Consequently, adolescents decisions of whether or not to 
enter college should depend on their beliefs about their probability of completion. If 
the perceived probability of graduation conditional on college entry is denoted π, the 
decision rule should be enroll in college if: 
 
( ) ( ) ( ))()()()()1()()( HSHSSCSCBABA CUBUCUBUCUBU −>−−+− ππ  
 
Where the subscript BA indicates graduating college with a bachelors degree 
or higher, SC (Some College) indicates enrolling in college but failing to graduate, 
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and HS indicates not having enrolled in college (i.e., High School only). Naturally, 
Some College can mean different things ranging from withdrawing immediately 
upon enrollment to withdrawing immediately before graduation, but for my purposes 
these differences are unessential. All that is essential is that adolescents see the net 
utility of failing to complete college as lower than the utility of not entering college at 
all. 
 
THE EFFECTS OF PERCEIVED ABILITY 
Sociology has long stressed the importance of beliefs, perceptions, social 
constructions, and related concepts on the supposition that subjectivity is crucial to 
understanding human behavior. Yet despite the almost certain importance of beliefs 
about the ability to complete college we have no real evidence on the quantitative 
importance of these beliefs, what determines them, how they are related to similar 
concepts like expectations, and so on. Work on the importance of self-perceptions in 
quantitative research, even in the sociology of education, gives more attention to 
broader measures of perceived ability like self-efficacy. Although research on the 
perceived ability to complete college is lacking, two bodies of research are clearly 
relevant. One examines the probability of college completion; the other examines 
adolescents academic self-concept.  
Research on the probability of graduation is sparse. Much of the available 
work could be described as unempirical and develops models and speculates on the 
ways that the perceived ability to complete college may be important (Manski 1989; 
Breen and Goldthorpe 1997; Morgan 2005). Comay, Melnik, and Pollatschek (1973) 
were the first to systematically incorporate the importance of the probability of 
completing an educational stage into the decision of whether or not to commence that 
stage. They engage in some prescriptive empirical analysis that estimates the present 
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value of entering college for several groups when graduation is uncertain, but they 
lacked any measures the ability to complete college. In an Italian context, Gambetta 
(1987:116124) argues that students look at their grades and whether or not they have 
repeated a grade at one level of schooling to judge their probability of success in 
subsequent levels. He found that both poor grades and repeating a grade were strong 
predictors of deciding against entering a subsequent level of education. However, 
Gambetta lacks a direct measure of perceived ability. This is important because the 
academic self-concept literature, which is discussed shortly, shows that performance 
and perceptions often differ and that these differences have consequences. Altonji 
(1993) uses a direct measure of students perceptions of their ability to complete 
college contained in the National Longitudinal Survey of the Class of 1972 data (the 
same measure that I use later in the High School and Beyond data). However, he 
combines it with SAT scores and high school grades to construct a composite ability 
measure. Consequently, it is not possible to discern the independent effects of 
perceived ability. 
The second line of research on academic self-concept (and related constructs 
such as academic self-efficacy, academic self-image, and perceived intelligence) does 
deal specifically with adolescents beliefs about themselves as students. For example, 
items from questionnaires measuring academic self-concept ask adolescents how 
much they agree with statements such as I am hopeless in English class and I am 
too stupid at school to get into a good university (Marsh 2006). Academic self-
concept is strongly influenced by academic performance, such as grades, but academic 
self-concept also varies substantially across students with the same demonstrated 
ability (Marsh et. al. 2005). Research consistently shows that academic self-concept 
predicts positive academic outcomes (grades, educational attainment, high aspirations, 
and so on) conditional on prior academic outcomes. Most relevant here, research 
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shows that academic self-concept increases the probability that an adolescent will 
enroll in college (Adams 1970). 
The literature on academic self-concept is certainly suggestive of the 
importance of the perceived ability to complete college. But it lacks specificity 
matching, which is the matching of specific self-perceptions to specific outcomes. 
This is a problem because when predicting an outcome with self-concepts, self-
concepts that closely relate to the outcome have much stronger effects than more 
general self-concepts (Swann et. al. 2007). For example, Hansford and Hattie (1982) 
found that self-concepts related to education were much better predictors of academic 
performance than global measures of self-esteem. Thus, a specific measure of the 
perceived ability to complete college may be a decidedly stronger predictor of college 
entry than more general measures of academic self-concept. 
What is needed is a direct measure of the perceived ability to complete college 
uncombined with other measures. Academic self-concept may appear to possess 
specificity matching, but the literature on academic self-concept suffers from the fact 
that it focuses narrowly on perceived academic ability. It seems to be assumed that 
perceptions of academic ability alone determine the perceived ability to complete 
college, but the perceived ability to complete college should be determined jointly by 
perceptions of academic ability and beliefs about the demands of college. Some high 
school students likely think that college is one big party and that colleges award 
degrees to anyone willing to show up for exams and pay tuition for the required 
number of years. Consequently, some high school students will think that they have 
the ability to complete college because they think that college will be undemanding, 
not because they have positive academic self-concepts.15 By focusing on direct and 
                                                
15 In the extreme case where an adolescent believes that college is just one big party, academic self-
concept may play no role whatsoever because the adolescent believes that almost any level of ability is 
sufficient to complete college. 
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indirect measures of academic ability the measures used in the literature fail to capture 
the effects of these perceptions. A more direct measure of the perceived ability to 
complete college is desirable because it will capture both the effects of perceived 
academic ability and the perceived demands of college.  
 
DETERMINANTS OF THE PERCEIVED ABILITY TO COMPLETE COLLEGE 
Several branches of research suggest that a diverse range of factors influence 
adolescents perceptions of their ability to complete college either by influencing their 
perceptions of their own academic ability or their perceptions of how challenging 
college will be. I begin by considering evidence available to adolescents that they 
might use to gauge their own ability. 
  
PERFORMANCE MEASURES. Among measures of academic performance, 
grades have received the most attention. In the Wisconsin Model grades influence 
significant others expectations: high grades lead significant others to expect higher 
educational attainment because high grades show that an adolescent has the ability and 
motivation to succeed in educational environments. However, students may also use 
grades to assess themselves. Regarding the relationship between grades and 
educational aspirations, Sewell, Haller, and Ohlendorf (1970) assume that this is not 
only because the youths grades in school impress other peoplebut also because the 
youth normally has a fairly adequate perception of the objective requirements for 
status attainment and to some extent independently gauges his ability to compete by 
assessing his grades relative to those of others (p. 1024) Other perspectives, such as 
Gottfredsons (1981) circumscription and compromise theory of occupational 
aspirations, also assume that students will judge how smart they are according to 
their school grades (p. 562). 
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Grades are not the sole indicator of ability. As noted, Gambetta (1987) argues 
that repeating a grade is evidence that adolescents likely use to assess their own 
ability, which seems reasonable because repeating a grade is a concrete instance of 
academic failure. Similarly, some have commented that tracking may demoralize 
students (Oakes 1985), and placement in nonacademic tracks may lower perceived 
ability. 
Measured cognitive skill is likely related to perceived ability. As will be 
discussed shortly, self-perceptions of cognitive skill can hardly be said to be accurate, 
but adolescents probably have some sense of their cognitive skill apart from school-
based measures. Sewell, Haller, and Ohlendorf (1970) provide evidence suggesting 
that significant others use an adolescents cognitive skill (instead of their grades alone) 
to develop their expectations for the adolescent. Just as was the case for grades, 
adolescents may reflect on their own cognitive skill to assess their ability to complete 
college. 
In the Wisconsin Model adolescents aspirations and expectations are formed 
by the expectations that others hold of them. If an adolescents peers expect them to 
pursue higher education then the adolescent will aspire to higher education either 
because they adopt the expectation or because they use the expectation as a source of 
information about reasonable strategies and expectations that they should have for 
themselves. Morgan (2005) argues that adolescents may be more reflective and use the 
expectations of others as a source of information to assess their own ability. 
Adolescents may also conceive of good study habits as a set of skills that will 
help them in college. If this is the case then those who have good study habits will 
have confidence that they can graduate, while those with poor study skills will be 
uncertain if they can increase their work intensity if necessary. 
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REFERENCE GROUPS AND RELATIVE STANDING. If one of the ways that grades, 
cognitive skill, and so on influence perceived ability is via relative standing then 
reference groups should be important because they also influence relative standing. An 
adolescents rank in an ability hierarchy depends on the ability levels of their peers, 
and an adolescent will generally have a lower rank the higher the ability of their peers. 
(I say generally because it is possible to have the same rank in different groups with 
different mean ability.) Because academic self-concept is influenced by relative 
standing, associating with higher ability peers may lower academic self-concept. This 
big-fish-little-pond effect (BFLPE), as the phenomenon has become known, 
receives substantial empirical support. The average cognitive skill of the students 
within a school is found to depress the academic self-concept of its members and a 
range of other outcomes including college attendance and educational aspirations 
(Marsh 1991). Most of the work on the BFLPE deals with academic self-concept 
(Marsh and Hau 2003) and educational or occupational aspirations (Davis 1966; 
Meyer 1970), but it is easy to see how the BFLPE mechanism could operate on the 
perceived ability to complete college. 
The composition of reference groups is a focal point in efforts to explain racial 
and ethnic differences in academic self-concept and self-concept more generally. The 
academic self-concept of blacks is similar to the academic self-concept of whites 
(Gray-Little and Hafdahl 2000), but this is surprising because blacks academic self-
concept would be expected to be lower than the academic self-concept of whites based 
on cognitive skill and other performance measures like grades. High schools are 
somewhat segregated. Blacks often attend schools with many blacks, Hispanics often 
attend schools with many Hispanics, and so on. Blacks will typically attend schools 
with lower mean cognitive skill than whites if blacks attend high schools with many 
blacks and blacks have low measured cognitive skill, grades, and so on. Consequently, 
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the standing of blacks relative to their peers will be higher than the standing of whites 
of equal cognitive skill relative to their peers.  
This reasoning alone cannot explain a complete lack of black-white differences 
in academic self-concept because schools are not completely segregated. Some have 
suggested that blacks reference groups may include only other blacks and that racial 
minorities may compare their outcomes only to other disadvantaged others (Broman, 
Neighbors, and Jackson 1988; Crocker and Major 1989; Major 1994; Major, 
Sciacchitano and Crocker 1993; Pettigrew 1967; Porter and Washington 1979; 
Simmons and Rosenberg 1971). If this were so, then blacks perceived relative 
standing should be the same as whites perceived relative standing. If a similar story 
held true for Hispanics, then we would expect Hispanics relative standing also to be 
the same as whites relative standing. 
Why would blacks compare themselves primarily or exclusively to other 
blacks? One explanation, suggested by Hoetler (1982) and Kao and Tienda (1998), is 
that blacks are relatively segregated even within the same school or classroom and 
that blacks do not interact much with whites. It is almost impossible to test this theory; 
there is no way to know who is whose reference group because this is probably not 
something that people are consciously aware of. However, there is abundant evidence 
of racial and ethnic homophily in marriage, confiding, work relationships, and 
schoolmate friendships (for a review see McPherson, Smith-Lovin, and Cook 2001).  
A second explanation is that blacks and other minorities may believe that 
whites superior performance is not caused by superior ability. Minority students may 
believe that whites put forth greater effort in school, that high school teachers 
discriminate against minorities when assigning grades, or that standardized tests are 
racially biased and understate their true ability. Perhaps these issues should not matter 
if minorities will be tested and graded in college in much the same manner as they are 
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in high school. However, blacks and Hispanics may believe that college is a more 
enlightened atmosphere in which their grades will be unaffected by discrimination. 
They may therefore reason that the disparity in grades between themselves and whites 
will be eliminated at college and conclude that comparing themselves only with 
members of their own racial or ethnic group in high school is appropriate. 
Jointly, the facts that (1) perceived ability is related to performance measures 
(e.g., grades and cognitive skill) and (2) blacks perceived academic ability is roughly 
equal to whites perceived academic ability, suggest that blacks perceived ability will 
be higher than whites perceived ability conditional on performance measures. 
Understanding this pattern is easiest within a matching framework. (The same 
reasoning applies in a regression framework, but it is less intuitive.) Suppose we have 
a group of white students whose cognitive skill is in the 50th percentile of all 
adolescents in the country. They will likely have about average perceived ability 
because they will likely stand at about the 50th percentile in their reference groups. 
Now consider that we find a group of black students whose cognitive skill is in the 
50th percentile in the country to match to the white students. The black students are 
likely to have much higher than average perceived ability because they are likely to 
stand much higher than at the 50th percentile in their reference groups because their 
reference groups are likely to have below average measured cognitive skill. As a 
result, when we compare these matched groups of adolescents, the black group will 
have higher perceived ability than the white group. In other words, while there is little 
difference in perceived ability between blacks and whites, conditioning on 
performance measures should induce a relationship.  
 
SCHOOLS. A large and growing body of research estimates school effects, 
which are the effects that schools have on the members of their student bodies. There 
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is no school effects research on the perceived ability to complete college, but here too 
there is closely related work on academic self-concept, educational aspirations, and 
college enrollment. School-mean cognitive skill appears to depress academic self-
concept and educational aspirations, as discussed earlier in connection with the 
BFLPE. The racial and ethnic composition of schools has also been found to affect 
some outcomes. Goldsmith (2004) examines the effects of racial composition on 
various school attitudes and found that black and Hispanic adolescents have more pro-
school attitudes and higher aspirations in schools in which their own race or ethnicity 
is predominant. This finding lends itself to the BFLPE because blacks and Hispanics 
have lower measured cognitive skill and grades than whites, so the presence of many 
whites may lower the relative standing of blacks and Hispanics. However, Goldsmith 
proposes another set of explanations. First, schools with many minorities may contain 
a relatively large number of students and parents who lack the adequate skills and 
resources for interpreting school feedback (p. 141). Second, minority teachers and 
teachers from working-class backgrounds (who are more common in schools with 
many minorities) may raise minority students interests in school with culturally 
relevant material and may have a greater connection with students. Goldsmith (2004) 
does find evidence that minority and working-class teachers raise the aspirations of 
minority students, but Frost (2007) fails to find any such evidence.  
In addition to the research on academic self-concept and aspirations, the 
broader school-effects research finds that a host of school characteristics have small 
but substantively important effects on some outcomes. For example, small schools are 
argued to be more effective (Lee and Smith 1993, 1995; Meier 1995); the percentage 
of students in the academic track has been found to lead to greater increases in test 
scores (Chubb and Moe 1990); Catholic schools are associated with greater growths in 
learning; and so on. I lack theoretical justification for the inclusion of these variables 
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in models, but these school characteristics are the subject of policy debates so it is 
useful to know what effects they may have on college-encouraging perceptions. 
 
THE PYCHOLOGY OF SELF-BELIEFS. The causes of the perceived ability to 
complete college presented thus far are rational in the sense that they deal with 
relevant information available to students. Even the BFLPE is subjectively rational in 
the sense that the effect is based upon available information. It appears, however, that 
a major portion of perceived ability is not based upon evidence. Studies consistently 
find that perceived ability is not strongly related to measured ability; for example, the 
correlation between self-reported and measured cognitive skill is only about 0.3 (for a 
review see Furnham and Chamorro-Premuzic 2004), although this value appears to 
vary somewhat across different types of skills (Gati, Fishman-Nadav, and Shiloh 
2006).  
Self-reported ability tends to be overstated. Psychologists study a phenomenon 
known as self-enhancement, which is the tendency to evaluate oneself favorably the 
evidence notwithstanding (for a review see Leary 2007). Research that compares self-
reported and measured ability finds that overestimation is far more common than 
underestimation. Overestimation is especially common among those with lower 
measured ability. Large majorities are found to report themselves as above average 
across a wide range of abilities, a phenomenon known as the above-average effect. 
Several explanations have been offered, but the most widely accepted is that self-
enhancement protects or builds self-esteem.  
Because of interpersonal differences in self-enhancement and the general 
inability to effectively use available information to accurately assess ability, a large 
component of the perceived ability to graduate is likely not caused by any measures 
that an outside observer would consider reasonable foundations to construct beliefs 
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upon. Instead, a major portion of the perceived ability to graduate is probably a 
manifestation of personality. For example, those with high self-esteem, self-efficacy, 
and optimism probably have high perceived ability to complete college conditional on 
available evidence. 
 
THE PERCEIVED DEMANDS OF COLLEGE. As discussed earlier, beliefs about the 
demands of college should also be strong determinants of the perceived ability to 
complete college. Family background should be related to these beliefs. Family 
income should be related to the perceived ability to complete college because is should 
be related to the perceived ability to finance college. Parental education may increase 
the perceived ability to complete college because adolescents are apt to believe that 
they can do whatever their parents can (and often quite a bit more). 
After briefly describing adolescents perceptions of their ability to complete 
college, in the empirical analysis that follows I estimate average treatment effects of 
the perceived ability to complete college on college entry using the propensity score 
weighting estimation strategy described in the Chapter 1. Following this, I examine 
the determinants of the perceived ability to complete college by estimating the relative 
weight that adolescents likely give various factors in assessing their ability to 
complete college.  
 
DATA 
 Data are from High School and Beyond (hereafter, HS&B), a two-stage 
probability sample of 1,015 high schools in 1980, and a random selection of 36 
sophomores and 36 seniors from each high school. (If there are less than 36 students 
all students are selected.) Students completed questionnaires and a set of standardized 
tests measuring a variety of cognitive skills. Some respondents teachers and parents 
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were also asked to complete questionnaires. School questionnaires, which provide 
information on school characteristics, were completed for most schools. Respondents 
were resurveyed in 1982, 1984, and 1986. The sophomore cohort only was resurveyed 
in 1992. The base-year survey included N=58,270 student respondents.  
Perceived ability to complete college is measured with the following question 
and response options: 
 
Whatever your plans, do you think you have the ability to complete college?  
Yes, definitely 
Yes, probably 
Not sure 
I doubt it 
Definitely not  
 
Based on responses to this question I generate two measures of the perceived 
ability to complete college. The first is a straightforward collapsing of categories. 
Because few students selected either of the two categories representing low perceived 
ability (Definitely not and I doubt it) these two categories are combined to form a 
single category in the analysis of the effects of the perceived ability to complete 
college on college entry.  
For analysis of the determinants of the perceived ability to complete college I 
construct a continuous measure of students subjective probability of completion 
conditional on entry by assigning the following probabilities, which I express as 
percentiles, to the 5 response categories: Yes, definitely→Pr=100; Yes, 
probably→Pr=75; Not sure→Pr=50; I doubt it→Pr=25; Definitely 
not→Pr=0). I construct this continuous measure because it provides an intuitive set 
of results, a benefit that I believe is too quickly disregarded when modeling 
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categorical outcomes. Preliminary analysis revealed that modeling the outcome as a 
set of ordered choices led to the same substantive results.  
Despite the specificity of this question, several issues may limit the 
interpersonal comparability of responses. Different students likely interpret college 
differently: some will think of completing a two-year college degree while others will 
think of a four-year college degree; some will think of a challenging major while 
others will think of a comparatively easy one. Different students likely interpret 
ability differently. From my initial reading of the question I assumed that students 
were being asked about mental ability and/or the discipline to complete the requisite 
schoolwork, but some students may be thinking about the ability to finance college. 
Exploratory analysis showed that responses are only weakly related to the perceived 
costs of college (results not reported), but certainly some students could be thinking 
about the costs of college.16 Different students may also be answering the question 
under different hypothetical effort levels. For example, some respondents may take 
the question to mean Do you have the ability to complete college if you spent 100 
hours a week on schoolwork, whereas other students may be responding under more 
realistic hypothetical effort levels. The measure of probability, if it can be called that, 
is also coarse. The responses Definitely not and Yes, definitely may each mean 
the same thing to all who select them, but other responses may not. For example, the 
response Yes, probably could sensibly mean anything between a probability of .50 
and .99, and we cannot determine precisely what different students responding Yes, 
probably mean.  
Apart from the question itself, the datas age may be a problem. Comparison of 
HS&B data and data from the National Longitudinal Study of the High School Class of 
                                                
16 The HS&B asks seniors how much they think that several types of postsecondary schooling would 
cost. Responses to this question are essentially unrelated to the perceived ability to complete college. 
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1972 (NLS72) shows that the perceived ability to complete college increased 
substantially between 1972 and 1980. In 1972 (NLS72) only about 40 percent of 
seniors reported Yes, definitely, whereas in 1980 (HS&B) almost 50 percent of 
seniors gave this response. This number may have grown since 1980, which 
potentially reduces the applicability of the results to current enrollment trends.17  
Despite these shortcomings, I believe that HS&B is the best available dataset 
for examining the perceived ability to complete college because the ability question 
asks specifically about completing college (rather than about academic ability more 
generally). It is also asked before college entry. 
The HS&B permits measurement of most of the concepts discussed in the 
preceding sections on the determinants of perceived ability to graduate, such as 
cognitive skill, parental education, family income, self-esteem, self-efficacy, race and 
ethnicity, grades, homework, track placement, and parents aspirations. A description 
of the variables used in the analysis is presented in Table 2.1. Unfortunately, the 
perceived demands of college can be measured effectively with neither variables in the 
HS&B data nor with variables in any other datasets I am aware of. Grade retention is 
also not included in the analysis because it is unavailable for seniors. (Sophomores 
and seniors were given slightly different questionnaires.) 
School characteristics are used to determine the characteristics of schools that 
influence the perceived ability to complete college. Some school characteristics are 
based on student-level variables. For example, school-level measures of cognitive 
skill, parental education, family income, and grades are all measured as their 
respective mean values for all HS&B respondents within the schools (sophomore and 
senior values are averaged). School-level variables of this type are referred to as
                                                
17 It is possible to examine trends in self-perceived academic ability among high school seniors from 
1976 onwards using data from Monitoring the Future, but no questions ask specifically about the 
perceived ability to complete college. 
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Table 2.1. Variables Used to Analyze the Perceived  
Ability to Complete College. HS&B 19801986. 
 62
 
Variable Description Mean  Stand.  
Dev. 
INDIVIDUAL LEVEL    
Perceived ability 
to complete 
college 
(categorical) 
Responses to the question Whatever your 
plans, do you think you have the ability to 
complete college? 
  
     Definitely not or I doubt it  .06 .24 
     Not sure  .13 .34 
     Yes, probably .33 .47 
     Yes, definitely .48 .50 
Probability of 
graduation 
(continuous) 
A linear measure of students perceived 
probability of college completion 
conditional on college entry measured as a 
percentage. 
79.98 24.13 
College entry  Entered a 2- or 4-year college as of the 3rd 
follow-up (1986) 
.62 .50 
Cognitive skill The mean of the math and reading scores on 
standardized tests administered in 1980. 
50.36 9.50 
Self-esteem Taken from self-concept composite scale 
score. Values reverse coded so that higher 
values indicate higher self-esteem. Based on 
4 items: 
1. I take a positive attitude toward myself 
2. I feel I am a person of worth, on an equal 
plane with others 
3. I am able to do things as well as most 
other people 
4. On the whole I am satisfied with myself 
.01 .66 
Self-Efficacy Composite measure based on 4 items. 
Values are reverse-coded so that higher 
values indicate higher self-efficacy: 
1. Good luck is more important than hard 
work for success  
2. Every time I try to get ahead, something 
or somebody stops me 
3. Planning only makes a person unhappy, 
since plans hardly ever work out anyway 
4. People who accept their condition in life 
are happier than those who try to change 
theirs 
.00 .74 
Grades Students average grades based on a 
categorical self-report. The variable I use 
converts responses to a continuous 
percentile variable. 
81.34 7.75 
Academic track Placement in the academic track (yes=1) or 
any of the other tracks. Missing responses 
are coded as zero because values for  
.38 .49 
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Table 2.1 (Continued) 
 
 covariates, such as cognitive skill, strongly 
suggest that the majority of students with 
missing values are not in the academic 
track. 
  
Homework Self-reported hours of homework per week. 
Midpoints of categories are used; zero is 
assigned to those who are not assigned 
homework 
3.86 3.80 
Mothers 
Aspirations 
Years of education students mothers would 
like them to get. Recoded from a categorical 
response variable. 
15.34 2.24 
Parental 
education 
Years of education of the most-educated 
parent, or of either parent if the other 
parents education is missing. Continuous 
recoded from categorical.  
13.54 2.51 
Family income Income of students family as reported by 
students. Recoded from a 7-category 
response variable. Midpoints used for 
categories and $75,000 is used for the 
category $50,000 or more. Missing values 
are filled in with responses to another 3 
category family income question. 
23,528.98 14,475.91 
Female Respondent is female (yes=1) .53 .50 
White Respondent is white (yes=1) .71 .45 
Black Respondent is black (yes=1) .11 .31 
Hispanic Respondent is Hispanic (yes=1) .05 .22 
Asian Respondent is Asian (yes=1). Note that 
included in the category Asian are groups 
that do not correspond to the most common 
current colloquial use of the word Asian, 
and that those tracing their ancestry to India, 
Bangladesh, and Pakistan are coded as 
Asian. 
.01 .12 
American Indian Respondent is American Indian (yes=1) .01 .09 
Other 
race/ethnicity 
Other race/ethnicity, or race and ethnicity 
cannot be determined from responses 
(yes=1) 
.10 .30 
    
SCHOOL LEVEL Statistics for school-level variables are 
based on the entire school-level sample, not 
only the senior cohort. 
  
Parental 
education 
Mean parental education of students in the 
school. 
13.38 1.15 
Family income Mean family income of students in the 
school. 
22,226.32 6,058.44 
Grades Mean grades at the school. 79.82 2.35 
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Table 2.1 (Continued) 
 
Cognitive skill Mean cognitive skill in the school. 33.35 5.90 
School size Number of students in the school 1,315.88 815.58 
% White % of students who are white 71.87 31.4 
% Black % of students who are black 15.31 24.57 
% Hispanic % of students who are Hispanic 10.70 21.18 
% Asian % of students who are Asian 1.40 3.84 
% American 
Indian 
% of students who are American Indian .70 4.42 
% Academic 
track 
% of students in the academic track 43.52 28.04 
Notes. Data for individual-level statistics are weighted using the 3rd follow-up weight. Variable 
statistics include imputed values. N= 8,248. 
 
school-mean variables (e.g., school-mean cognitive skill) to distinguish them from 
the student-level measures. The school survey is used to measure school size (the 
number of students in the school); percentage of students in the academic track; 
percentage of students who are white, black, Hispanic, Asian, and American Indian.  
Different samples are used for estimation of (1) the effects of perceived ability 
and (2) analysis of the determinants of perceived ability. Analysis of the determinants 
of perceived ability uses the base-year (1980) sophomores and seniors attending 
schools for which school surveys were completed; sample size is N=54,128 
respondents, and N=988 schools. Analysis of the effects of perceived ability on 
college entry focuses on entry into a two- or four-year college as of the third follow 
up, and uses only seniors in the base-year survey who took part in all of the first three 
follow-ups; sample size is N=8,886 respondents. Respondents with invalid college 
entry data are dropped for analysis of the determinants of perceived ability to complete 
college on college. Missing values for all other variables are imputed using Statas 
impute command. I imputed school-level variables using both items from the school 
survey and the school level variables created using items from the student surveys and 
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the test batteries. I adjusted some imputed values to fit within the 0 to 100 percent 
range for percent of students in the academic track and so on. 
 
FINDINGS 
DESCRIPTIVE RESULTS  
I first examine the distribution of adolescents perceptions. Figure 2.1 presents 
the percentage of seniors responding to each category of the question asking students 
if they thought they had the ability to complete college. It shows that almost 50 
percent of respondents think that Yes, definitely they have the ability to complete 
college. Just over 30 percent respond Yes, probably, meaning that roughly 80 
percent of students are at least somewhat confident in their ability to complete college. 
About 13 percent are Not sure, leaving only about 6 percent of students with serious 
doubts about their ability to complete college. 
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Figure 2.1. Responses to the Question Whatever your plans, do you think you have 
the ability to complete college? HS&B, 1980 Senior Cohort. 
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These students seem overly optimistic, since far fewer than 80 percent of 
college entrants obtain college degrees. This may reflect students answering the 
question under the hypothetical If I do 100 hours of schoolwork per week condition, 
but likely to some extent it represents unrealistic confidence, like that observed in 
educational expectations and studies of self-assessed intelligence. 
 
THE EFFECTS OF THE PERCEIVED ABILITY TO COMPLETE COLLEGE 
It may seem most natural to begin with analysis of the determinants of 
perceived ability and follow through the temporal sequence to subsequently address 
the effects of the perceived ability to complete college on college entry. I prefer to 
begin with analysis of the effects of perceived ability because if their effects are weak 
then their origin is of considerably less interest.  
First consider the unadjusted relationship between the perceived ability to 
complete college and college entry, which is presented in Column 1 of Table 2.2. As 
in the Chapter 1 example, I present estimates of entry rates in the upper portion of the 
columns and estimates of effects below them in the same column. Results show that 
the perceived ability to complete college is strongly related to college entry. Only 
about 12 percent of students with serious doubts about their ability enter college, 
whereas about 81 percent of students who are certain of their ability enter college. 
Effects are presented as the effect of moving up from one perceived ability level to the 
next higher level. (Although I will shortly argue that unadjusted differences are poor 
estimates of effects, following common practice I use the term effect somewhat 
loosely to refer to differences that exist when ignorability cannot be maintained.) They 
show that effects are fairly large for all three transitions, but they are somewhat larger 
for the latter two transitions. 
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Table 2.2. College Entry Rates for Students at Each Level of Perceived Ability to 
Complete College. HS&B 198086, Senior Cohort. 
Response to the question:  
Whatever your plans, do you think you have the 
ability to complete college? 
(1) Unadjusted (2) Matched* 
 ENTRY RATES 
 Unadjusted entry 
rates 
Matched entry rates 
(1) Definitely not or I doubt it .124 .361 
 (.023) (.072) 
(2) Not sure .292 .455 
 (.020) (.042) 
(3) Yes, probably .576 .633 
 (.013) (.013) 
(4) Yes, definitely .809 .703 
 (.009) (.012) 
   
 EFFECTS 
 Naïve estimates 
δNAIVE 
Matching Estimates 
δATE 
From (1) to (2) .166 .108 
 (.032) (.091) 
From (2) to (3) .280 .175 
 (.024) (.045) 
From (3) to (4) .237 .071 
 (.016) (.016) 
Notes. N=8,886. Bootstrap standard errors in parentheses.  
*Response groups are balanced on cognitive skill, grades, time spent on homework, mothers 
aspirations, track placement, family income, parental education, gender, and race and ethnicity. 
 
As will be discussed more fully in the next section on the determinants of 
perceived ability, students with less confidence in their ability to complete college 
tend to have lower grades, lower cognitive skill, and so on. I apply the matching 
algorithm outlined in Chapter 1 to reduce differences in these pretreatment variables to 
better isolate the effects of perceived ability.  
The counterfactual model alerts us to the fact that there are potentially 
numerous causal effects, such as the average treatment effect for the treated and the 
average treatment effect for the controls. Typically, theory or the motivation of the 
research suggests what effect is of most interest. For example, Hardings (2003) 
research on neighborhood effects estimates in the effects of moving families from high 
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poverty neighborhoods to lower poverty or nonpoverty neighborhoods, which he 
defines as the treatment effect on the treated, because any conceivable social policy 
would seek to move households that are actually in high poverty neighborhoods into 
lower poverty neighborhoods. 
 In the current context I see no clear choice of causal effect to estimate. 
Education policy usually seeks to increase educational attainment, especially among 
groups with historically low levels of attainment. An argument can thus be made that I 
should estimate the effect of increasing perceived ability among students with 
backgrounds that could be characterized as disadvantaged with respect to college 
entry. It could also be argued thatbecause a policys effect is likely greatest on 
adolescents seriously considering both enrolling and not enrollingI should estimate 
the effects of increasing perceived ability among these types of marginal students. 
For example, I could examine students whose propensity scores were between .4 and 
.6 in the treatment selection model.  
Because it is unclear what effects are of greatest interest in the context of the 
perceived ability to complete college, I choose to estimate average treatment effects. 
These seem a logical choice of initial estimates in an area lacking estimates of any 
type. As the name suggests, average treatment effects are the average effect of the 
treatment for all members of the population (be they in the treatment group or the 
control group). One way to think of the average treatment effects is the difference in 
outcomes if no one received the treatment and if everyone received the treatment.  
I do not match one group to another to estimate average treatment effects. 
Instead I generate balancing weights for each of the four response categories that 
results in each response category having the same distribution of pretreatment 
variables as the entire sample. For example, the mean cognitive skill of adolescents 
reporting Definitely not/Not likely is 42.07, while the corresponding value for 
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adolescents reporting Yes, definitely is 53.56. I want to generate balancing weights 
for each response group so that they have the same mean cognitive skill as the entire 
sample, which is 50.31. I want these balancing weights to balance each group to the 
entire sample on other important determinants of college entry as well. 
Specifically, I balance the four response groups on sex, race and ethnicity, 
cognitive skill, parental education, family income, grades, and track placement. The 
steps to achieve balance are very similar to those outlined in Chapter 1, so I do not 
present them here. They are presented, however, in Appendix A for interested readers. 
The results, which are presented in Column 2 of Table 2.2, show that the perceived 
ability to complete college has fairly strong effects even in the balanced samples. First 
consider entry rates. The first row of Column 2 shows that even if they had the same 
cognitive skill, parental education, and so forth, of the overall population, only about 
36 percent of students with serious doubts about their ability to complete college 
would enter college. Balancing to the population also increases college entry rates 
substantially among students selecting Not sure, and Yes, probably, and decreases 
the entry rate among students selecting Yes, definitely.   
Estimates of effects are presented below entry rates in Column 2, which are 
again the effect of moving from one perceived ability level to the next higher level. 
The results show that the matching estimates are much lower than the naïve estimates, 
but remain sizable. For example, the matching estimates suggest that moving from 
Definitely Not/I Doubt it to Not sure increases college entry rates by almost 11 
percent, that moving from Not sure to Yes, probably increases college entry rates 
by over 17 percent, and that moving from Yes, probably to Yes, definitely 
increases college entry rates by about 7 percent.  
These results are strong evidence of the importance of the perceived ability to 
complete college. To use the most dramatic characterization, the model predicts that 
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moving from the lowest to the highest perceived ability category increases the 
probability of college entry by 34 percent.18 
 
DETERMINANTS OF PERCEIVED ABILITY  
In this section I estimate the relative importance of likely determinants of the 
perceived ability to complete college within a regression framework. I regress the 
continuous perceived ability to graduate measure, which was discussed earlier in the 
data section and in Table 2.1, on the various proposed determinants of perceived 
ability. I use regression instead of matching because this allows me to estimate school-
level effects, which I estimate shortly in Model 5. A problem with the types of 
proposed mechanisms discussed earlier in the review of literature is that reasonable 
arguments can be made for reverse causality. For example, I assume that parental 
aspirations influence students perceptions of their ability to complete college, but 
causality could easily run in the opposite direction with students demonstrated ability 
affecting parental expectations. The data do not permit careful examination of reverse 
causality sodespite the likely importance of reciprocal effectsI proceed with the 
empirical analysis by specifying a priori that the perceived ability to complete college 
is caused by the variables considered here. Thus the results should be seen as 
preliminary and suggestive.19 
Model 1 regresses the perceived probability of college completion on dummy 
variables for gender and race and ethnicity. The results (Table 2.3, Column 1) show 
                                                
18 A statement like this based on a comparison on nonadjacent categories of perceived ability is possible 
because average treatment effects have been estimated and all of the categories of perceived ability to 
graduate have been balanced to the same distribution of cognitive skill, family income, and so on. 
19 Members of the sophomore cohort are asked about their ability to complete college in the first and 
second round, making it possible to model changes in the perceived ability to complete college from the 
first to second round. This does not get at the heart of the issue because we will not know if changes in 
independent variables caused changes in perceived ability or the other way around. For example, if 
perceived ability increased among students whose grades also increased, we would not know if the 
grades caused the change in perceptions or if the change in perceptions caused the change in grades.  
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essentially no gender effects, but race and ethnicity differences are present. Blacks 
perceived probability of completion is about 1.5 percent higher than whites, and 
Asians perceived probability of completion is slightly over 5 percent higher than 
whites. Hispanics perceived probability is almost 4 percent lower than whites. 
Variables for American Indian and other race or ethnicity are also included in the 
model, but results are suppressed in the table because there are too few of the former, 
and the composition of the latter is unknown. 
Model 2 (Column 2) adds family income, parental education, and cognitive 
skill, which have been converted to z-scores to facilitate comparisons among them. 
The results show that cognitive skill is fairly strongly related to the perceived ability to 
complete college. Both measures of family background are related to perceived ability, 
although not as strongly as cognitive skill. The coefficient for female is now positive 
and statistically-discernable from zero at the p<.05 level. The coefficient for Hispanic 
is positive and fairly strong, and the coefficient for black is positive and quite large.  
Here is an example where conditioning on cognitive skill and family background 
induces relationships between race and ethnicity on the one hand and college-
encouraging perceptions on the other.  
Model 3 adds grades, mothers educational aspirations, hours of homework per 
week, self-esteem, self-efficacy, and a dummy variable for academic track. The results 
(Column 3) show that all of the added variables predict perceived ability. The 
coefficient for mothers aspiration and homework are fairly small, but coefficients for 
academic track and grades are large. The coefficients for self-efficacy and self-esteem 
are in the expected direction; however, their somewhat modest effects indicate that 
they are empirically quite distinct from the perceived ability to complete college, 
despite their apparent conceptual similarity. Indeed, a model that regressed the  
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Table 2.3. Coefficients from Models Predicting Perceived Ability. HS&B, 1980.  
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Intercept 76.953*** 
(.237) 
76.953*** 
(.156) 
76.953*** 
(.121) 
76.981*** 
(.124) 
77.023*** 
(.116) 
SCHOOL LEVEL      
School-Mean Parental 
Education 
    1.168*** 
(.281) 
School-Mean Family 
Income 
    .261 
(.268) 
School-Mean Cognitive 
Skill 
    .470 
(.246) 
School-Mean Grades     .410** 
(.139) 
School Size     .724*** 
(.125) 
% Asian     .141 
(.118) 
% Hispanic     .752*** 
(.171) 
% Black     .538*** 
(.178) 
% Academic Track     .139 
(.151) 
INDIVIDUAL LEVEL      
Female .530 
(.303) 
2.443*** 
(.229) 
.180 
(.192) 
.215 
(.191) 
.261 
(.190) 
Black 1.488*** 
(.486) 
11.135*** 
(.438) 
5.007*** 
(.340) 
4.625*** 
(.342) 
3.842*** 
(.409) 
Hispanic 3.872*** 
(.611) 
4.890*** 
(.476) 
1.750*** 
(.382) 
1.059*** 
(.370) 
.147 
(.430) 
Asian 5.276*** 
(.798) 
4.457*** 
(.765) 
.136 
(.713) 
.588 
(.718) 
1.434 
(.754) 
Family Income  2.064*** 
(.112) 
.981*** 
(.098) 
.909*** 
(.098) 
.818*** 
(.101) 
Parental Education  3.610*** 
(.005) 
1.276*** 
(.097) 
1.178*** 
(.098) 
1.039*** 
(.102) 
Cognitive Skill  8.530*** 
(.190) 
2.139*** 
(.139) 
2.143*** 
(.132) 
2.116*** 
(.135) 
Grades   5.876*** 
(.142) 
6.009*** 
(.007) 
6.160*** 
(.144) 
Academic track   4.206*** 
(.219) 
4.212*** 
(.218) 
4.078*** 
(.218) 
Homework   1.017*** 
(.095) 
1.002*** 
(.095) 
.941*** 
(.097) 
Mothers Educational 
Aspiration 
  4.481*** 
(.113) 
4.312*** 
(.112) 
4.232*** 
(.111) 
Self-Efficacy   2.541*** 
(.109) 
2.485*** 
(.108) 
2.468*** 
(.108) 
Self-Esteem   3.437*** 
(.103) 
3.407*** 
(.103) 
3.385*** 
(.103) 
τ00 NA NA NA 2.709**** 2.352*** 
Notes. N=54,128. Heteroskedastic-robust standard errors in parentheses. * p<.05; **p<.01; ***p<.001  
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perceived ability to complete college on only self-efficacy and self-esteem showed 
that these two variables account for only about 15 percent of the variance in the 
perceived ability to complete college (results not shown).  
A comparison of Models 2 and 3 reveals that introducing the academic 
measures reduces all of the estimates (except the intercept). The coefficient for 
cognitive skill is reduced by 75 percent. It seems likely that the effect of cognitive 
skill is largely mediated by these other variables, much in the same way that the 
Wisconsin Model suggests. Supplementary analysis (results not shown) revealed that 
the addition of grades had the greatest effect on the coefficients for cognitive skill, 
which is also consistent with the claims of the Wisconsin Model.  
The coefficients for black and Hispanic are also reduced due to the fact that
relative to whites with comparable cognitive skill and family backgroundblacks and 
Hispanics have higher grades, are more likely to be in the academic track, and their 
parents have much higher aspirations for them. The coefficient for Asian has declined 
to essentially zero for the same reasons. The female coefficient is now negative, which 
is due to females superior academic performance.  
As discussed, no measures are available for the perceived demands of college 
so their effects cannot be effectively estimated. However, the possibility that perceived 
ability to graduate is at least partially a function of the perceived demands of college 
suggests alternate interpretations to those previously offered for several effects long 
observed in the literature. For example, Haller (1982) claims that significant others 
expectations influence students expectations and attainment because students adopt 
them. Morgan (2005) speculates that students use others expectations as a source of 
information about their own ability. However, students may also be using the 
expectations of others as a source of information about the demands of college. 
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Adolescents whose significant others expect them to complete college may conclude 
If everyone thinks I should go to college, then college must not be that demanding. 
Similarly, beliefs about the demands of college could explain the apparent 
independent effect of parents education. Students with highly-educated parents may 
think If my parents can do it, then how hard can it be? A similar story may apply to 
the educational attainment of older siblings and peers educational plans. These 
interpretations are somewhat speculative, but so is the traditional socialization 
explanation in the Wisconsin Model. Certainly, their plausibility is warrant for 
inclusion of questions about the demands of college in surveys administered to high 
school students. 
Model 4 (Column 4) is a random intercept multilevel model that allows the 
mean value of the perceived ability to complete college to vary across schools. First 
note that the variance of the intercepts, which is denoted τ00, is 2.709 and is 
statistically-discernable from zero at the p<.001 level. This means that mean perceived 
ability does vary across schools conditional on cognitive skill, family background, and 
the other student-level characteristics included in the model. A comparison of 
Columns 3 and 4 shows that allowing the intercepts to vary has little effect on the 
estimates for cognitive skill, grades, academic track, and homework. However, 
coefficients for black, Hispanic, and Asian are lower indicating that blacks, Hispanics, 
and Asians tend to attend high schools that increase the perceived ability to complete 
college.  
What characteristics of schools account for differences in the perceived ability 
to complete college? Model 5 explores this issue by introducing school-level measures 
as predictors of the intercept. The variables considered here include school-mean 
parental education; school-mean family income; school-mean cognitive skill; school-
mean grades; school size; the percentage of students who are in the academic track; 
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and the percentage of students who are Asian, Hispanic, and black. The percentage of 
students who are American Indian is also included, but results are suppressed because 
there are so few American Indian students. The addition of these level-two predictors 
reduced τ00 only by about 25 percent (Column 5), which means that about 75 percent 
of the variability across schools in their mean level of perceived ability is not caused 
by these level-two predictors. The results also show that, consistent with the literature 
on relative position, school-mean cognitive skill decreases the perceived ability of 
students, although the effect is not statistically-discernable from zero. It is surprising 
that this effect is not larger. Examination revealed that school-mean cognitive skill and 
school-mean grades are positively related, and if grades are excluded from the model 
the negative effect of school-mean cognitive skill is larger and statistically discernable 
from zero.  
Higher grades also appear to depress perceived ability. This does not mean that 
schools aiming to enhance their students perceived ability should lower the grades 
given in their school. The finding only shows that for a given student with a given 
grade, being in a school with lower average grades tends to increase perceived ability. 
In fact, if grades are excluded in the level-one model, then higher grades at the school 
level are associated with higher perceived ability even conditional on cognitive skill. 
This suggests that schools can engage in grade inflation to increase their students 
perceived ability to complete college.  
Also consistent with the findings for educational expectations, the percentage 
of blacks and Hispanics in a school tends to increase the perceived ability to complete 
college. It is difficult to determine why this would be the case with the data at hand 
given that school-mean cognitive skill is already in the model. As discussed earlier in 
the chapter, Goldsmith (2004) suggests reasons why the concentration of blacks and 
Hispanics would increase aspirations among blacks and Hispanics in particular, and 
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these can be applied to perceived ability. Yet supplementary analysis reveals that the 
concentration of blacks and Hispanics raises whites perceived ability by roughly the 
same amount as it raises blacks and Hispanics perceived ability, and this is not 
predicted by Goldsmiths explanations. School-mean parental education also increases 
perceived ability, but school-mean family income does not. Lastly, contrary to 
expectations, the percentage of students in the academic track does not increase 
school-mean levels of perceived ability, and school size is positively related to school-
mean levels of perceived ability. It is unclear why school size would matter, but the 
findings do call into question some of the praise given to smaller high schools (Lee 
and Smith 1993, 1995; Meier 1995).  
 
CONCLUSIONS  
This chapter examined determinants and consequences of the perceived ability 
to complete college. The perceived ability to complete college appears to be 
determined in large part by school-related evidence about academic ability; grades, 
test scores, and academic track placement are all strong predictors of perceived ability. 
Time spent on homework is a weak predictor. Mothers educational aspiration, which 
adolescents may also use to gauge their ability to complete college, is a weak 
predictor. Self-efficacy and self-esteem also appear to increase perceived ability, but 
their relationship with perceived ability is surprisingly weak, and estimates of their 
effects on perceived ability are small in models including a range of covariates.  
Conditional on cognitive skill, grades, track placement, and other academic 
measures blacks, Hispanics, and Asians are more confident than whites in their ability 
to complete college. For Hispanics and Asians the net-advantage in perceived ability is 
largely caused by a combination of academic performance and the fact that Hispanics 
and Asians tend to be in high schools that increase perceived ability. These factors 
 77
appear to contribute to the net-black advantage in perceived ability, but blacks have 
considerably higher perceived ability than whites even within the same school and 
conditional on academic performance measures. 
High schools appear to affect their students perceived ability to complete 
college. School size, the percentage of students who are black or Hispanic, and school-
mean parental education all increase the perceived ability to complete college. School-
mean family income appears to have no effect. School-mean grades and school-mean 
cognitive skill appear to lower adolescents perceived ability to complete college 
conditional on their own grades and cognitive skill. However, most of the variation 
across schools cannot be explained with any of these school-level variables. 
The perceived ability to complete college has strong effects on college entry 
conditional on grades, test scores, track placement, family income, parental education, 
and several other predictors of college entry. Consistent with the literature on 
academic self-concept, this suggests that perceptions have consequences and that 
increasing the perceived ability to complete college increases the probability of 
college entry.  
These findings contribute to the literature on the perceived ability to complete 
college, which has lacked sufficient empirical content. The results provide qualified 
support for many assertions, and they point to a middle ground between various 
positions taken in the literature. Several examples are in order. Breen and Goldthorpe 
(1997) assert that family background is related to the perceived ability to graduate. 
The findings presented here show that the perceived ability to graduate related to 
family background; however, the relationship is weak. Morgan (2005) suggests that 
significant others influence increase adolescents expectations by increasing their 
perceived ability. The results presented here suggest that significant others 
expectations increase adolescents perceptions of their ability, but by only a small 
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amount. Also, supplementary analysis shows that significant others expectations have 
fairly large effects on college entry independent of their relationship with perceived 
ability (results not shown), so it seems unlikely that the effects of significant others 
influence capture only perceived ability. Hoelter (1982) and Kao and Tienda (1998) 
suggest that blacks expectations may be as high as whites expectations despite large 
black-white differences in ability measures (such as grades) because minorities 
compare themselves only to one another. This is likely true to some extent. Blacks and 
Hispanics tend to have overly optimistic perceptions of their ability to complete 
college, and this tendency is less pronounced in schools containing a high proportion 
of white students.  
Following Rosenbaum (2001), the results might be used to inform adolescents 
of their undue optimism and give them information upon which to make more realistic 
assessments of their ability. These realistic assessments would in turn be used to make 
sensible college entry decisions. For example, students might be told that those not in 
the academic track are much less likely to complete college than those who are. 
Telling students to be more realistic is not without its price, however. To some extent 
college is an experiment (Manski 1989), and it is not possible predict prior to 
matriculation who will graduate and who not.  
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CHAPTER 3. THE PSYCHIC COSTS OF EDUCATION 
 
Education can be said to impose psychic costsvarious frustrations and 
irritations associated with learning in an academic settingbecause learning is 
sometimes tedious and difficult. It is natural to suppose that psychic costs affect 
schooling decisions, but the literature on psychic costs and their effects is poorly 
developed. When psychic costs are discussed, they are typically not measured. Collins 
simply denies that psychic costs exist at the postsecondary level and claims that 
because of the sociable culture of college that developed after World War II, college 
became an interlude of fun and the main appeal of the revitalized university for 
large groups of students was not the training it offered but the social experience of 
attending it (Collins 1979:124). Others agree that schooling has consumption 
benefits, such as when a student enjoys their courses or the college lifestyle, but they 
give the matter little attention (Ehrenberg and Smith 2000:296). It is probably 
unreasonable to think that college has no net psychic costs, but even if it is conceded 
that schooling is enjoyable, interpersonal variation in how much it is enjoyed may still 
be important.  
Others incorporate psychic costs into models of schooling decisions without 
measuring them (e.g., Charles and Luoh 2003; Garen 1985; Frazis 2002) or point out 
that psychic costs might be related to variables included in empirical analysis, such as 
family background and school related behaviors (e.g., Belzil and Hansen 2003; Jacob 
2002). Several economists infer psychic costs from adolescents educational decisions 
(Lazear 1977; Cunha, Heckman, and Navarro 2006) by determining how much 
education adolescents should obtain to maximize lifetime earnings and assuming that 
psychic costs alone cause adolescents to invest below this level. Cunha, Heckman, and 
Navarro (2006) apply this logic to the NLSY79 data and estimate that the mean 
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psychic cost of obtaining a bachelors degree among high school graduates is roughly 
$488,000 in lifetime earnings.  
This revealed preferences approach assumes that adolescents know the 
returns to education, but this is hardly uncontroversial when decades of study on the 
returns to education have failed to generate a consensus among labor economists. The 
revealed preferences approach also assumes that psychic and money costs are the only 
reasons adolescents do not pursue postsecondary schooling. Adolescents self-reported 
reasons for not pursuing postsecondary schooling suggest alternate explanations. 
Students in the Educational Longitudinal Study, 2002 (which is used in my empirical 
analysis and will be discussed in more detail shortly) who are not planning to pursue 
postsecondary schooling are asked Which of the following are reasons why you have 
decided NOT to continue your education after high school? and then select from a 
list of reasons all that apply to them.20 The results, which are presented in Figure 3.1, 
show that only slightly over half of the students select I dislike school even though 
they may choose as many of the reasons as they like. This seems like strong evidence 
that psychic costs are not always the reason for failing to pursue postsecondary 
schooling.  
The most common selection was Rather work and make money. Adolescents 
eager to assume adult roles may forgo postsecondary schooling if they see it as a 
continuation of adolescence. This could be conceived of as a type psychic cost (e.g., 
the psychic cost of not pursuing adult roles), but this is not the conventional 
meaning of the expression psychic costs of schooling. Because the revealed 
                                                
20 Strictly speaking, the question asks students who are not planning to continue their education 
immediately after high school Which of the following are reasons why you have decided not to 
continue your education right after high school? Because I have limited the sample to students not 
expecting postsecondary schooling at any time in the future responses should be the same as they would 
be if the question asked Which of the following are reasons why you have decided not to continue 
your education at all? 
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preferences approach offers no way to distinguish among different facets of psychic 
costs it is useful to look at more direct measures that capture more traditional 
definitions of psychic costs. 
Figure 3.1 also shows that almost 40 percent of adolescents not planning to 
pursue postsecondary schooling select Not needed for my career. Thus, adolescents 
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Figure 3.1. Reasons for Not Continuing Education after High School. ELS02, 2004.  
Notes. N=359. The sample is limited to respondents who reported in the 2004 round that they expected 
no postsecondary schooling. 
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not pursuing postsecondary schooling may not want the types of jobs commonly held 
by Baccalaureates. Rather than being deterred by schoolings costs, it appears that 
some adolescents are unattracted by its benefits. 
 
CONCEPTUALIZING AND MEASURING THE PSYCHIC COSTS OF SCHOOLING 
This discussion indicates that psychic costs can be quite broadly conceived. 
Postponing adult roles may impose psychic costs, moving away from ones friends 
and family may impose psychic costs, immersion in college culture may impose 
psychic costs, and so on.21 The approach taken here is to focus on the psychic costs 
associated with academic activities. Thus the costs I refer to could be considered the 
psychic costs of academic activities rather than a broader conception that includes 
all nonmonetary costs. 
The costs associated with academic activities can be broken down into several 
components. The first is the pleasure or displeasure associated with engagement in 
academic tasks. Some enjoy reading, writing, solving math problems, and listening to 
lectures; others despise these same activities. There are some activities, such as 
studying and test-taking, that very few adolescents enjoy. But we should still  
expect interpersonal variation in how much they are disliked. Naturally, the more 
these tasks are disliked the greater are the psychic costs of schooling. The second 
component is interest in academic material. Some adolescents are interested in 
abstract academic material, but others find it boring and are annoyed by its irrelevance 
to employment and everyday life. A third component is the satisfaction that academic 
                                                
21 College culture is secular. Research finds that Fundamentalist Protestants are less apt to pursue 
postsecondary schooling (Lehrer 2004) and numerous researchers have suggested that this is caused by 
the lack of acceptance of their values and beliefs. College culture is also liberal, and those with a 
conservative outlook may experience psychic costs through interaction with faculty and students who 
generally do not support their views. Vella (1994) finds, for example, that those holding traditional 
gender roles invest in less education.  
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work brings. One typically experiences a sense of accomplishment after mastering 
complex material or completing tasks. The level of enjoyment of this experience 
doubtlessly varies interpersonally; some adolescents likely do not enjoy this 
experience at all.  
 
DETERMINANTS OF PSYCHIC COSTS  
Speculation on the determinants of psychic costs has focused on cognitive skill 
and family background.22 Cognitive skill, which has received the most attention 
(Cunha, Heckman, and Navarro 2006; Garen 1985), should be closely tied to psychic 
costs because it reduces the time required for comprehension of material and 
acceptable performance. Cognitive skill is also strongly related to investigative 
interests (Holland 1997), which include interests in activities of an academic nature, 
such as abstract problem solving.  
Belzil and Hansen (2003) suggest that family background is correlated with 
psychic costs. Bourdieu (1973) makes a similar claim when he proposes that 
adolescents with advantaged backgrounds receive more encouragement for engaging 
in the intellectual aspects of schooling. Class differences in parenting, especially 
practices related to reading (Bus, van Ijzendoorn, and Pellegrini 1995), may develop 
stronger preferences for academic activities among middle- and upper-classes than 
among lower-classes. Ethnographic studies depict class based oppositional cultures 
that may increase psychic costs among lower-class students by defining school as 
irrelevant to future employment (Willis 1977). Similarly, oppositional cultures that 
define academic engagement as acting white (Fordham and Ogbu 1986) may 
                                                
22 Although perhaps the most commonly cited determinant of psychic costs, the case of cognitive skill is 
revealing of the extent to which psychic costs are ignored in empirical research. Cognitive skill is used 
as an explanatory variable in the majority of studies of educational plans and attainment, but that it 
might lower psychic costs is rarely mentioned. 
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increase psychic costs among blacks or other racial or ethnic groups. Jacobs (2002) 
taps into a common stereotype when he proposes that psychic costs are lower for 
females than for males.  
Schools and students placement within them may also influence psychic costs. 
Track placement may affect psychic costs because college preparatory tracks have 
more effective teachers and more interesting assignments than general or vocational 
tracks (Gamoran and Mare 1989). Some suggest that general or vocational tracks may 
demoralize students (Oakes 1985), which could also lead to higher psychic costs. 
Schools differ in the proportion of students in the college preparatory track, and this 
could lead to inter-school variation in psychic costs. Psychic costs may be lower in 
smaller schools because they create an inviting atmosphere and induce participation 
(Meier 1995; Wicker 1969). Teachers almost certainly affect psychic costs. Some are 
boring, amicable, and encouraging; others are uninteresting, distant, and intimidating. 
Unfortunately, meaningful analysis of teacher effects is not possible with the data used 
here.  
This chapter represents the first attempt to directly measure the psychic costs 
of schooling and estimate their effects on educational outcomes. The measures of 
psychic costs are somewhat crude, but the use of direct measures represents a much 
needed supplement to (and possibly alternative to) the revealed preferences approach. 
I first present the distribution of measured psychic costs to get a sense of the level of 
interpersonal variation in psychic costs that exists. I then estimate the effects of 
psychic costs on educational expectations. Lastly, I examine the determinants of 
psychic costs to see if the conjectures made in the literature are supported by the data 
and approach I use. 
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DATA 
 Data are from the Educational Longitudinal Study of 2002 (hereafter, ELS02), 
which is a nationally-representative sample of U.S. students in the 10th grade in 2002. 
In total, 752 schools are included and 15,326 students completed base-year 
questionnaires. Asian and Hispanic students are oversampled. Parents, teachers, 
principals, and librarians also completed questionnaires. A second follow-up was 
conducted in 2004 when most respondents were in the spring semester of their senior 
year of high school.  
 The ELS02 offers the best opportunity to measure the psychic costs of 
schooling because it contains questions tapping into the three facets of psychic costs 
discussed earlier. Two items measure the like or dislike of academic tasks. 
Respondents read the statements Because reading is fun, I wouldnt want to give it 
up and Because doing mathematics is fun, I wouldnt want to give it up and report 
how much they agree or disagree on a four-point scale. These measures do not 
distinguish between nonacademic and academic contexts, which is unfortunate 
because some adolescents likely enjoy reading for pleasure but not for school.23 
The extent to which respondents are interested in academic material is 
measured with their level of agreement with the statement I go to school because I 
think the subjects Im taking are interesting and challenging. The extent to which 
respondents find academic work satisfying is measured with their level of agreement 
with the statement I go to school because I get a feeling of satisfaction from doing 
what Im supposed to do in class. 
                                                
23 Ideally, questions would inquire directly about academic activities like homework, studying, 
attending lectures, and so on. Actual time spent on homework and study practices are available in the 
ELS02, and these could be used as proxies for preferences. However, homework and study practices 
will often reflect parental preferences and the enforcement of rules rather than adolescents preferences. 
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A composite psychic costs variable is created by summing responses to these 
four questions after each has been converted to a z-score and reverse coded so that 
higher values indicate higher psychic costs. Because they tap into the same concept, 
finding math and reading fun are each given a weight of 0.5.  
Educational expectations are taken from the first follow-up when most students 
were in the 12th grade and indicate if respondents expect less than a four-year degree 
or if they expect a four-year degree or higher. Students responding Dont know are 
excluded from the analysis.  
 Additional independent variables include family income; parental education, 
which is the highest grade completed by the most-educated parent or guardian; 
cognitive skill, which is measured with the base-year standardized test composite 
score; and academic track placement, which is measured in the base year because it is 
unavailable in the first follow-up. More detail on these and other variables used in the 
analysis is included in Table 3.1. There is no measure of respondents perceived 
ability to complete college in the ELS02, which Chapter 2 showed was a strong 
determinant of postsecondary schooling choices. Academic self-concept is used in its 
place as a control variable. Academic self-concept is measured as the sum of 
responses to 14 questions in the base-year student questionnaire asking respondents 
how they feel about their academic ability and performance. Chapter 4 shows that 
preferences relating to employment also predict educational attainment, and I adjust 
for these preferences to better isolate the effects of psychic costs. Specifically, the 
importance students attach to Being successful in your line of work, Becoming an 
expert in your line of work, Getting a good job, and Having lots of money are 
used as measures of job values.  
School characteristics are used to explain school variation in psychic costs. 
Student-level variables are used to estimate values for school-mean family income,
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Table 3.1. Variables Used to Analyze Psychic Costs. ELS02, 20022004.
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Variable Description Mean  Stand.  
Dev. 
Section 
INDIVIDUAL 
LEVEL 
(N=10,787 Students)    
Psychic 
costs 
Psychic costs are measured as the weighted 
sum of 4 variables. The questions, and the 
weights they are given are: 
How much do you agree or disagree with 
the following statements about why you go 
to school? 
1. I go to school because I get a feeling of 
satisfaction from doing what Im supposed to 
do in class. (1) 
2. I go to school because I think the subjects 
Im taking are interesting and challenging. 
(1) 
3. Because doing mathematics is fun, I 
wouldnt want to give it up (.5) 
4. Because reading is fun, I wouldnt want to 
give it up (.5) 
7.64 1.70 BY 
Student 
Expect a 4-
year degree 
or higher 
The student expects a 4-year degree or higher 
(i.e., Graduate from college (4- or 5-year 
degree); masters degree or equivalent; PhD, 
MD, or other advanced degree)  
.70 .46 F1 
Student 
Cognitive 
skill  
Base-year standardized test composite score, 
which is the sum of the standardized scores 
from the math and reading tests. If 
respondents had a score for only one of the 
two tests, a single score was used. 
51.5 9.86 BY 
Test 
Battery 
Family 
income 
Reported categorically with ranges (by 
parents/guardians) but converted to a 
continuous variable using category range 
midpoints and $250,000 for the highest 
category $200,001 or more. 
64,926.44 51,021.02 BY 
Parent 
Parental 
education 
Highest grade completed by the most-
educated parent (or guardian), or of either 
parent if education is missing for the other 
parent.  
Parents self-reported education is used, and 
missing values are filled in with students 
reports of their parents education where 
available. Parental education is reported 
categorically, but responses are recoded as a 
continuous highest grade completed variable 
using the following crosswalk: 
Did not finish high school=10  
Graduated from high school or 
equivalent=12  
 
14.58 2.49 BY 
Parent 
and BY 
Student 
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Table 3.1 (Continued) 
 
 Graduated from high school and attended a 
two-year school (such as a vocational or 
technical school, a junior college, or a 
community college), but did not complete 
a degree=13  
Graduated from a two-year school (such as a 
vocational or technical school, junior 
college, or a community college)=14  
Graduated from high school and went to 
college, but did not complete a four-year 
degree=14; Graduated from college=16  
Completed a masters degree or 
equivalent=18  
Completed a PhD, MD, or other advanced 
professional degree=20 
   
Academic 
Self-Concept  
Academic self-concept is measured as the 
sum of responses to 14 questions asking 
students How often do these things apply to 
you? (1=Almost never; 2=Sometimes; 
3=Often; 4=Almost always). The 14 
statements are: 
Im confident that I can do an excellent job 
on my math tests 
Im certain I can understand the most 
difficult material presented in math texts 
Im certain I can understand the most 
difficult material presented in English texts 
When I sit myself down to learn something 
really hard, I can learn it 
Im confident I can understand the most 
complex material presented by my English 
teacher 
Im confident I can do an excellent job on 
my English assignments 
Im confident I can do an excellent job on 
my English tests 
Im confident I can understand the most 
complex material presented by my math 
teacher 
Im certain I can master the skills being 
taught in my English class 
If I decide not to get any bad grades, I can 
really do it 
If I decide not to get any problems wrong, I 
can really do it 
Im confident I can do an excellent job on 
my math assignments 
If I want to learn something well, I can 
Im certain I can master the skills being 
taught in my math class 
37.51 8.46 BY 
Student 
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Table 3.1 (Continued) 
 
Importance 
of work 
success  
The subjective importance of Being 
successful in your line of work (1=Not 
Important; 2=Somewhat Important; 3=Very 
Important). Treated as a continuous measure. 
2.91 .30 F1 
Student 
Importance 
of money 
The subjective importance of Having lots of 
money (1=Not Important; 2=Somewhat 
Important; 3=Very Important) Treated as a 
continuous measure. 
2.24 .62 F1 
Student 
Importance 
of being an 
expert at 
work 
The subjective importance of Becoming an 
expert in your field of work (1=Not 
Important; 2=Somewhat Important; 3=Very 
Important) Treated as a continuous measure. 
2.71 .51 F1 
Student 
Importance 
of getting a 
good job 
The subjective importance of Getting a 
good job (1=Not Important; 2=Somewhat 
Important; 3=Very Important) Treated as a 
continuous measure. 
2.93 .27 F1 
Student 
White Student is white (yes=1). .65 .48 BY 
Student 
Black Student is black (yes=1). .12 .33 BY 
Student 
Hispanic Student is Hispanic (yes=1). .14 .34 BY 
Student 
Asian Student is Asian (yes=1). Included in the 
category Asian are groups that do not 
correspond to the current colloquial use of 
the word Asian, such as those tracing their 
ancestry to India, Bangladesh, and Pakistan 
are coded as Asian. 
.04 .20 BY 
Student 
American 
Indian 
Student is American Indian (yes=1)  .01 .09  
Missing 
Race/ 
ethnicity 
Students race/ethnicity is missing (yes=1) .04 .19  
Female Student is female (yes=1). .51 .50 BY 
Student 
Academic 
track 
Placement in the academic or college 
preparatory track (yes=1). 
Missing values are coded as zero because 
students with missing data have 
characteristics (e.g., cognitive skill) quite 
unlike those in the academic track. 
.54 .50 BY 
Student 
Sampling 
weight 
Weight for students in both the base-year and 
1st follow-up  (F1PNLWT) 
   
     
SCHOOL-
LEVEL 
(N=735 Schools) School-level variables 
based on student-level variables are  
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Table 3.1 (Continued) 
 
 Calculated using all students with valid 
responses, not only the students in the 
samples used in the analysis in this paper. 
   
Family 
income 
Mean family income of students in the 
school. 
66,652.13 30,742.80 BY 
Parent 
Parental 
education 
Mean parental education of students in the 
school. 
14.70 1.38 BY 
Parent 
& BY 
Student 
Cognitive 
skill 
Mean cognitive skill of students in the 
school. 
51.53 5.84 BY 
Test 
Battery 
Size Total enrollment at the school. Midpoints are 
used for school size categories; 2,750 is used 
for the highest category (2500+ students). 
1,157.67 698.48 BY 
Admin. 
Public Public school (1=yes) .78 .42 BY 
Admin. 
Catholic Catholic school (1=yes)   .13 .33 BY 
Admin. 
Private Non-Catholic private school (1=yes) .10 .30 BY 
Admin. 
% Academic 
track 
Percentage of 10th grade students in 
academic, college preparatory, or specialized 
academic programs 
59.87 31.71 BY 
Admin. 
Notes. Data are weighted using the panel weight for students in both the base-year and 2nd follow-up. 
Variable statistics include imputed values. 
 
parental education, and cognitive skill. Variables measuring school size, percentage of 
students in the academic track, and sector (public, Catholic, non-Catholic private) are 
drawn from the base-year School Administrator Questionnaire. 
 The sample is limited to respondents in both the base-year and first-follow up 
rounds with valid responses to the educational expectation question. Missing values 
for all other variables are imputed using Statas best-subset regression command 
impute.24,25 The resulting sample size is N=10,328. Sampling weights designed for 
                                                
24 For composite measuressuch as academic self-conceptindividual variables used to create the 
composite measure are imputed separately first. 
25 Psychic costs must be imputed for many adolescents. However, in most instances this means 
imputing psychic costs for respondents with valid responses to the school satisfying and courses 
interesting questions and with missing values for the questions on finding reading and math fun. 
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longitudinal analysis of respondents in both the base-year and first follow-up are used 
throughout. 
 
RESULTS 
DESCRIPTIVE ANALYSIS 
I first present frequencies of responses to the four items in the ELS02 that are 
used to measure psychic costs. Having never been examined, we do not know if 
psychic costs vary substantially interpersonally or if all adolescents preferences are 
roughly the same (such as would be the case if the popular notion that all adolescents 
dislike school is approximately true). Examining responses to individual items is also 
useful to see if self-reports support the suggestion that education delivers psychic 
benefits to some students.  
Figure 3.2A presents responses to the questions used to construct the psychic 
costs variable. Regarding thinking that reading and math are fun, 14 percent and 20 
percent of respondents respectively report that they Strongly disagree, which can 
reasonably be interpreted to mean that they rather dislike these activities. Conversely, 
14 percent and 7 percent report that they Strongly agree, which suggests that they 
enjoy these activities. This is consistent with the claim of Cunha, Heckman, and 
Navarro (2006) that education provides psychic benefits for some adolescents. The 
majority of respondents choose one of the intermediate categories, but responses are 
reasonably spread out across the four categories. With roughly 50 percent of students 
choosing to Agree that courses are interesting and that schoolwork is satisfying, 
there is less variation in these aspects of psychic costs, but responses are again not 
clustered on one choice. 
                                                                                                                                       
Questions on finding math and reading fun appear near the end of the questionnaire, and many students 
failed to respond to any of the questions near the end of the questionnaire. 
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Figure 3.2. Distribution of Responses to the Psychic Costs Questions, and the Psychic 
Costs Measure. ELS02, 2002.
 94
Figure 3.2B presents the distribution of psychic costs (the composite variable 
constructed from the variables in Figure 3.2A) and serves as further evidence of 
substantial interpersonal variation in psychic costs. Note that the items used to 
construct the composite psychic costs measure have been reverse-coded and that 
higher values indicate higher psychic costs.26    
 
THE EFFECTS OF PSYCHIC COSTS ON EDUCATIONAL EXPECTATIONS 
 As was the case with the perceived ability to complete college, there is no clear 
choice of causal effect to estimate. I therefore estimate average treatment effects in the 
same way as I did I Chapter 2. Unlike the perceived ability to complete college, 
however, there is no natural way to separate psychic costs into discrete treatment 
states. I therefore, somewhat arbitrarily, cut psychic costs into fourths, and I estimate 
the average treatment effect of moving from the lowest fourth to the next lowest 
fourth, and so on.  
Table 3.2 presents the results. Column 1 first presents the expectation of a 
four-year degree for each fourth of psychic costs. Some people would call the fourths 
quartiles; however, quartiles are actually the name for the break points between the  
fourths. This provides a useful terminology for effects, however, because we can say 
first quartile effects to refer to the effect of moving from the first fourth to the 
second fourth, and so on. Predictably, the results show that educational expectations 
decrease with higher psychic costs. Below the expectations in Column 1 are the naïve 
estimates of the treatment effects, which are the unadjusted differences in expectations 
                                                
26 To be consistent with the other chapters (in which higher values indicate more college-encouraging 
preferences and perceptions) I could have reverse-coded this variable to make an intrinsic value of 
schooling variable. I chose to retain the concept and expression psychic costs because it has gained 
wide currency in the context of schooling decisions. 
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across adjacent fourths. At .077 and .065, the effects for the first and third quartiles are 
considerably larger than for the effect for the second quartile, which is only .029. 
 
Table 3.2. Proportion of Students at Each Fourth of Psychic Costs Expecting a 4-year 
College Degree or Higher. ELS02 2002-2004. 
Psychic costs (higher values indicate a greater 
dislike for academic activities) 
(1) Unadjusted Results (2) Matching Results* 
 ENTRY RATES 
 Unadjusted Entry Rates Matched Entry Rates 
1st Fourth  .845 .807 
 (.008) (.010) 
2nd Fourth   .780 .788 
 (.013) (.012) 
3rd Fourth  .751 .757 
 (.008) (.008) 
4th Fourth   .674 .709 
 (.010) (.011) 
   
 EFFECTS 
 Naïve Estimates 
δNAIVE 
Matching Estimates 
δATE 
1st Quartile Effect .065 .019 
 (.016) (.016) 
2nd Quartile Effect  .029 .031 
 (.015) (.014) 
3rd Quartile Effect .077 .048 
 (.014) (.013) 
Notes. N=10,787. Bootstrap standard errors in parentheses. *Response groups are balanced on cognitive 
skill, grades, track placement, race and ethnicity, sex, family income and parental education. 
 
Column 2 presents results when each of the fourths have been balanced to the 
population on cognitive skill, family income, parental education, academic self-
concept, sex, and race and ethnicity. The third quartile effect is reduced by about 40 
percent to .048. Balancing reduces the first quartile effect to .019, which suggests that 
further reducing already low psychic costs has little effect on the expectation of a four-
year college degree. The effect for the second quartile is increased slightly, but it 
remains fairly low and is not statistically-discernable from zero at the p<.05 level.  
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To characterize the effect most dramatically, the effect of moving from the 
highest fourth of psychic costs to the lowest fourth increases the probability of 
expecting a four-year degree or higher by about 0.1.  
 
THE DETERMINANTS OF PSYCHIC COSTS 
Table 3.3 examines the determinants of psychic costs with a series of 
regression models. Model 1 (Column 1) regresses psychic costs on dummy variables 
for female, black, Hispanic, and Asian. Consistent with the suggestion of Jacob 
(2002), the results show that psychic costs are lower for females than for males. 
Surprisingly, psychic costs are also lower for blacks, Hispanics, and Asians  
than they are for whites.27 Note that cognitive skill, family income, and parental 
education are excluded from the model, so this is surprisingly not a case of blacks and 
Hispanics having more college-encouraging preferences than whites only conditional 
upon these factors. This is consistent with the finding that blacks have slightly more 
pro-school attitudes than whites (Cook and Ludwig 1997), but I offer no explanation 
for this unexpected finding. 
Model 2 (Column 2) adds family income, parental education, and cognitive 
skill. Cognitive skill is negatively related to psychic costs. Contrary to expectations, 
both family income and parental education are essentially unrelated to psychic costs. 
Introducing cognitive skill has increased black-white and Hispanic-white differences 
in psychic costs. Asian-white differences are slightly reduced because Asians have 
higher cognitive skill than whites in the ELS02. Academic track is strongly negatively 
related to psychic costs, although it is particularly easy in this case to see how 
causality could run in both directions.  
                                                
27 Separate analyses that examined males and females separately demonstrated that the black-white 
differences are largest among males. 
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Table 3.3. Coefficients from Regression Models Predicting the Psychic Costs of 
Schooling. ELS02, 2002. 
Outcome=Psychic costs of 
schooling 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
Intercept .022 .022 .025 .025 
 (.014) (.013) (.038) (.040) 
School-Level     
   Mean Family Income    .005 
    (.023) 
   Mean Parental Education    .018 
    (.024) 
   Mean Cognitive Skill    .060* 
    (.022) 
   Size    .040* 
    (.017) 
   Private    .083 
    (.058) 
   Catholic    .166*** 
    (.045) 
   % in College Prep.    .051* 
    (.017) 
Student-Level     
   Female .203*** .216*** .220*** .223*** 
 (.021) (.026) (.026) (.026) 
   Black .316*** .470*** .452*** .426*** 
 (.045) (.047) (.046) (.046) 
   Hispanic  .234*** .311** .300*** .266*** 
 (.037) (.039) (.040) (.041) 
   Asian .360*** .349*** .355*** .344*** 
 (.046) (.049) (.046) (.043) 
   Family Income  .026* .025 .021 
  (.013) (.013) (.014) 
   Parental Education  .006 .008 .019 
  (.014) (.013) (.014) 
   Cognitive Skill  .139** .143** .161*** 
  (.015) (.015) (.016) 
   College Prep. Track  .301** .310** .310** 
  (.025) (.025) (.027) 
τ00   .168*** .159*** 
Notes. N=10,787 level-one units (students); N=735 level-two units (schools). Heteroskedastic-robust 
standard errors in parentheses. * p<.05, **p<.01; *** p<.001. 
 
Model 3 (Column 3) is a multilevel model that models the nested structure of 
the data. It is a random-intercept model that allows the mean level of psychic costs to 
vary across high schools. Inter-school variation in psychic costs is measured with the 
τ00 term. The results (τ00=.168) show statistically-discernable and substantively-
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significant variation across schools. But note that allowing variation across schools 
has done little to change to coefficients for the level-one regressors. Therefore, while 
psychic costs vary across schools this does little to explain, for example, why psychic 
costs are lower for blacks and Hispanics than for whites. 
In an effort to explain inter-school variation in psychic costs, Model 4 (Column 
4) introduces the school-level variables school size, percentage of students in the 
academic track, school-mean family income, school-mean parental education, school-
mean cognitive skill, and dummy variables for Catholic school and nonCatholic 
private school as predictors of school-mean levels of psychic costs. Neither school-
mean family income nor school-mean parental education appears to influence psychic 
costs. School-mean cognitive skill appears to increase psychic costs, albeit modestly. 
School size seems to lower psychic costs, but the effect is quite modest. Psychic costs 
appear to be substantially lower in Catholic schools than in public schools. The 
percentage of students in the college preparatory track seems to increase psychic costs, 
which is surprising in light of the earlier finding that psychic costs are much lower for 
individuals in the academic track. 
Note also that these school-level variables can account for only about 5 percent 
of the variation in psychic costs that exists across schools. I find this unsurprising 
because reading, solving math problems, and finding school satisfying all seem like 
components of personality that are not easily influenced by school characteristics. I do 
not rule out school effects, but I could easily imagine that selection bias (or baseline 
bias) is responsible for the inter-school variation in psychic costs. 
 
CONCLUSIONS 
 To my knowledge, the research undertaken here is the first effort to directly 
measure psychic costs and estimate their effects on educational outcomes in the 
 99
United States. Results show considerable interpersonal variation in psychic costs, with 
some students seeing high psychic costs in schooling and others seeing considerable 
intrinsic value. Psychic costs appear to influence educational expectations. For 
example, moving from the highest fourth of psychic costs to the lowest fourth 
increases the probability of expecting a four-year degree by almost 0.1. It is difficult to 
draw firm conclusions about the importance of psychic costs from the results 
presented here because psychic costs are only crudely measured. What the results do 
provide is a general sense of the importance of psychic costs: they are not 
unimportant, but nor are they of overwhelming importance. For example, they appear 
to have a much weaker effect on expectations than the perceived ability to complete 
college (Chapter 2).28  
Psychic costs are lower for females than for males and lower for blacks, 
Hispanics, and Asians than for whites. Psychic costs are negatively related to 
cognitive skill, but the relationship is somewhat weak. Psychic costs are unrelated to 
parental education and family income. Psychic costs vary across schools, with 
Catholic schools, small schools, schools with a lower proportion of students in the 
college preparatory track, and schools with low mean levels of cognitive school 
having lower psychic costs. This being said, the majority of the school variation in 
psychic costs that exists conditional on students characteristics cannot be accounted 
for with the school-level variables considered here.  
These results bear directly on numerous claims and suggestions in the 
literature. Collins argues that schooling entails no meaningful psychic costs (Collins 
1979:124), while Cunha, Heckman, and Navarro (2006) argue that psychic costs are 
extremely high and are the main cause of adolescents decisions to forgo 
                                                
28 Chapter 2 actually looked at college entry, but unreported results on expectations show that the 
perceived ability to complete college has an even stronger effect on expectations than on college entry. 
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postsecondary schooling. The results presented here suggest that a more reasonable 
conclusion lies somewhere between these two extremes. The findings also fail to 
support the suggestions that psychic costs are lower for adolescents with advantaged 
backgrounds (Belzil and Hansen 2003) and that whites have more pro-school 
attitudes than blacks (Fordham and Ogbu 1986). 
If psychic costs reduce educational expectations and presumably attainment, 
then policy directed at increasing educational attainment could aim to lower psychic 
costs. Naturally we want to lower psychic coststo improve students lives if for no 
other reasonbut it is unknown the extent to which lowering psychic costs comes at 
the price of reducing academic rigor.  
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CHAPTER 4. OCCUPATIONAL PREFERENCES  
 
Empirical analysis in the schooling as investment tradition has taken too 
narrow a conception of utility functions by looking at earnings in particular as the 
motivation for postsecondary education. This chapter takes what I call an 
occupational preference perspective in which adolescents enter college to obtain 
occupations with the characteristicspecuniary and nonpecuniarythat they want. 
From this perspective, interpersonal differences in schooling decisions are seen to 
arise, in part, from interpersonal differences in occupational preferences.  
Economic models of schooling decisions assume that schooling is motivated 
by the desire to maximize utility and often explicitly assume that maximizing lifetime 
earnings maximizes utility. Typically, researchers do not justify the assumption, but 
the unstated argument is roughly: people want high earnings; schooling increases 
earnings; therefore, people go to school to increase their earnings.  
Should this argument be accepted? Evidence seems unnecessary for the claim 
that people want high earnings if the claim is limited to ceteris paribus conditions. The 
evidence for the claim that schooling increases earnings is very strong (for a review 
see Card 1998), although the precise magnitude of the effect and the mechanisms that 
bring it about are both disputed. This argument also assumes that people are aware of 
the causal effect of schooling. Research that surveys high school students beliefs 
finds that students generally believe that college will increase their earnings (Dominitz 
and Manski 1996; Avery and Kane 2004; Rouse 2004).  
As for the conclusion that adolescents enter college to increase their earnings, 
it appears to be just that: a conclusion based upon the first two claims. There is 
essentially no direct evidence. The only real evidence that has been offered is a degree 
of correspondence in trends over time in returns to education and college enrollment. 
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These trends were reviewed in Chapter 1 and were shown to be less than compelling 
evidence that earnings in particular motivate postsecondary schooling.  
The same arguments and evidence offered in support of the assumption that 
schooling is primarily about earnings can also be offered for the importance of 
nonpecuniary labor-market outcomes. People care about nonpecuniary labor market 
outcomes. Studies find that job satisfaction is only weakly affected by earnings 
(Gruenberg 1980). Research on compensating differentials shows that workers forgo 
higher earnings for more pleasant and safer jobs (Viscusi 2004; Moretti 2000; 
Feinberg 1981; Kostiuk 1990). Using the rankings people gave of their own jobs in 
conjunction with their descriptions of their own jobs, Jencks, Perman, and Rainwater 
(1988) found that earnings was the single strongest determinant of a jobs desirability 
but that other factors (such as autonomy, full-time employment, vacation time, on-the-
job training, job security, variety, cleanliness, and unionization) were collectively 
twice as important as earnings. This led them to conclude that nonpecuniary job 
characteristics are probably far more important to workers than most of us ordinarily 
assume (1343).29 Most directly, tabulations based on data from Monitoring the 
Future, which is described more fully shortly, show that adolescents report that 
nonpecuniary outcomes are very important to them. In fact, results show that over 35 
percent of respondents report that it is more important to them to have interesting 
work than to have high-paying work; only 8 percent report that high earnings are more 
important than interesting work. (The remaining 57 percent are ties.)  
Although the literature is neither as extensive nor as sophisticated as the 
research on the effect of education on earnings, research on nonpecuniary outcomes 
also consistently shows that education has strong effects on desirable nonpecuniary 
                                                
29 As an example, based on the parameters they estimate, they calculate that workers rate a clean job 
paying $10,000 a year about the same as a dirty job paying $23,000 a year (1339), which even I find 
hard to believe. 
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outcomes as well, such as working conditions and autonomy (Jencks, Perman, and 
Rainwater 1988; Duncan 1976). It would thus be sensible for adolescents to pursue 
college to improve the nonpecuniary aspects of their employment.  
Typically well disposed to seeing structure in the labor market, sociologists 
have long targeted occupations as important determinants of labor-market outcomes. 
Occupations have meaningful effects on the earnings of their incumbents with various 
mechanismssuch as occupational closure strategies (Weeden 2002) and sex 
composition (Kilbourne et al. 1994)offered as explanations for the effects. The tasks 
associated with occupations also appear to have important effects on job satisfaction 
(Kalleberg 1977), personality, and cognitive functioning (Kohn and Schooler 1982). 
These effects have motivated research seeking to understand the processes that result 
in incumbency in different occupations.  
Some of the research on occupational incumbency focuses on discrimination 
and other barriers to entry into desirable occupations. Other research focuses on 
preferences that lead different people to want different occupations (Filer 1983). I 
work within this latter preferences tradition. I argue, as have others, that it is sensible 
to think that the effect that education has on occupational attainment motivates 
schooling decisions (Morgan 2005; Powers and Wojtkiewicz 2004; Xie and Goyette 
2003:474476; Mare 1995; Jencks 1972) and that interpersonal differences in 
preferences relating to labor-market outcomes can explain interpersonal differences in 
postsecondary schooling decisions. This could be called an occupational preference 
perspective that sees postsecondary education as a means to an end, where the end is 
an occupation or a general type of occupation with certain characteristics.  
Orthodox status attainment models assume that the effects of education on 
occupational outcomes do not act as incentives to continue schooling (e.g., Sewell, 
Haller, and Portes 1969), but this seems unreasonable. Early work by Kahl (1953:196) 
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showed that adolescents see education as a means to occupations or types of 
occupations, and I believe that the assumption that they still do is reasonable and 
uncontroversial.  
 
INTERPERSONAL VARIATION IN OCCUPATIONAL PREFERENCES 
Preferences can vary both in strength and in kind. The distinction I make is 
between preferences for different types of outcomes and strengths of preferences for 
the same types of outcomes. This distinction is captured by the commonsense notion 
that people can have different standards than others for evaluating occupations and 
that people can have higher standards than others for evaluating occupations.  
First consider preferences for different types of outcomes, which I also refer to 
as different standards. Some occupational characteristics are liked by some and 
disliked by others. For example, some people find abstract problem solving interesting 
and satisfying, while others find it boring and frustrating. Some people like leadership 
roles and others are highly uncomfortable in them. Interpersonal variation in types of 
preferences is at the heart of the field known as vocational psychology. In John L. 
Hollands (1997) widely used system people are classified with six personality types. 
Each personality type has activities that they like and dislike and goals that they value 
and do not value. Realistic types like activities involving machines and tools, and they 
dislike educational activities. Investigative types prefer activities involving exploration 
and understanding. Artistic types prefer creative, musical, and artistic activities. 
Enterprising types like to lead, especially toward personal goals and the goals of 
organizations they are associated with. Conventional types like structured activities 
and routines, and they value material accomplishments. There are also six 
corresponding environments in Hollands framework, and people seek out the 
environments fitting their personality to achieve person-environment congruence. 
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There is considerable evidence of the effect of interests on occupational choice (see 
Holland 1997 and the references therein). 
Next consider differences in strengths of preferences. By their very nature, 
some tasks are undesirable to almost everyone. For example, some tasks are 
dangerous, exhausting, or involve environmental discomforts such as heat and cold. 
While these tasks are undesirable to almost everyone, there is almost certainly 
interpersonal variation in the extent to which they are considered undesirable. 
Similarly, some tasks and extrinsic rewards are desirable to almost everyone. For 
example, some jobs have high earnings and involve tasks that allow people to see the 
results of their work. Here too, while these features of a job are desirable to almost 
everyone, there is almost certainly interpersonal variation in the extent to which they 
are desired. Those who value a certain occupational characteristic highly could be said 
to have higher standards than others who value them but value them less. 
Vocational psychology is interested in differences in strengths of preferences 
as well, but they are somewhat downplayed. Most of the research on strengths of 
preferences is conduced by sociologists who study job values (also known as work 
values) to examine individual and group differences in the strength of various 
occupational preferences.  
It is useful here to clarify some of my terminology. Occupational preferences 
are preferences that adolescents and others have for various aspects of their 
employment. These are preferences for both pecuniary and nonpecuniary aspects of 
employment and for both intrinsic and extrinsic aspects of employment. There are 
several ways to measure occupational preferences. Two have already been touched 
upon. Adolescents can be given an interest inventory. A second similar way to 
measure occupational preferences is with a job values battery. Typical items in job 
values batteries ask respondents how important working with ideas, working with 
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people, working at a slow pace, and so on are in selecting a job. The job values 
literature confirms considerable interpersonal variation in job values and that job 
values influence occupational choice (Mortimer 1996). 
 
THE EFFECTS OF OCCUPATIONAL PREFERENCES ON EDUCATION 
What relationships should we expect between occupational preferences and 
college entry? Naturally, a rational choice perspective predicts that adolescents with 
preferences for the types of outcomes that education increases will be more likely to 
pursue college than those whose preferences lead them to dislike them. For example, 
education likely increases the probability of future work tasks that involve abstract 
problem solving; therefore, those enjoying abstract problem solving should expect and 
attain more education than those who dislike it. Limited research in vocational 
psychology supports this logic. Rottinghaus et al. (2002) and Gasser, Larson, and 
Borgen (2004) find that interest in investigative themes (which include abstract 
thinking, exploration, and understanding) predicts educational aspirations among 
college undergraduates. 
A similar logic applies to the strength of preferences. For example, education 
appears to increase earnings and occupational prestige, so strong preferences for 
earnings and status should increase the probability of college entry. This is essentially 
a job satisfaction explanation drawing on Kallebergs (1977) job values model. 
Kalleberg (1977) finds that those with lower scores on self-reported job values have 
higher job satisfaction conditional on the actual rewards of their jobs. For example, if 
two people have jobs with the same level of autonomy, the person who values 
autonomy more will have lower job satisfaction. Using my terminology, Kalleberg 
reasons that those with higher standards are less apt to meet their standards and are 
consequently more apt to be dissatisfied with their outcomes. Applying this reasoning 
 107
to the analysis of schooling decisions, if schooling increases rewards (e.g., autonomy), 
then those who most value these rewards should be the most likely to pursue 
postsecondary schooling for fear that their standards will go unmet if they do not. 
Those with lower standards will be less likely to pursue postsecondary schooling 
because they are more likely to be satisfied with the type of job they could obtain 
without it. 
Support for this reasoning dates back at least to the work of Kahl (1953) who 
examined academically able adolescents with modest family backgrounds and found 
that half of the boys chose not to strive for success as the term is conventionally 
defined. Instead, they planned little or no postsecondary schooling because they 
would be content with the lesser jobs that would likely be open to them (p. 186) and 
reported that for them the competitive game to rise higher was not worth the candle 
(p. 192).  
Limited research on job values provides only mixed support for the idea that 
high standards increase educational attainment. Lindsay and Knox (1984) find that the 
importance of intrinsic values, such as interesting work and autonomy, is positively 
related to subsequent educational attainment, and the more recent work of Johnson and 
Elder (2002) finds that those who attend postsecondary institutions place greater 
emphasis on authority and challenge. However, both studies find that those who 
pursue postsecondary education place less emphasis on extrinsic values, such as 
earnings and social status, than those who do not. 
Halaby (2003) argues against the intrinsic-extrinsic dichotomy and proposes 
that job values can more meaningfully be grouped into entrepreneurial job values 
(which include a preference for risk-taking and autonomy) and bureaucratic job 
values (which include preferences for job security, pensions, and so forth). Halaby 
(2003) found that respondents expecting to enter college had stronger preferences for 
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entrepreneurial job values (especially autonomy) than for bureaucratic job values, 
whereas those not expecting to enter college had stronger preferences for bureaucratic 
values.  
Halaby (2003) also shows that many job values are somewhat strongly related 
to cognitive skill and that cognitive skill is positively related to most aspects of 
entrepreneurial job values and negatively related to bureaucratic values.  
I have thus far examined occupational preferences measured as job values and 
self-reported interests. Occupational preferences have also been measured using 
occupational expectations and aspirations. Xie and Goyette (2003) use occupational 
expectations to explain in part why Asians have higher educational attainment than 
whites. Using NELS88 data, they map scores from a socioeconomic index onto the 
occupational expectations of whites and Asians to get a measure of the socioeconomic 
status of the occupations they expect. They found that Asians expect occupations with 
higher socioeconomic status than whites and that this can explain part of the higher 
college entry of Asians. Although they do not use the explanation themselves, this can 
be seen as a higher standards phenomenon.  
Powers and Wojtkiewicz (2004) use occupational aspirations to explain why 
females have higher educational attainment than males. Using the National 
Longitudinal Survey of Youth, 1979, they find that occupational aspirations explain the 
female advantage in high school graduation. Having found that the occupations 
females wanted did not have higher prestige than the occupations males wanted, they 
proposed what I term a different standards explanation. They found, for example, 
that females are more apt to want clerical occupations than skilled manual occupations 
and noted that these preferences would lead to higher educational attainment among 
females even though clerical occupations cannot be said to assume higher positions in 
the occupational hierarchy than skilled manual occupations. Powers and Wojtkiewicz 
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also found that introducing occupational aspirations into models of college graduation 
has only small effects on estimates of female-male differences, but their data is from 
1979 so it is difficult to determine if occupational aspirations are important in 
explaining the current female advantage, which had not clearly emerged in this cohort. 
Using occupational aspirations and expectations to measure occupational 
preferences is useful because more datasets include aspirations or expectations than 
job values. Occupational expectations and aspirations probably also do a better job at 
capturing occupational preferences than job values. For example, if someone reports 
wanting a clerical occupation this likely tells us more about the type of work they want 
than responses to even an entire job values battery, which has problems of 
interpersonal consistency of meaning (such as when A lot of money means different 
things to different people and when Very important means to one person what 
Somewhat important means to another). Job values batteries also fail to inquire 
about important occupational characteristics like working conditions, safety, and so 
on, which are implicitly contained in occupational expectations and aspirations.  
However, adolescents occupational expectations and aspirations are likely not 
determined by occupational preferences alone. Instead, they are likely caused jointly 
by adolescents occupational preferences and perceptions of what occupations are 
available to them. In the terminology of Gottfredsons (1981) circumscription and 
compromise theory of occupational aspirations, the occupations adolescents report as 
the one they would like to have as adults are the product of occupational preferences 
and perceived accessibility, which are perceptions of the types of occupations they 
have the ability to enter. Perceived accessibility is determined largely by adolescents 
inclination and self-assessed ability to complete the required training (including 
education) and perform the relevant occupational tasks. 
 110
Perceived accessibility often leads adolescents to engage in anticipatory 
compromise, which results in the reporting of occupations not completely in line with 
ones occupational preferences but perceived to be attainable. For example, a 
respondent may report wanting to be a health technician when ideally they would be a 
physician. This thinking is not in keeping with the interpretation of aspirations as 
statements of preferences,30 but evidence strongly suggests that aspirationsnot just 
expectationsare influenced by perceived accessibility.31 This issue, ignored by 
Powers and Wojtkiewicz (2004) and Xie and Goyette (2003), is important here 
because my interest is in occupational preferences per se, not perceived accessibility. 
This being said, differences in the level of occupational expectations and 
aspirations are probably not caused solely by perceived accessibility. Some 
adolescents will have preferences for being challenged, such as by challenging 
occupational tasks like abstract problem solving or by demanding entry requirements 
like a professional degree. Adolescents who want to be challenged will have higher 
occupational goals than similar adolescents lacking this preference. Differences in 
preferences for status could also lead some adolescents to want and expect 
occupations with higher status, which typically have more demanding entry 
                                                
30 Gottfredson uses the term preferences in the way that some people use the term aspirations: 
Preferences are the wish rather than the reality component of aspirations or goals (Gottfredson 
1981:548). 
31 Occupations become more realistic as respondents age, which strongly suggests that their aspirations 
are influenced by perceived accessibility. The NLSY79 data, described in more detail below, also 
suggest that perceived accessibility influences occupational aspirations. Following the occupational 
aspirations questions respondents are asked What do you think your chances are of getting into this 
type of work? with respondents choosing either Excellent, Good, Fair, or Poor. Only 3 
percent of respondents think that their chances of getting the occupation they report are Poor, which 
suggests that respondents do not report the occupation they would ideally have without consideration of 
potential barriers (22, 50, and 25 percent choose Fair, Good, and Excellent, respectively). 
Tabulations of occupational aspirations (results not shown) also reveal that those reporting that their 
chances of getting their occupation are Poor are much less likely to report occupations with low entry 
requirements  such as manual work  and are much more likely to report occupations with challenging 
entry requirements  such as athlete and (especially) writer or entertainer. More generally, the 
accessibility of occupations tends to increase as responses move from Poor to Excellent. Those 
with lower cognitive skill report occupations requiring lower cognitive skill, and this too has been 
interpreted as the effects of perceived accessibility, but this could also reflect preferences. 
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requirements. In a similar vein, occupational expectations may to some extent be a 
statement of where an adolescent thinks they belong in the occupational hierarchy. 
Thus it is important to take perceived accessibility into consideration, but it is also 
important to remember that differences in occupational level can result from 
preferences as well.  
 
DETERMINANTS OF OCCUPATIONAL PREFERENCES  
The literature shows that lower-class background is associated with valuing 
security and earnings and higher-class background is associated valuing autonomy and 
intrinsic rewards, such as interesting work (Pearlin and Kohn 1966; Kohn and 
Schooler 1969; Kohn and Schooler 1983; Johnson and Elder 2002; Halaby 2003). In 
Halabys (2003) job values dichotomy, more advantaged family backgrounds are 
associated with entrepreneurial job values. As discussed, Halaby (2003) also finds that 
cognitive skill is positively related to bureaucratic job values such as risk-taking for 
high rewards. 
Research on gender differences in job values finds that females have a greater 
concern for social rewards (e.g., a job that gives you a chance to make friends), 
altruistic rewards (e.g., a job that is worthwhile to society), and intrinsic rewards 
(Marini, et al. 1996).32 Research on gender differences in occupational aspirations and 
expectations finds very strong gender effects. Females are more likely to want or 
expect clerical occupations or health related occupations; males are more likely to 
want or expect managerial and engineering occupations. 
 No literature exists on school-effects on job values, but some of the broader 
school-effects literature is suggestive of relationships. As I argued earlier, 
                                                
32 Data prior the 1980s shows the females have less concern than males for extrinsic rewards, but 
Marini et al. (1996) shows that this is no longer the case. 
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occupational aspirations and expectations almost certainly represent occupational 
preferences to some extent, and research suggests that there are school effects on 
occupational expectations. Goldsmith (2004) finds that a schools racial mix affects 
occupational aspirations; specifically, occupational expectations increase as the 
proportion of students who are either black or Hispanic increases. Marsh (1991) finds 
that the mean level of cognitive skill at a school lowers occupational aspirations, and 
he attributes this finding to the big-fish-little-pond effect (see Chapter 2).  
The job values and status attainment traditions have largely developed in 
isolation of one another (Halaby 2003), and the possibility that occupational 
preferences affect schooling decisions has been the subject of surprisingly little 
research. This chapter contributes to the literature by providing a more complete 
picture of the links between occupational preferences and educational attainment than 
currently exists. I measure occupational preferences as (1) self-reported job values, (2) 
occupational expectations, and (3) implied preferences for occupational characteristics 
by mapping occupational characteristics onto the occupations adolescents want. I also 
directly compare the use of job values and occupational expectations as measures of 
occupational preferences by using data containing both types of measures.  
The empirical analysis consists of three major sections. The first section 
describes the relationship between occupational preferences and educational 
expectations. This is done using job values, occupational aspirations, and with 
implied preferences based on occupational aspirations. The second section estimates 
the causal effect of occupational preferences on educational expectations and college 
entry. The third section briefly addresses the determinants of occupational preferences. 
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DATA 
Two datasets are used. Monitoring the Future is used to measure occupational 
preferences using both self-reported job values and occupational expectations. The 
National Longitudinal Survey of Youth, 1979 is used to examine occupational 
preferences using occupational aspirations. This dataset is ideal because occupational 
aspirations are coded into a standard occupational classification system, and 
occupational characteristics can be mapped onto the occupations adolescents want.  
 
MONITORING THE FUTURE, 1990 to 2005. Monitoring the Future (hereafter, 
MTF) is a nationally-representative, cross-sectional survey of high school seniors in 
approximately 130 public and private high schools in the United States. It has been 
conducted annually since 1976. It is a three-stage sample: the first stage is 
geographical areas; the second stage is one or more high schools within the 
geographical areas; the third stage is high school seniors within the high schools. 
Sampling weights are used to adjust for unequal probabilities of selection resulting 
from the sampling procedures. The sample used here was constructed by pooling data 
from the 1990 to 2005 surveys. 
Occupational expectations are measured with a 16-category classification, 
which is presented in Table 4.1 along with descriptions, means, and standard 
deviations of all of the variables used in the analysis. Job values are measured with a 
battery of questions asked of a subset of all MTF respondents. Respondents are told 
that Different people may look for different things in their work, and they are asked 
how important each of 23 characteristics is to them in their work. Full wording for all 
23 characteristics is presented in Table 4.1, which also includes descriptive names I 
have given the job values that I use throughout the remainder of the Chapter. The 
same subset of respondents is asked both the job values and occupational expectations 
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questions, so these two methods of measuring occupational preferences can be 
compared. 
Respondents are asked how likely it is that they will obtain a four-year degree 
and are allowed to report that they Definitely will, Probably will, Probably 
wont, or Definitely wont obtain one. I generate a dichotomous variable that 
equals one if respondents think they Definitely will obtain a four-year degree and 
equals zero if they select any of the other three response options. I refer to those who 
report that they Definitely will graduate as expecting four-year degrees and the 
others as expecting less, although this is not completely accurate because many of 
them think that they Probably will get bachelors degrees.33  
Parental education is measured as the educational attainment of the most 
educated parent or whichever parents education is available if the other parents 
education is missing. There is no measure of the perceived ability to complete college, 
but I measure perceived ability with both self-assessed intelligence and self-assessed 
academic ability. Measures of self-assessed ability are also valuable also because they 
can be used to control for the perceived accessibility of occupations.  
The MTF was chosen for its job values battery, but it has several shortcomings 
for other measures that hinder my ability to present results for the MTF that are 
comparable to results based upon other datasets. There are no school identifiers in the 
public release data, so multilevel models are not possible. Race and ethnicity can only 
be coded in the three categories white, black, and other. There is neither a family 
income question nor a question on parents occupation, which could be used as a 
proxy. MTF also lacks a measure of cognitive skill. Because cognitive skill is so 
central to the analysis, I include grade point average (hereafter, GPA) and a dummy 
                                                
33 Other codings of educational expectations were experimented with. All yielded largely similar 
results. 
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Table 4.1. Variables Used to Analyze Occupational Preferences. 
 (A) MTF, 19902005; (B) NLSY79, 19791990; (C) O*NET98.
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PANEL A. MONITORING THE FUTURE (N=36,920)   
Variable Description Mean  Stand.  
Dev. 
Expects a 4-
year degree 
Student is certain they will obtain a 4-
year degree (yes=1). 
Coded from a question asking How 
likely is it that you will do each of the 
following things after high 
school?...Graduate from college (four-
year program)  
(Response options: 1=Definitely Wont; 
2=Probably Wont; 3=Probably Will; 
4=Definitely Will). Only students 
responding that they Definitely will 
are coded as expecting a 4-year degree. 
.54 .50 
Occupational 
expectations 
The kind of work students think they 
will be doing when they are 30 years 
old; chosen from the following 16 
categories: 
  
 Laborer .00 .05 
 Service worker .02 .13 
 Operative .01 .10 
 Sales clerk .00 .06 
 Clerical or office worker .03 .18 
 Protective service .04 .19 
 Military service .03 .16 
 Craftsman or skilled worker .05 .23 
 Farm owner, farm manager .01 .09 
 Owner of a small business .06 .23 
 Sales representative .02 .12 
 Manager or administrator .06 .23 
 Professional I .35 .48 
 Professional II .19 .39 
 Homemaker .01 .10 
 Dont know .02 .13 
 Missing occupational expectation .10 .31 
Job values How much respondents value various 
aspects of jobs in assessing their 
desirability. Based on responses to 
Different people may look for 
different things in their work. Below is 
a list of some of these things. Please 
read each one, then indicate how 
important this thing is to you. 
(Response options: 1=Not important; 
2=A little important; 3=Pretty  
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 important; 4=Very important)   
Advancement A job where the chances for 
advancement and promotion are good 
3.49 .72 
Income A job which provides you with a 
chance to earn a good deal of money 
3.41 .78 
Respect A job that most people look up to and 
respect 
3.17 .89 
Prestige A job that has high status and prestige 2.85 .94 
Secure Future A job that offers a reasonably 
predictable, secure future 
3.52 .70 
No Relocating A job which allows you to establish 
roots in a community and not have to 
move from place to place 
3.05 .96 
Decision-
Making 
A job where you get a chance to 
participate in decision making 
3.10 .82 
Challenging 
Problems 
A job where most problems are quite 
difficult and challenging 
2.36 .93 
Interesting A job which is interesting to do 3.81 .48 
Can Be 
Yourself 
A job where you do not have to pretend 
to be a type of person that you are not 
3.56 .80 
Uses Your 
Skills 
A job which uses your skills and 
abilities  lets you do things you can do 
best 
3.64 .60 
See Results of 
Work 
A job where you can see the results of 
what you do 
3.39 .72 
Skills Remain 
Useful 
A job where the skills you learn will not 
go out of date 
3.27 .86 
Learn New 
Things 
A job where you can learn new things, 
learn new skills 
3.24 .77 
Creativity A job where you have the chance to be 
creative 
3.09 .89 
You Help 
Others 
A job that gives you an opportunity to 
be directly helpful to others 
3.23 .84 
Benefit to 
Society 
A job that is worthwhile to society 3.17 .87 
Make Friends A job that gives you a chance to make 
friends 
3.19 .85 
Interpersonal A job that permits contact with a lot of 
people 
2.90 .97 
Free Time A job which leaves a lot of time for 
other things in your life 
3.24 .78 
Unsupervised A job which leaves you mostly free of 
supervision by others 
2.88 .91 
Vacations A job where you have more than two 
weeks vacation 
2.67 1.03 
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Slow Pace A job with an easy pace that lets you 
work slowly 
2.32 .97 
White Student is white (yes=1). .64 .48 
Black Student is black (yes=1). .11 .32 
Other 
race/ethnicity 
Student is a race or ethnicity other than 
white or black (yes=1). 
.19 .40 
Female Student is female (yes=1). .52 .49 
Parental 
education 
Highest grade completed by the most 
educated parent, or whichever parents 
education is available if the others is 
missing. 
14.51 2.50 
Perceived 
school ability 
Students perceived school ability 
relative to others their age throughout 
the country. Measured with responses 
to: Compared with others your age 
throughout the country, how do you 
rate yourself on school ability? 
(Response categories: 1=Far below 
average; 2=Below average; 3=Slightly 
below average; 4=Average; 5=Slightly 
above average; 6=Above average; 
7=Far above average) 
4.89 1.17 
Perceived 
Intelligence 
Students perceived intelligence relative 
to others their age throughout the 
country. Measured with responses to: 
How intelligent do you think you are 
compared with others your age? 
(Response categories: 1=Far below 
average; 2=Below average; 3=Slightly 
below average; 4=Average; 5=Slightly 
above average; 6=Above average; 
7=Far above average) 
4.98 1.16 
Academic track Student is in the academic or college 
preparatory track (yes=1) 
.55 .50 
Grade point 
average (GPA) 
Which of the following best describes 
your average grade so far in high 
school? 
Response categories: A; A; B+; B; B; 
C+; C; C; D 
Response categories are converted to a 
GPA as follows: A = 4.0; A =3.7; B+ 
= 3.3; B = 3.0; B =2.7; C+=2.3; C = 
2.0; C = 1.7; D = 1.0; F = 0  
3.06 .67 
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PANEL B. NLSY79 19791990 (N=4,066)   
Variable Description Mean  Stand.  
Dev. 
Expects a 4-
year degree 
Adolescent expects a 4-year degree or 
higher (yes=1). 
 
.47 .50 
College entry Adolescent has entered a 2- or 4-year 
college by the 1990 round 
.64 .48 
Parental 
education 
Highest grade completed of the most 
educated parent, or whichever parents 
education is available if the other 
parents education is missing. 
12.8 2.89 
Family income Family income from all sources in 
1979.  
20,367.31 12,861.38 
Cognitive skill Score on the Armed Forces Qualifying 
Test (AFQT) 
199.34 33.65 
Female Student is female (yes=1) .51 .50 
White Student is white (yes=1) .79 .41 
Black Student is black (yes=1) .14 .35 
Hispanic Student is Hispanic (yes=1) .05 .23 
Other 
race/ethnicity 
Student is a race or ethnicity other than 
white, black, or Hispanic (yes=1) 
.01 .10 
    
PANEL C. 
O*NET98 
   
Variable Description   
INTERESTS    
Realistic Realistic occupations frequently 
involve work activities that include 
practical, hands on problems and 
solutions. They often deal with plants, 
animals, and real world materials like 
wood, tools, and machinery. Many of 
the occupations require working outside 
and do not involve a lot of paperwork 
or working closely with others. 
.00 1.00 
Investigative Investigative occupations frequently 
involve working with ideas and require 
an extensive amount of thinking. These 
occupations can involve searching for 
facts and figuring out problems 
mentally. 
.00 1.00 
Artistic Artistic occupations frequently involve 
working with forms, designs, and 
patterns. They often require self- 
.00 1.00 
 120
Table 4.1 (Continued) 
 
 expression and the work can be done 
without following out a clear set of 
rules. 
  
Social Social occupations frequently involve 
working with, communicating with, and 
teaching people. These occupations 
often involve helping or providing 
service to others.  
.00 1.00 
Enterprising Conventional occupations frequently 
involve starting up and carrying out 
projects. These occupations can involve 
leading people and making many 
decisions. Sometimes they require risk 
taking and involve business. 
.00 1.00 
Conventional Conventional occupations frequently 
involve following set procedures and 
routines. These occupations can include 
working with data and details more than 
with ideas. Usually there is a clear line 
of authority to follow. 
.00 1.00 
OTHER 
INTRINSIC 
   
Creativity Workers on this job try out their own 
ideas. 
.00 1.00 
Variety Workers on this job have something 
different to do each day. 
.00 1.00 
Achievement Workers on this job get a feeling of 
accomplishment. 
.00 1.00 
Responsibility Workers on this job make decisions on 
their own. 
.00 1.00 
Frustrating 
Circumstances 
To what extent do frustrating 
circumstances (roadblocks to work 
that are beyond the workers control) 
hinder the accomplishment of this job? 
.00 1.00 
Activity Workers on this job are busy all the 
time. 
.00 1.00 
EXTRINSIC    
Compensation Workers on this job are paid well in 
comparison with other workers. 
.00 1.00 
Security Workers on this job have steady 
employment. 
.00 1.00 
Social Status Workers on this job are looked up to by 
others in their company and 
community. 
.00 1.00 
Advancement Workers on this job have opportunities 
for advancement. 
.00 1.00 
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ALTRUISTIC    
Moral Values Workers on this job are never pressured 
to do things that go against their sense 
of right and wrong. 
.00 1.00 
Assist & Care 
for Others 
Providing assistance or personal care 
for others. 
.00 1.00 
Presumed 
Good of the 
People 
A preference for working for the 
presumed good of the people. (This is a 
DOT variable.) 
.00 1.00 
INTERPERSONAL 
RELATIONS 
   
Authority Workers on this job give directions and 
instructions to others. 
.00 1.00 
Autonomy Workers on this job plan their work 
with little supervision. 
.00 1.00 
Independence Workers on this job do their work 
alone. 
.00 1.00 
Conflict 
Situations 
How frequently do the job requirements 
place the worker in conflict situations? 
.00 1.00 
Deal with 
Unpleasant/ 
Angry People 
How frequently does the worker have to 
deal with unpleasant, angry, or 
discourteous individuals as part of the 
job requirements? 
.00 1.00 
Coworkers Workers on this job have coworkers 
who are easy to get along with. 
.00 1.00 
WORK ENVIRONMENT 
Working 
Conditions 
Occupations that satisfy this work value 
offer job security and good working 
conditions. 
.00 1.00 
Radiation- 
Injury 
Likelihood 
What is the likelihood that the worker 
would be injured as a result of being 
exposed to radiation while performing 
this job? 
.00 1.00 
Disease- Injury 
Likelihood 
What is the likelihood that the worker 
would be injured as a result of being 
exposed to diseases/infections while 
performing this job? 
.00 1.00 
Hazardous 
Conditions-
Injury 
Likelihood  
What is the likelihood that the worker 
would be injured as a result of being 
exposed to hazardous situations while 
performing this job?  
.00 1.00 
ABILITIES/SKILLS    
Deductive 
Reasoning 
The ability to apply general rules to 
specific problems to come up with 
logical answers. It involves deciding if 
an answer makes sense. 
.00 1.00 
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Social 
Perceptiveness 
Being aware of others reactions and 
understanding why they react the way 
they do. 
.00 1.00 
Manual 
Dexterity 
The ability to make coordinated 
movements with one hand, a hand 
together with its arm, or two hands to 
grasp, manipulate, or assemble objects. 
.00 1.00 
Notes. Data are weighted. Variable statistics include imputed values. 
 
variable for academic track (both of which are strongly related to cognitive skill) in 
models in an effort to control for the effects of cognitive skill. GPA and track 
placement will fail to capture the total effects of cognitive skill and will likely capture 
other effects such as effort. However, these variablesin conjunction with self-
assessed intelligence and self-assessed academic abilityshould collectively control 
for most of the effects of cognitive skill.  
 The sample is limited to respondents with valid responses to the educational 
expectation question; sample size is N=36,920. Missing values for all other variables 
are imputed using Statas best subset imputation command impute. Missing values 
for job values have been rounded to the nearest integer for Figures 4.2A and 4.2B. A 
dummy variable for missing occupational expectations is used for missing 
occupational expectations. This is not in keeping with current imputation practice; 
however, there are so many respondents with missing occupational expectations (and 
they are virtually all imputed as Professional II if they are imputed) that a separate 
category seems appropriate. 
 
NATIONAL LONGITUDINAL SURVEY OF YOUTH, 1979. The National 
Longitudinal Survey of Youth, 1979 (hereafter, NLSY79) is a sample of 12,686 youth 
born between 1957 and 1964 living in the United States in 1979. Respondents were 
interviewed annually from 1979 to 1994 and biennially from in 1994 to the present. 
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Sampling weights are used to adjust for unequal probabilities of selection resulting 
from the sampling procedures.  
Educational expectations come from the 1979 round when respondents were 
asked the highest grade of formal schooling they expect to complete. Expectations are 
measured as a dichotomy equaling one if respondents expect a four-year degree or 
higher and zero if they expect less education. Ever attended college indicates if the 
respondent has attended a two- or four-year college as of the 1990 round (when 
respondents were aged 25 to 33). 
Race and ethnicity are coded with the mutually-exclusive categories white, 
black, Hispanic, and Other.34 Cognitive skill is measured with the 1989 version of 
AFQT supplied with the data.35 Family income is taken from the Household Screener; 
missing values are filled in with responses to the family income question in the 1979 
survey. Parental education is measured as the highest grade completed by the most 
educated parent or guardian as reported by the respondent or with whichever parents 
education is available is the other parents education is missing.  
Occupational aspirations are based on a series of questions in 1979 asking 
respondents what kind of work they would like to be doing when they are 35 years 
old. Verbatim responses were coded in the 1970 Census Occupation Code (COC).  
There is a long tradition in quantitative social stratification research of treating 
occupations as measures of labor-market outcomes, especially using prestige scores or 
                                                
34 The racial/ethnic cohort from the screener was the primary variable used to code race and ethnicity. It 
has three categories: 1) Hispanic, 2) black, and 3) nonblack, nonHispanic. The first two categories are 
used to code Hispanic and black. White was coded by isolating respondents from the third category that 
are White using sequentially the 1979-1981 interviewer remarks. A respondent was coded as white if 
the interviewer said they were white and not white if they said they were black or other.  
35 Controversy surrounds the use of the AFQT because respondents took the test at different ages and 
with different levels of education and it is not clear how best to adjust the AFQT scores. I have simply 
included a measure for age in 1979, which should absorb differences owing to age. I am reluctant to 
adjust for schooling differences because with the young sample I have, which is limited to respondents 
who were in high school in 1979, most education differences could be due to grade retention, which 
will be largely a consequence of differences in cognitive skill. 
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socioeconomic scores. Rather than using a single measure, such as a socioeconomic 
score, a range of occupational characteristics can be mapped onto the occupations 
adolescents want to provide a more complete picture of the differences in occupational 
preferences between the more- and less-educated.36 Doing so allows for occupations to 
be different from one another though not necessarily better or worse. It also allows an 
occupation to be better than another occupation in some ways and worse in others. 
Occupational characteristics that are mapped onto the occupations respondents aspire 
to are drawn primarily from the Occupational Information Network (hereafter, 
O*NET), which is a database system for collecting, organizing, and describing the 
characteristics of occupations and their incumbents. O*NET replaces the Dictionary of 
Occupational Titles (hereafter, DOT). It is preferable to the DOT because it contains 
more measures (including Hollands six interest types) and measures that are more 
finely-grained than those found in the DOT.37 The first version of O*NET (which is 
commonly referred to as O*NET98) is used becauseunlike later releasesit 
contains a crosswalk that can be used to generate values for the 1990 COC, which is 
easily converted into 1980 COC. Unfortunately, there is no crosswalk from O*NET98 
to the 1970 COC, which is the classification system used to code occupational 
aspirations in the NLSY79. To generate values for the 1970 COC a probabilistic 
crosswalk known as the Treiman File (U.S. Bureau of the Census 1985), which is a 
portion of the 1970 Census with respondents occupations coded in both the 1970 and 
1980 COC, is used. 
                                                
36 Recent decades have seen a shift away from occupations and towards earnings. The shift to earnings 
is understandable because earnings are a better measure of material well-being, occupational measures 
have considerable measurement error due to the heterogeneity of jobs (the combination of work duties 
and employer) within an occupational title and due to the coding process in which verbatim responses 
are categorized into one of a group of occupational titles. Nonetheless, occupational measures are 
probably the best way to get a more complete picture of the types of work people want and get in the 
context of large sample surveys. 
37 In the DOT, measures often only indicate the presence or absence of a characteristic, while O*NET 
measures are typically on a multiple-point scale. 
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One measureworking for the presumed good of the peopleis drawn from 
the DOT, Fourth Edition because a similar measure is lacking in O*NET98. Table 4.1 
gives more detail on the occupational characteristics considered here and descriptive 
names used throughout the chapter. 
The sample is limited to respondents in the cross-sectional sample, the 
oversample of blacks and Hispanics, and the oversample of disadvantaged whites (i.e., 
it excludes the supplemental sample of military personnel); who were living with their 
parents or adult guardians in the 1979 round (to ensure that family income represents a 
family background measure); with valid educational expectations and college entry 
data; and to respondents who were still enrolled in high school in 1979 when the 
educational expectations and occupational aspiration questions were asked (to reduce 
the effects of full-time labor-force participation on expectations and aspirations). 
Sample size is N=4,066. 
 
RESULTS  
DO ADOLESCENTS EXPECTING COLLEGE DEGREES HAVE DIFFERENT 
OCCUPATIONAL PREFERENCES THAN THOSE EXPECTING LESS EDUCATION? 
The first set of analyses seeks to show that (1) occupational preferences vary 
substantially interpersonally, (2) those who expect college degrees want different 
things from their employment than those expecting less education, and (3) 
interpersonal variation in occupational preferences is not caused solely by the 
perceived accessibility of occupations. I attempt to show these points by measuring 
occupational preferences in several ways and by attempting to adjust for perceived 
accessibility in several ways.  
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USING JOB VALUES TO MEASURE OCCUPATIONAL PREFERENCES. Both 
Lindsay and Knox (1984) and Johnson and Elder (2002) report that the college 
educated have stronger preferences for intrinsic values and weaker preferences for 
extrinsic values. However, both engage in data reduction by generating composite 
measures, which precludes the possibility of discerning which specific job values are 
important and which are not. For example, it is not possible to determine if 
preferences for status influence educational outcomes because status and earnings are 
combined to create a single variable measuring the importance of extrinsic values. 
This is especially important when seemingly different job values are used to construct 
a single composite variable.38 I first examine each of the job values in the MTF 
separately and the relationships that they have with the expectation of a four-year 
degree. 
Figure 4.1A presents the distribution of responses for each job value by 
educational expectations. A cursory examination of Figure 4.1A reveals that, while 
most adolescents select Very Important for numerous job values (e.g., Advancement, 
Income, Interesting), there is considerable variation in job values in the sense that 
responses are not clustered around a single response category. 
Figure 4.1A also suggests that most of the variation in preferences is variation 
in strengths of preferences not variation in types of preferences. If a job value was 
unimportant to an adolescent or if they had a distaste for the occupational 
characteristic the job value inquired about, then they should respond Not important. 
                                                
38 For example, guided by factor analysis Johnson and Elder (2002) use both the values a  job which 
leaves a lot of free time for other things in your life and a job which leaves you mostly free of 
supervision of others to construct a composite variable leisure. Similarly, a composite variable 
measuring the influence someone has at work is generated with responses to the disparate job values a 
job where you get a chance to participate in decision making and a job where most problems are quite 
difficult and challenging. These are surely related in a correlational sense, but they tap into distinct 
concepts, and they could have different effects on education. 
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Figure 4.1A. Job Values by Educational Expectations. MTF, 19902005. 
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Figure 4.1B. Job Values by Educational Expectations with Other Predictors of 
Educational Expectations set to their Means. MTF, 19902005. 
Notes. Results were generated based on parameter estimates from a multinomial regression. Gender, race and ethnicity, GPA, 
academic track, perceived intelligence, and perceived school ability have been set to their means.  
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Examination of Figure 4.1 shows that very few adolescents select Not 
important for most of the job values. For example, Not important is reported by 
only about 2 percent of respondents for the job values Advancement, Income, 
Interesting, Uses Your Skills, See Results of Work, Learn New Things, Free Time, and 
Secure Future. Only about 5 percent of respondents report Not important for the job 
values Respect, Be Yourself, Skills Remain Useful, Creativity, Help Others, Benefit to 
Society, Make Friends, and Decision-Making. Only for the job values Slow Pace, 
Challenging Problems, and Vacations do substantial proportions report Not 
important.  
Do adolescents expecting four-year degrees have different job values than 
those expecting less education? First consider the five job values typically considered 
together as extrinsic rewards. Figure 4.1A shows that two of the five extrinsic 
valuesRespect and Prestigeare of greater importance to those expecting 
bachelors degrees. Income is less important to those expecting four-year degrees, and 
Secure Future and Advancement are essentially unrelated to expectations.  
Intrinsic values are generally, but not always, more important to those 
expecting bachelors degrees. For example, it is more important to those expecting 
bachelors degrees to have work that is Interesting, allows them to Be Yourself, lets 
them Use Your Skills, and allows them to See Results of Work. However, having Skills 
Remain Useful, Learn New Things, and being Creative are of roughly equal 
importance to both groups.  
Both types of altruistic rewards (You Help Others and Benefits to Society), both 
types of social rewards (Make Friends and Interpersonal), and Decision-Making are 
more important to those expecting bachelors degrees. Leisure reward differences are 
small, although a Slow Pace is less important to those expecting bachelors degrees. 
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Perhaps these differences reflect differences in perceived accessibility. For 
example, adolescents who believe that they cannot become physicians may begin to 
believe that Income and Respect are unimportant to them, such as might happen if a 
sour grapes mechanism (Elster 1983) was operating. It is therefore useful to look at 
job values conditional on perceived accessibility. Because I lack a direct measure of 
perceived accessibility, I use variables for both measured ability and perceived ability. 
Specifically, I model job values determination with a multinomial logit model, and I 
regress each job value on GPA, academic track, perceived intelligence, and perceived 
school ability. I also include gender and race, which also predict educational 
expectations, as regressors. I then set all of these regressors to their mean to predict 
job values. Figure 4.1B presents the results. 
A comparison of Figures 4.1A and 4.1B shows that conditioning on variables 
intended to measure perceived and actual ability has increased differences between 
educational expectation groups for some job values, reduced them for some job 
values, reversed them for some job values, and has left some differences unchanged. 
For example, adolescents expecting four-year degrees had weaker preferences for 
Advancement and Income before conditioning, but they have slightly stronger 
preferences conditional on perceived accessibility. The changes in intrinsic values are 
especially mixed. For example, differences in Interesting have shrunk, differences in 
Creativity have grown, differences in Interpersonal have remained the same, and 
differences in Learn New Things have reversed direction.  
It is thus difficult to say if conditioning on perceived ability has increased or 
decreased differences in job values. More generally, however, it could be said that 
differences between the educational expectation groups exist, it is unlikely that these 
differences are due solely to perceived accessibility, and the differences are not of an 
overwhelming magnitude.  
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USING OCCUPATIONAL ASPIRATIONS TO MEASURE OCCUPATIONAL 
PREFERENCES. I next explore occupational preferences by looking at the occupations 
adolescents want in the NLSY79, which codes occupational aspirations in the 1970 
COC. Figure 4.6 presents the distributions of occupational aspirations by educational 
expectations as a first overview of results. It shows that respondents expecting four-
year degrees are far more likely than those expecting less education to want to be 
professionals, and the reverse is true for blue-collar occupations. 
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Figure 4.2. Distribution of Occupations Wanted by Educational Aspiration Group. 
NLSY79, 1979. 
 
Distributions of occupations are informative and useful for providing an 
intuitive demonstration of differences in occupational preferences. More informative 
of the specific preferences that might motivate these choices is an examination of the 
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multiple measures from O*NET98 that characterize the occupations aspired to. The 
first set of results, which are presented in Column 1 of Table 4.4, report differences 
between those expecting bachelors degrees and those expecting less education. 
Specifically, Column 1 reports the parameter estimates αBA from regression models in 
which an occupational characteristic (O) is regressed on a dummy variable for 
expecting a bachelors degree or higher (BA); controls also include a dummy variable 
for female (F), and age measured in years (A): 
 
iAiFiBAi AFBAOE αααα +++= 0)(  
 
Occupational characteristics are converted to z-scores to facilitate comparisons 
among them. For example, the coefficient .428 in the first row of Column 1 indicates 
that the importance of Realistic interests in the occupations wanted by those expecting 
a bachelors degree is .428 standard deviations lower than the importance of Realistic 
interests in the occupations wanted by those expecting less education. (Note that sex 
and age are included only as control variables, and the parameter estimates αF and αA 
are not presented in Table 4.4.)  
Table 4.4 does not include all O*NET98 variables, of which there are 
hundreds. Instead, it contains groups of variables that are illustrative of more general 
patterns found across the broader range of O*NET98 variables. To give some structure 
to the discussion I have classified the occupational characteristics into the seven 
categories interests, other intrinsic, extrinsic, altruistic, interpersonal relations, work 
environment, and abilities/skills. Despite my efforts to keep the occupational 
characteristics to a minimum, it is best to make somewhat cursory observations 
leaving detailed examination to readers. 
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Table 4.2. Coefficients from Regressions Predicting the Characteristics of Occupations 
Wanted at Age 35. NLSY79, 1979. 
 (1) 
αBA 
(2) 
βBA 
(3) 
γBA 
INTERESTS    
    Realistic .428** .287** .038 
 (.036) (.042) (.028) 
    Investigative .838** .617** .156** 
 (.035) (.041) (.028) 
    Artistic .528** .436** .254** 
 (.037) (.046) (.048) 
    Social .469** .465** .039 
 (.034) (.041) (.020) 
    Enterprising .342** .193** .072 
 (.039) (.046) (.040) 
    Conventional .020 .092 .145** 
 (.040) (.050) (.049) 
OTHER INTRINSIC    
    Creativity .868** .662** .184** 
 (.036) (.045) (.037) 
    Variety .883** .710** .172** 
 (.037) (.045) (.034) 
    Achievement .960** .800** .277** 
 (.036) (.044) (.035) 
    Responsibility .960** .739** .223** 
 (.035) (.043) (.033) 
    Frustrating Circumstances .429** .382** .126** 
 (.038) (.046) (.038) 
    Activity .314** .252** .146** 
 (.038) (.047) (.045) 
EXTRINSIC    
    Compensation .541** .369** .074* 
 (.036) (.042) (.037) 
    Security .672** .531** .027 
 (.036) (.044) (.035) 
    Social Status 1.025** .827** .254** 
 (.035) (.043) (.028) 
    Advancement .491** .301** .031 
 (.039) (.046) (.038) 
ALTRUISTIC    
    Moral Values .668** .548** .017 
 (.037) (.044) (.033) 
    Assist & Care for Others-Lev .455** .434** .043 
 (.034) (.041) (.026) 
    Presumed Good of the People .445** .510** .152** 
 (.034) (.042) (.032) 
INTERPERSONAL RELATIONS    
    Authority .907** .748** .127** 
 (.036) (.043) (.027) 
    Autonomy .920** .656** .171** 
 (.035) (.044) (.034) 
    Independence .327** .358** .031 
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Table 4.2 (Continued) 
 
   
 (.037) (.044) (.034) 
    Conflict Situations .604** .520** .102** 
 (.036) (.042) (.029) 
    Deal w/Unpleasant/Angry People .339** .387** .108** 
 (.036) (.042) (.032) 
    Coworkers .513** .468** .054 
 (.037) (.045) (.036) 
WORK ENVIRONMENT    
    Working Conditions .638** .369** .121** 
 (.037) (.045) (.036) 
    Radiation- Injury Likelihood .258** .251** .143** 
 (.036) (.044) (.041) 
    Disease- Injury Likelihood .304** .322** .060* 
 (0.034) (.042) (.028) 
    Hazardous Conditions-Injury Likelihood  .368** .265** .093** 
 (.038) (.043) (.032) 
ABILITIES/SKILLS    
    Deductive Reasoning-Lev .861** .637** -- 
 (.035) (.042) -- 
    Social Perceptiveness .782** .679** -- 
 (.035) (.041) -- 
    Manual Dexterity .420** .259** -- 
 (.037) (.043) -- 
Notes. N=4,066. Heteroskedastic-robust standard errors in parentheses. 
 
As discussed, Realistic interests are negatively related to educational 
expectations. Investigative, Artistic, Social, and Enterprising interests are positively 
related to educational expectations. 
Turning to the other intrinsic characteristics, Creativity and Variety are 
strongly positively related to educational expectations. Achievement, which measures 
the use of ones skills and the feeling of satisfaction that this use brings, and 
Responsibility, which indicates that incumbents make decisions on their own, are also 
strongly related to educational expectations. 
All extrinsic occupational characteristicsCompensation, Security, Social 
Status, and Advancementare positively related to the expectation of a four-year  
degree. The findings for earnings and security are at odds with findings based on job 
values, but the findings based on occupational characteristics cannot overturn findings 
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based on job values because we do not know if earnings and security in particular 
draw adolescents expecting four-year degrees to the occupations they want. This is the 
important shortcoming of using occupational aspirations: it is not possible to know if a 
specific occupational characteristic motivates schooling decisions or if the 
characteristic in question is merely related to another characteristic that adolescents 
are attracted to.  
Regarding altruistic aspects of jobs, the results show that those expecting four-
year degrees want occupations Assisting or Caring for Others and occupations in 
which workers have a preference for working for the Presumed Good of the People. 
At the same time, however, they are less likely to want jobs in which workers are 
never pressured to do things that go against their sense of right and wrong (Moral 
Values). This finding seems in large measure caused by the fact that Moral Values are 
negatively related to authority.  
Regarding interpersonal relations, those expecting four-year degrees are more 
likely to want occupations involving interaction with others (i.e., they have lower 
values for Independence: Workers on this job do their work alone) and interacting 
with pleasant coworkers (i.e., they have higher values for Coworkers: Workers on 
this job have co-workers who are easy to get along with). Those expecting bachelors 
degrees are more likely to want higher positions in hierarchies. For example they want 
to have Authority (Workers on this job give directions and instructions to others), 
and they also want Autonomy (Workers on this job plan their work with little 
supervision). However, higher educational expectations are also associated with some 
undesirable social interaction including Conflict Situations and Dealing with 
Unpleasant/Angry People.  
The main finding for work environment, which is not dealt with in the job 
values literature, is that those expecting bachelors degrees want occupations with 
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better Working Conditions. More concretely, they want occupations with white-
collar working conditions. For example, low values of Working Conditions are 
associated with extreme heat and cold, bothersome noises, poor lighting, operation of 
vibrating machinery, and so on. The narrower preference for safety is difficult to 
characterize because the occupations wanted by those expecting less than a four-year 
degree are more likely to have Hazardous Conditions, but they involve less exposure 
to Disease and Radiation, owing primarily to health related occupations. 
Educational expectations are strongly positively related to the level of 
Deductive Reasoning and Social Perceptiveness (Being aware of others reactions 
and understanding why they react the way they do) required for the occupations they 
want, which are used to measure cognitive and social skill requirements, respectively. 
Expectations are negatively related to Manual Dexterity, which is used to measure 
manual skill requirements. 
The differences in occupational characteristics revealed in Column 1 could 
arise in part from differences in perceived accessibility. It is thus useful to examine 
these relationships conditional on cognitive skill and family background measures 
(which are likely related to perceived accessibility) to better isolate differences in 
occupational preferences. Column 2 addresses the relationship between educational 
expectations and the characteristics of the occupations adolescents want conditional on 
cognitive skill, parental education, and family income. Column 2 is thus analogous to 
Column 1, except that now the coefficients βBA are reported from models that include 
cognitive skill (C), parental education (PE), and family income (FI): 
 
iFIiPEiCiAiFiBAi FIPECAFBAOE βββββββ ++++++= 0)(  
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 The results for some occupational characteristics, such as Moral Values and 
Assist or Care for Others, are little influenced by the introduction of cognitive skill 
and family background. Several others, such as Presumed Good of the People and 
Deal with Unpleasant or Angry People, are slightly increased. However, adding the 
controls attenuates the majority of coefficients. The degree of attenuation varies 
considerably, with some occupational characteristicssuch as Investigative interests, 
Creativity, Variety, and the three skill requirementsdeclining by about 25 percent, 
while others are reduced much less. Despite the general trend of attenuation, fairly 
large differences in occupational characteristics remain, which suggests that those 
expecting bachelors degrees want quite different jobs than those expecting less 
education. 
A critic could respond that the addition of cognitive skill and family 
background doubtless captures a good deal of the effects of perceived accessibility, 
but actual and perceived ability are not at all the same thing. Thus, perceived 
accessibility could still be driving the relationship between educational expectations 
and the occupational characteristics observed in Column 2. Ideally I would control for 
perceived accessibility by controlling for perceived ability. The NLSY79 lacks a 
measure of respondents perceived ability, so no such measure can be added as a 
control variable to isolate differences in occupational preferences. However, controls 
can be used for skills and abilities that tap into the actual accessibility of the 
occupation. Conditional on these measures, differences between educational 
expectation groups should be largely due to preferences.  
Occupations skill requirements probably do the most to reduce their 
accessibility. A virtue of using occupational characteristics mapped onto occupations 
(rather than using dummy variables for the occupations themselves) is that it allows 
me to condition on specific occupational characteristics, such as skill requirements. In 
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an effort to control for perceived accessibility, I estimate another series of regression 
models with Deductive Reasoning requirements (R), Social Perceptiveness 
requirements (S), and Manual Dexterity requirements (M) added to the model as 
regressors:  
 
      iMiSiRiFIiPEiCiAiFiBAi MSRFIPECAFBAOE γγγγγγγγγγ +++++++++= 0)(  
 
The estimates γBA are presented in Column 3 of Table 4.4. Adding skill 
requirements further attenuates many of the coefficients, and numerous sizable 
coefficients in Column 2such as Compensation, Advancement, and Frustrating 
Circumstancesare negligible in Column 3. Often when a coefficient was reduced 
substantially with the introduction of cognitive skill and family background, it is again 
reduced substantially upon the introduction of skill requirements. For example, the 
coefficients for Investigative interests, Creativity, and Variety were much lower in 
Column 2 than they were in Column 1, and they are much lower in Column 3 than 
they were in Column 2. Again, however, although many of the coefficients are 
attenuated considerably, most are far from zero. This suggests thatconsistent with 
findings based on job valuesthose expecting bachelors degrees or higher do have 
different occupational preferences than those expecting less education.  
 
THE EFFECT OF OCCUPATIONAL PREFERENCES ON SCHOOLING DECISIONS 
JOB VALUES AND OCCUPATIONAL EXPECTATIONS. I first estimate the effect 
occupational preferences on educational expectations using self-reported job values in 
MTF. In Chapters 2 and 3 I estimated the causal effects of perceptions and preferences 
with the propensity score matching approach I introduced in Chapter 1. I would have 
used the same approach here, but considerable preliminary analysis revealed that this 
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approach is unsuitable for estimating the effects of individual job values conditional 
on other job values, which is my objective. The problem is that when I want to 
estimate the effect of a job value, for example Income, I want to balance each of the 
four categories of valuing earnings (i.e., Not important, A little important, Pretty 
important, and Very important) on the various determinants of college expectations 
discussed in the previous chapters and on all of the other job values. The result is very 
large balancing weights (some run literally in the millions) which lead to very large 
standard errors. I therefore model the outcomethe expectation of a four-year 
degreewith regression. Typically, logistic regression would be used to predict the 
binary outcome expects a four-year degree, but preliminary analysis revealed that 
linear probability models produce the same basic results, and I favor a linear 
probability model because results are more intuitive.  
Model 1 (Column 1 of Table 4.5) regresses expecting a bachelors degree on 
separate measures for 22 job values, parental education, GPA, perceived intelligence, 
perceived school ability, and dummy variables for academic track, female, black, and 
other race and ethnicity.39 I have converted all of the job values to z-scores to 
facilitate comparisons of effect sizes. GPA, perceived intelligence, perceived ability, 
and parental education have been converted to z-scores for the same reason.  
A problem with the disaggregate approach that estimates the effects of all of 
the individual job values is that we are likely to have some statistically-significant 
results for some job values from chance alone. Naturally, I cannot determine which 
significant effects represent chance, but it should be noted that coefficients are 
statistically-discernable from zero at the p<.05 level for 10 of the 22 job values; we  
                                                
39 Note that, although one of my objectives is to estimate the effects of job values separately, it seems 
unreasonable to include both Prestige and Respect because they tap into the same concept. I have 
chosen therefore to include only Respect. Results are very similar if Prestige is used in the place of 
Respect. 
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Table 4.3. Odds-Ratios from Logistic Regressions Predicting the Expectation of a 4-
year College Degree. MTF 19902005.  
Outcome=Expects a 4-year 
degree or higher 
(1) (2) 
Female .064** .044** 
 (.006) (.006) 
Black .055** .039** 
 (.010) (.009) 
Other race/ethnicity .039** .023** 
 (.007) (.007) 
Parental education .070** .059** 
 (.003) (.003) 
GPA .077** .065** 
 (.004) (.004) 
Academic track .121** .098** 
 (.003) (.003) 
Perceived intelligence .028** .020** 
 (.004) (.004) 
Perceived academic ability .042** .037** 
 (.005) (.005) 
JOB VALUES   
Income .010**  
 (.004)  
Advancement .000  
 (.003)  
Security .004  
 (.003)  
Prestige .026**  
 (.004)  
Interesting .011**  
 (.003)  
Creative .006  
 (.003)  
See Results .003  
 (.003)  
By Yourself .002  
 (.003)  
Help Others .014**  
 (.004)  
Benefit to Society .006  
 (.003)  
Skills Last .010**  
 (.003)  
Ability Util. .007*  
 (.003)  
New Learning .024**  
 (0.003)  
Challenging .018**  
 (.003)  
Decision Making .019**  
 (.003)  
Unsupervised .005  
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Table 4.3 (Continued) 
 
  
 (.003)  
Vacations .004  
 (.003)  
Short Hours .002  
 (.003)  
Slow Pace .019**  
 (.003)  
No Relocating .002  
 (.003)  
Interpersonal .029**  
 (.003)  
Make Friends .003  
 (.003)  
OCCUPATIONAL EXPECTATIONS   
Professional II  .118** 
  (.007) 
Business Owner  .120** 
  (.012) 
Manager  .021 
  (.012) 
Skilled Manual  .287** 
  (.011) 
Sales  .011 
  (.021) 
Farming  .198** 
  (.029) 
Military  .173** 
  (.016) 
Protective Ser.  .117** 
  (.015) 
Retail Worker  .269** 
  (.033) 
Semiskilled Worker  .299** 
  (.018) 
Service  .266** 
  (.018) 
Laborer  .242** 
  (.034) 
Clerical  .265** 
  (.015) 
Homemaker  .196** 
  (.026) 
Don't Know  .053** 
  (.020) 
Constant .510** .560** 
R2 .280 .310 
Sheaf variable for occupational 
preferences 
.067** 
(.003) 
.125** 
(.003) 
Notes. N=36,920. Heteroskedastic-robust standard errors in parentheses. 
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would expect only one to be statistically-discernable from zero by chance.  
First consider extrinsic rewards. The preference for Income is negatively 
related to expectations. This finding is contrary to the predictions of my high 
standards reasoning, but it is consistent with previous findings (Knox and Lindsay 
1984; Johnson and Elder 2002). However, preferences for Advancement and Security 
are unrelated to expectations, and a preference for Respect is relatively strongly related 
to expectations, which is inconsistent with past research that finds that extrinsic 
rewards are negatively related to educational outcomes.  
A preference for Challenging Problems increases the probability of expecting 
a four-year degree. A preference for a Slow Pace reduces this probability. This 
suggests that those who want to take it easy at work are less apt to expect four-year 
degrees. A preference for Skills Last is negatively related to expecting a four-year 
degree, which could also be interpreted as a desire to not expend effort at work 
(because if skills last then future training is unnecessary). However, a preference for 
Learn New Things is negatively related to expecting a four-year degree, and other 
related measures like Vacations and Free Time are unrelated to the expectation of a 
four-year degree. 
Otherwise, consistent with past research, the results show that preferences for 
intrinsic rewards are positively related to expecting a four-year degree. Specifically, 
preferences for Interpersonal, making your Own Decisions, and work that Helps 
Others all predict expecting a four-year degree or higher.  
I have argued that it is useful to estimate the effects of individual job values, 
but doing so makes it is difficult to assess the total effects of job values. A convenient 
way to summarize the total effects of job values is with Heises sheaf variable 
(Heise 1972). A sheaf variable for a group of variables is created using the parameter 
estimates from a model in which they were all included. In Model 1 the expectation of 
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a four-year degree (Y) is regressed on GPA (G), perceived intelligence (C), perceived 
school ability (S), and dummy variables for black (B), other race or ethnicity (O), 
academic track (A), female (F), and the 22 job values (J1 to J22): 
 
iiiSiCiAiFiOiBi JJSCAFOBYE 2222110)( βββββββββ K+++++++=  
 
A sheaf variable J for the total effects of the job values is most easily 
constructed by summing the products of the k job values and their coefficients (Whitt 
1986): 
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=
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Sheaf variables constructed in this way always have coefficients of one 
because they are measured in the units of the outcome. To get a sense of the 
importance of the total effect of sheaf variables, they are typically converted to z-
scores, which I do here. Using a sheaf variable methodology reveals that the total 
effect of the job values in Model 1 is .067 (see the last row in Column 1), which 
means that an increase in one standard deviation of job valuesweighted as 
describedincreases the probability of expecting a four-year degree by .067. 
Model 2 (Column 2) estimates the effect of occupational preferences using 
occupational expectations instead of job values by adding dummy variables for 
occupational expectations in the place of job values. Recall that the same respondents 
in the MTF are asked about their job values and the occupation they expect, so results 
based on these two approaches to measuring occupational preferences can be directly 
compared.  
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Professional I is the excluded category. As would be expected when 
Professional I is the excluded category, the estimates for the occupational dummy 
variables are negative, except for Manager, Professional II, and, surprisingly, Sales. 
Estimates are generally what we would expect; expecting an occupation with low 
educational requirements, such as Laborer and Semi-skilled, reduces the probability of 
college entry.  
Just as I did for job values, I estimate the effect of a sheaf variable that 
captures the effects of the occupational expectation dummy variables. The total effect 
is .125, which is almost twice the effect estimated for job values.  
Two reasons were offered earlier to explain why occupational aspirations 
would suggest stronger effects than job values. One was that the occupations (or more 
precisely in this case, occupational categories) contain more information than job 
values. The other was that occupational expectationsprobably more so than job 
valuesrepresent a mix of preferences and perceived accessibility. Perceived 
intelligence and academic ability are included in the model, but surely they control for 
perceived accessibility only imperfectly.  
One way to get a sense for the magnitude of the problem of perceived 
accessibility is to compare the results of Model 2 in Table 4.5 to a model excluding 
both perceived intelligence and academic ability. Results from such a model produces 
a sheaf variable with a coefficient of .131, which is only about 5 percent higher than 
the estimate of .125 presented in Table 4.5. If perceived accessibility was a serious 
issue then we would expect this number to be much larger.40  
                                                
40 Other approaches also suggest that perceived accessibility does not seriously bias results. After 
reporting their occupational expectations, respondents were asked to report How likely do you think it 
is that you will actually get to do this kind of work? Perceived accessibility should play a smaller role 
among those who are less certain that they will actually enter their expected occupation, so the 
occupations expected by respondents who are less certain should be purer measures of occupational 
preferences. Examination (results not shown) revealed that the total effects of occupational expectations 
on educational expectations is weaker among those who are less certain that they will enter the 
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What is more, while the estimates of the total effects of occupational 
preferences may be biased upwards because occupational expectations represent both 
perceived accessibility and occupational preferences, they are also likely biased 
downwards because expectations are measured with somewhat coarse occupational 
categories. Separate analysis of the NLSY79 (results not shown) suggests that coarse 
occupation categories understate the effect of occupational expectations on 
educational attainment by roughly 25 percent.41 In other words, with a more detailed 
measure of occupational expectations, such as one based on the COC or the SOC, the 
estimated effect of occupational expectations on educational expectations would be 
much higher.  
 
CHARACTERISTICS OF OCCUPATIONS ASPIRED TO. I next employ my hybrid 
approach of measuring occupational preferences using occupational aspirations in the 
NLSY79 as sources of implied occupational characteristics that adolescents want. 
Model 1 regresses the expectation of a four-year degree on cognitive skill, parental  
                                                                                                                                       
occupation they expect, which suggests that perceived accessibility does play a role and that estimates 
of the effects of occupational preferences based on occupational aspirations are biased upwards. 
However, total effects were roughly .107 even for those responding Somewhat likely, which was the 
lowest category with sufficient sample size for estimation.  
Respondents are also asked How satisfying do you think this kind of work will be for you? 
and respond on a 5-point scale from Not satisfying to Extremely satisfying. Respondents whose 
expectations are compromised by perceived accessibility should be less optimistic about the satisfaction 
the occupation will deliver because they have reported a less-than-ideal occupation. Conversely, 
perceived accessibility should play a relatively minor role among those who expect that the occupation 
they reported would be Extremely satisfying, because presumably they reported the occupation they 
actually want, not a second choice that would lead them to be less optimistic about their future job 
satisfaction. Examination (results not shown) again suggest that perceived accessibility plays only a 
minor role in the occupations selected, and that estimates of the effect of occupational preferences 
based on occupational expectations are biased upwards by about 10-20 percent. 
41 In the NLSY79 occupational aspirations are coded in the 1970 COC. I estimated two models. In the 
first I used separate dummy variables for all of the 1970 COC variables (about 250 occupations). In the 
second I collapsed the separate 1970 COC occupations into coarser occupational categories like the 
ones in MTF, and included these dummy variables (15 of them) in the place of the coarser ones. I found 
that the estimate of the effect of the sheaf variable calculated using the 1970 COC categories was 
roughly 25 percent higher than the effect of the sheaf variable calculated using the coarser 15 
categories. 
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Table 4.4. Odds Ratios from Logistic Regressions Predicting Educational Expectations 
And College Entry. NLSY79, 1979. 
 Expects a 4-year degree College entry 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
ADOLESCENTS CHARACTERISTICS     
Female .015 .009 .041* .042* 
 (.020) (.020) (.018) (.018) 
Black .216** .216** .188** .188** 
 (.020) (.020) (.021) (.021) 
Hispanic .202** .202** .163** .163** 
 (.022) (.022) (.023) (.023) 
Cognitive Skill .128** .128** .154** .154** 
 (.010) (.010) (.010) (.010) 
Parental Education .085** .086** .089** .089** 
 (.008) (.008) (.009) (.009) 
Family Income .028** .028** .010 .009 
 (.008) (.008) (.008) (.008) 
CHARACTERISTICS OF 
OCCUPATIONS ASPIRED TO 
    
Realistic .002 .013 .016 .020 
 (.023) (.023) (.021) (.022) 
Investigative .038* .026 .011 .002 
 (.018) (.023) (.019) (.025) 
Artistic .015 .014 .028 .026 
 (.017) (.017) (.016) (.016) 
Social .034 .022 .013 .005 
 (.026) (.029) (.026) (.028) 
Enterprising .026 .013 .000 .001 
 (.019) (.020) (.020) (.021) 
Conventional .016 .017 .021 .022 
 (.019) (.019) (.020) (.020) 
Authority .018 .012 .001 .004 
 (.022) (.022) (.021) (.021) 
Responsibility .069** .077** .009 .013 
 (.024) (.024) (.024) (.024) 
Variety .029 .036* .021 .018 
 (.016) (.016) (.019) (.020) 
Activity .080* .068* .013 .011 
 (.033) (.034) (.035) (.037) 
Assist & Care for Others .009 .009 .009 .010 
 (.015) (.015) (.015) (.015) 
Moral Values .045** .018 .017 .005 
 (.014) (.017) (.015) (.018) 
Worthwhile to society .022 .042 .013 .010 
 (.020) (.022) (.019) (.021) 
Working Conditions .004 .034 .022 .016 
 (.023) (.026) (.023) (.027) 
Social Status .059* .071** .031 .033 
 (.023) (.023) (.023) (.024) 
Compensation .038 .066* .007 .000 
 (.028) (.029) (.031) (.032) 
Security .028 .020 .002 .000 
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Table 4.4 (Continued) 
 
    
 (.021) (.022) (.020) (.022) 
Advancement .073* .047 .032 .019 
 (.030) (.034) (.030) (.034) 
Deductive Reasoning-Lev  .008  .010 
  (.020)  (.021) 
Social Perceptiveness-Lev  .000  .015 
  (.026)  (.027) 
Manual Dexterity-Lev  .058**  .011 
  (.017)  (.018) 
Sheaf Variable for Occupational 
Preferences 
.190*** 
(.008) 
.173*** 
(.014) 
.100*** 
(.009) 
.079*** 
(.013) 
Notes. N=4,066. Heteroskedastic-robust standard errors are in parentheses. 
 
education, family income, age at the time of the interview, and dummy variables for 
female, black, Hispanic, and other race or ethnicity. Also included are a range of 
occupational characteristics derived from the occupations respondents want. Many 
theoretically defensible occupational characteristics could be included in the model, 
but O*NET98 contains hundreds of variables so it is desirable to limit the number of 
regressors. The decisions that led to the specification in Model 1 were based on prior 
research in job values, vocational psychology, job satisfaction, and job desirability. 
The occupational characteristics included as regressors are Responsibility, Variety, 
Activity, Assist or Care for Others, working for the Presumed Good of the People, 
Moral Values, Working Conditions, Social Status, Compensation, Job Security, and 
the six Holland Interest variables (Realistic, Investigative, Artistic, Social, 
Enterprising, and Conventional). The results of Model 1 are presented in Column 1 of 
Table 4.4.  
Inferring causality to this or that specific occupational characteristic is difficult 
because we do not know which characteristic or characteristics adolescents are drawn 
to or even which ones they have accurate knowledge of. I am therefore primarily 
interested in the sheaf variable, which has a coefficient of .190.  
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Apart from the role of respondents cognitive skill and family background, 
Model 1 ignores the issue of perceived accessibility. Model 2 (Column 2) introduces 
Deductive Reasoning, Social Perceptiveness, and Manual Dexterity as measures of 
skill requirements in an effort to estimate the effects of occupational preferences 
conditional on accessibility. The coefficient for the sheaf variablewhich is generated 
using the same regressors as in Model 1 and excludes the effects skill requirements
is reduced to .173, a reduction of less than 10 percent.  
The NLSY79 permits analysis of college entry, and Columns 3 and 4 of Table 
4.4 present results from models predicting college entry. Results for the sheaf variable 
in Column 3 show that occupational preferences have much weaker effects on college 
entry than on expectations. (This is also true when effects are characterized as odds-
ratios.) A comparison of the sheaf variables in Columns 3 and 4 shows again that 
introducing measures of skill requirements reduces the effect of occupational 
preferences by about 20 percent. Again, however, the majority of the effect remains. 
  
THE DETERMINANTS OF OCCUPATIONAL PREFERENCES 
 I turn now to a brief analysis of the determinants of occupational preferences. I 
use the MTF because it allows a comparison of job values and occupational 
expectations. As discussed, estimation of school effects is not possible with the MTF 
because school identifiers are unavailable in the public release data.42  
Although they may be of interest elsewhere for a variety of reasons, job values 
are of interest here because they affect educational decisions. I therefore do not 
attempt to estimate the determinants of specific job values, such as You Help Others or 
                                                
42 Analysis of job values using the National Longitudinal Study of Youth, 1972 shows considerable 
inter-school variation in job values. However, the results also show that permitting random intercepts 
had little effect on any of the level-one estimates and that school characteristics did a poor job 
predicting why job values are different in one school than in another. 
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Challenging Problems. Instead, I estimate the determinants of the sheaf variable 
constructed earlier for models of educational expectations, which is tailor-made as a 
measure of the effect of job values on schooling decisions. Specifically, I use the sheaf 
variable constructed in Column 1 of Table 4.3 as the outcome. However, I use the 
sheaf variable before converting it into a z-score; this way, the coefficient for the sheaf 
variable will be in the metric of educational expectations.  
Model 1 regresses the job values sheaf variable on dummy variables for 
female, black, and other race or ethnicity (white is the omitted race and ethnicity 
category). The results, which are presented in Column 1 of Table 4.5, show that the 
estimate for female is .023, which means that females have job values associated with 
an increase in the probability of expecting a bachelors degree of .023. Estimates for 
the race and ethnicity categories are near zero.  
Model 2 adds parental education, GPA, academic track, perceived intelligence, 
and perceived school ability, which have all been converted to z-scores so that their 
relative strength can be more easily assessed. Parental education, academic track, self-
assessed intelligence, and self-assessed school ability are positively related to college-
encouraging job values, but their effects are surprisingly weak. 
Occupational expectations are considered in Columns 3 and 4. Now the sheaf 
variable from Column 2 of Table 4.3 is the outcome, and the specifications in 
Columns 3 and 4 are otherwise the same as those in Columns 1 and 2 to permit 
comparison of results based on job values and occupational expectations. The 
estimates for Model 3 (Column 3) show that females occupational expectations make 
them more likely than males to expect four-year degrees and that estimates for the  
race and ethnicity dummy variables are again close to zero. Note, however, that using 
occupational expectations leads to a female-male difference twice the size of the 
difference estimated using job values.  
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Table 4.5. Regression Coefficients from Models Predicting Sheaf Variables for Job 
Values and Occupational Expectations. MTF, 19902005.  
 Outcome=Job Values 
Sheaf Variablea 
Outcome=Occupational 
Expectations Sheaf 
Variableb 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Female .023** .023** .046** .042** 
 (.001) (.001) (.002) (.002) 
Black .002 .001 .000 .016** 
 (.001) (.001) (.002) (.002) 
Nonblack, nonwhite .002* .006** .006** .022** 
 (.001) (.001) (.002) (.002) 
Parental Education  .003**  .015** 
  (.000)  (.001) 
GPA   .001  .012** 
  (.001)  (.001) 
Academic track  .006**  .029** 
  (.000)  (.001) 
Perceived Intelligence  .003**  .010** 
  (.001)  (.001) 
Perceived school ability  .005**  .010** 
  (.001)  (.001) 
Constant .012** .014** .060** .063** 
 (.001) (.001) (.001) (.001) 
R2 .03 .06 .03 .21 
Notes. N=36,920. aJob values sheaf variable is taken from Column 1 of Table 4.3. bOccupational 
expectations sheaf variable taken from Column 2 of Table 4.3. 
 
The estimates for Model 4 reveal some different results than the corresponding 
job values model. Generally, occupational expectations are more strongly related to 
the regressors than are job values. Now there appears to be a net-black advantage in 
occupational expectations and positive effects for parental education, GPA, and 
academic track. Perceived intelligence and perceived school ability are also more 
strongly related to occupational expectations, suggesting that occupational 
expectations capture either more perceived accessibility effects or more preference 
for challenge effects than job values. 
 
 
 
 151
CONCLUSIONS 
Adolescents motivation for acquiring postsecondary schooling is the subject 
of little research. Most relevant research concedes that nonpecuniary rewards are 
probably important but ignores them empirically or assumes, often implicitly, that 
students are motivated by the expectation of higher future earnings. By taking a 
broader occupational preferences perspective that considers both pecuniary and 
nonpecuniary motives, this chapter tries to deepen our understanding of why some 
adolescents enter college and some do not.  
I measure occupational preferences both with self-reported job values and as 
occupational expectations. Examination of self-reported job values revealed that those 
expecting bachelors degrees or higher have different occupational preferences than 
those who expect less education. Those expecting bachelors degrees are more likely 
to value work that is interesting, is helpful to others, and involves decision-making. I 
found similar results using the characteristics of the occupations adolescents wanted at 
age 35 and also that those expecting bachelors degrees also wanted more variety and 
better working conditions.  
Multivariate analysis of self-reported job values suggests that job values 
influence educational expectations. Past research found that preferences for extrinsic 
rewards predicted lower educational attainment (Knox and Lindsay 1984; Johnson and 
Elder 2002). My results do not represent a reversal of these findings, but they do call 
for a more refined presentation of results and some skepticism. I find that individual 
extrinsic rewards have different relationships with education outcomes, so it is not 
reasonable to generalize about all extrinsic rewards. For example, a preference for 
earnings is negatively related to the expectation of a four-year degree, a preference for 
status is positively related, and preferences for advancement and job security are 
unrelated to expecting a four-year degree. Generally consistent with past research, I 
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found that wanting work that is interesting and involves helping others, working with 
others, and decision-making increases the probability that a respondent expects a 
bachelors degree. The effects of individual job values are modest, but the total effect 
of all of the job values is fairly large.  
Analysis of the determinants of occupational preferences revealed that when 
occupational preferences are measured with occupational expectations, females, 
blacks, those in the academic track, and those with good grades tend to have more 
college-encouraging occupational preferences. When occupational preferences are 
measured with self-reported job values these effects are attenuated considerably.  
A good deal of research is explicitly or implicitly guided by the advocacy for 
ever more education. This research attempts to answer questions such as How can we 
increase educational attainment generally? and How can we get group A to get more 
education to reduce educational disparities between group A and group B? The results 
presented here suggest that educational attainment can be increased by manipulating 
preferences, such as the preference for challenging work or helping others. Preferences 
such as these may seem to be elements of personality not easily manipulated, but panel 
studies show that job values and interests change substantially during adolescence 
(Tracey, Robbins, and Hofsess 2005) and that postsecondary schooling affects job 
values (Johnson and Elder 2002). These findings suggest the possibility that 
occupational preferences can be intentionally influenced in elementary and high 
school settings to increase postsecondary expectations and attainment.  
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CHAPTER 5. BELIEFS ABOUT THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN 
EDUCATIONAL AND OCCUPATIONAL ATTAINMENT 
 
Knowledge of the relationship between educational and occupational 
attainment is critical in the development of sensible plans to reach career goals, yet 
research finds that adolescents know little about this relationship. Many adolescents 
lack knowledge of the training requirements of common occupations, including 
occupations they are planning to pursue (DeFleur and Menke, 1975; Grotevant and 
Durrett 1980; Ludwig 1999; Schneider and Stevenson 1999). For example, Grotevant 
and Durrett (1980) found that the correlation between perceived and actual educational 
requirements was only r=.41 for adolescents most preferred occupation. Correlations 
were much lower for less preferred occupations. Schneider and Stevenson (1999) find 
that only 44 percent of adolescents have aligned ambitions, which means that their 
educational expectations are consistent with the mean educational attainment of the 
incumbents of the occupations they expect.  
Research finds that adolescents understanding of the relationship between 
educational and occupational attainment influences their educational decisions. 
Ludwig (1999) finds that more accurate knowledge of educational requirements of 
expected occupations predicts greater educational attainment. Schneider and 
Stevenson (1999) find that high school students with aligned ambitions have more 
realistic plans and engage in appropriate preparatory behaviors such as preparing for 
college entrance exams and taking courses required for future requisite schooling. 
These are the only studies I am aware of that examine the effects of perceived 
educational requirements on educational plans and attainment. Other research that 
constructs more general measures of occupational knowledge by combining these 
perceptions with other beliefs, such as beliefs about the duties and earnings of 
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occupations, also shows that accurate knowledge predicts educational attainment 
(Parnes and Kohen 1975; Howell 1978).  
It seems clear that perceptions of the education-occupation nexus should be 
important. The limited body of research linking adolescents perceptions of the 
relationship between educational and occupational attainment focuses on the accuracy 
of perceptions, but researchers generally fail to justify this approach theoretically (e.g., 
Ludwig 1999; Schneider and Stevenson 1999), and it is not clear why accuracy as 
such should be related to educational attainment.43 Theories of the relationship 
between occupational knowledge and schooling decisions focus on beliefs about the 
effects of education on outcomes, not on the accuracy of beliefs. In the next section I 
outline three theories that link beliefs about the effects of education to educational 
decisions. 
 
HOW SHOULD PERCEPTIONS AFFECT SCHOOLING DECISIONS? 
HUMAN CAPITAL. Human capital theory predicts that beliefs about the returns 
to education should influence schooling decisions. Researchers have traditionally 
assumed that adolescents are aware of the actual returns to schooling, but beliefs about 
returns should influence decisions whether they are accurate or not (Rouse 2004; 
Avery and Kane 2004). Human capital theory predicts that adolescents who believe 
that the returns to education are the highest should invest in the most education 
because they will believe that the costs of more education will be offset by its effects 
on earnings. As an example, Figure 5.1 shows two hypothetical high school seniors A 
                                                
43 Certainly a theoretical justification is desirable here because measures of the accuracy of occupational 
knowledge may tap into aspects of cognitive skill not captured in conventional test batteries, and the 
apparent effects of occupational knowledge may actually be the effects of cognitive skill. Indeed, 
Bachman (1970, cited in Parnes and Kohen 1975), upon finding a very high correlation between 
occupational knowledge and cognitive skill, questions whether occupational knowledge measures 
anything independent of general intelligence.  
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and B who have different beliefs about the effects of education on utility. Human 
capital theory typically deals with the multiplicative effect of education on wages in 
empirical research, but human capital theory is fundamentally about utility 
maximization. I use the abstraction utility because it allows easier comparison of 
human capital theory and another perspective I discuss shortly. Human capital theory 
predicts that, ceteris paribus, B will get more education than A.  
 
 
Figure 5.1. Perceptions of Utility Conditional on Postsecondary Educational 
Attainment. 
 
SATISFICING. Despite the sound logic and plausibility of human capital theory, 
I offer an alternative and competing account of how adolescents beliefs about the 
relationship between educational and occupational attainment influences their 
educational decisions. I proposed in Chapter 4 that adolescents have occupational 
preferences and that education can be seen as a means of satisfying these preferences. 
One way I operationalized preferences was as occupational expectations, and I argued 
that adolescents select occupations and make subsequent education decisions that 
allow them to enter their chosen occupation. If this causal ordering is accepted, it 
follows that conditional on occupational expectations higher perceived educational 
requirements should lead to higher educational expectations and attainment and that 
 0 
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lower perceived educational requirements should lead to lower educational 
expectations and attainment. For example, if two high school seniors want to become 
engineers and one believes that this is possible with an Associates degree while the 
other believes that a bachelors degree is necessary, the latter will expect and obtain 
more education.  
Despite its simplicity, the commonsensical notion that higher perceived 
educational requirements lead to higher educational expectations and attainment is not 
clearly consistent with human capital theory, which assumes that actors plan and 
pursue courses of action that maximize utility. Herbert Simon (1957) has suggested 
that across a range of contexts actors are satisficers rather than maximizers, by which 
he meant that they set goals and plan and pursue strategies to meet them.44 Satisficers 
are satisfied if their goals are met even if maximization has not been achieved or if it is 
not known if maximization has been achieved.  
I propose that adolescents are satisficers when making their educational 
decisions. Adolescents occupational expectations represent their goals and education 
is the means used to meet their goals. I refer to this model as occupation-first 
satisficing because occupational decisions are made first and education decisions are 
made second in an effort to meet occupational goals. 
The satisficing-maximizing distinction is not trivial in the education context. 
Reconsider the example in Figure 5.1 if A and B are satisficers, and their occupational 
goals are u. In other words, both A and B will be satisfied with a utility of u, and both 
will terminate their education when they expect that it will permit them to gain 
employment providing utility equal to u. A will acquire education eA, and B will 
acquire education eB. Thus, A will acquire more education than B, which is reverse to 
                                                
44 Simon actually used the expression aspiration levels for what I am calling goals. However, this is at 
variance with the meaning of the expression aspiration in the sociology of education (and elsewhere) 
so I use the term goals.  
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the prediction made by human capital theory.45 This logic also applies to the context in 
which occupational expectations are goals. For example, u in Figure 5.1 could be the 
occupation engineer. 
 
EDUCATION-FIRST SATISFICING. The previous model assumes that 
adolescents set occupational goals first and make educational decisions second, but a 
reverse education-first satisficing model could be more appropriate. For example, an 
adolescent may have decided upon a bachelors degree (perhaps because all of their 
friends have decided similarly, their parents want them to obtain a bachelors degree, 
and so on) and then choose as their occupational goal their most preferred occupation 
among those occupations they believe are accessible to them with a bachelors degree.  
To illustrate education-first satisficing and an important prediction that it 
makes, Figure 5.2 again shows A and B. In this example labor-market outcomes are 
operationalized as occupations. Both A and B have the same occupational preferences: 
they would ideally both like to become engineers. In education-first satisficing 
educational goals are decided first. In Figure 5.2 this is represented as the vertical 
dotted line intersecting the X-axis at education equal to eatt, which indicates that both A 
and B have decided that they will obtain education equal to eatt. When asked to report 
their occupational goal, B will report engineer; A will not because A believes that 
becoming an engineer is not possible at their chosen education level. Instead, A will 
report an occupation that they believe requires less education than an engineer. For 
example, they may report technician, which is also depicted in Figure 5.2. 
                                                
45 For the purposes of this example it is convenient to set aspiration levels at u and construct the 
mapping functions as they have been. However, the location of u is consequential for predicting 
educational decisions. For example, if u is set at the intersection of As and Bs beliefs, A and B will 
make the same decision. These simple figures and those that follow ignore some complications, such as 
crossing mapping functions. However, for an initial application of a satisficing model to education 
decisions these complications are most usefully acknowledged but ignored. 
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Therefore, while occupation-first satisficing predicts that higher perceived educational 
requirements increase educational plans and attainment, education-first satisficing 
predicts that higher perceived educational requirements lower occupational goals. 
Specifically, higher perceived education requirements should lead adolescents to 
select occupations that they believe have lower educational requirements than their 
ideal occupation.  
 
 
Figure 5.2. Hypothetical Beliefs of Two Adolescents with Predetermined Educational 
Goals. 
 
Because education-first satisficing begins with schooling decisions having 
already been made it cannot explain schooling decisions. I therefore focus on 
occupation-first satisficing in the empirical analysis because it can potentially explain 
education decisions. However, it is important to consider both occupation-first and 
education-first satisficing because, as will be explained in greater detail later in the 
analysis, they make some of the same predictions and it is sometimes difficult to 
determine which of the two is operating. 
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DETERMINANTS OF PERCEIVED EDUCATION REQUIREMENTS  
Adolescents knowledge of the educational requirements of occupations is 
often poor. Why would beliefs be so inaccurate? Satisficing is important here as well, 
but it is important in a different way. Satisficing behavior is associated with certain 
conditions, such as when information is unavailable or available only at prohibitive 
costs.46 Acquiring information on educational requirements may not appear to satisfy 
these conditions because the planning of ones career seems sufficiently important to 
justify the time and effort associated with obtaining this type of information. However, 
casual observation of human behavior suggests that collecting information from 
reliable sources is an activity with surprisingly high psychic costs for many people. 
Many adolescents may prefer a more passive route to information collection in which 
they rely on information that comes to them during their daily lives rather than 
actively seeking out information. Aside from considerations of the costs of collecting 
reliable information, some adolescents may not seek out reliable information because 
they mistakenly believe that they already possess it. Grotevant and Durrett (1980) 
found that many students who reported that they had considerable knowledge of the 
occupations they wanted either underestimated or overestimated the educational 
requirements of these occupations. It may also not have occurred to many adolescents 
that sources providing information on the educational requirements of occupations 
exists.  
If not from reliable sources, where do adolescents obtain information about the 
educational requirements of occupations? Research on the determinants of 
adolescents occupational knowledge focuses on parents, educational institutions, part-
time job experiences, friends, and mass media (Levine and Hoffner 2006). Levine and 
                                                
46 As Simon points out, information may be so costly that collecting it is irrational from a cost-benefit 
perspective because the costs of collecting it may outweigh the expected benefits of possessing it. 
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Hoffner (2006) asked a small sample of high school students where they had obtained 
information about various aspects of occupations. Respondents reported receiving 
little information on educational requirements from any sources; 14.1, 6.3, 3.1, 0, and 
1.6 percent of respondents reported that they received information about educational 
requirements of occupations from schools, parents, their own jobs, friends, and mass 
media, respectively. This means that at least 75 percent of adolescents have received 
information on educational requirements from none of these sources.47 
These numbers may reflect only explicit and direct information about 
occupations, such as when a parent, friend, or teacher says You need a four-year 
college degree to become an engineer. Information about educational requirements 
may also be obtained by observing the relationship between educational and 
occupational attainment among adults. For example, if an adolescent knows four adult 
engineers and knows that they all have four-year college degrees, they may infer that a 
four-year college degree is required to become an engineer. 
Different social networks will provide different information on the education-
occupation relationship. This is an important theme in Wilsons (1987) work on class-
based disadvantages associated with very poor neighborhoods. Wilson argues that 
adolescents in high poverty urban communities fail to see the connection between 
education and meaningful employment because these communities are socially 
isolated. Wilson reasons that because few adult residents of very poor neighborhoods 
have desirable occupations and commensurate education, adolescent residents lack 
first-hand exposure to the relationship between education and occupation, especially 
between higher education and desirable occupations. Ludwigs (1999) research, which 
                                                
47 The results presented in Levine and Hoffner (2006) show what percentage of adolescents reported 
that they received information from each of the sources, so a single respondent could report more than 
one source. If some adolescents reported receiving information from more than one source, then more 
than 75 percent would have received information from none of these sources. 
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finds that adolescents from poor neighborhoods have less accurate occupational 
knowledge, provides some supporting evidence.  
Educational requirements may also be inferred from more general statements 
about the importance of education. Other than to not take illicit drugs, of the messages 
adults direct at adolescents perhaps none is more common than that adolescents should 
get as much education as they can. Adolescents may infer from these messages that 
they need more education than they actually do for the occupations of their choice. 
After repeatedly being told to stay in school, for example, an adolescent wanting to be 
an engineering technician may assume that a bachelors degree is required to enter this 
occupation. Indeed, Schneider and Stevenson (1999) find that many students believe 
that a bachelors degree is required even for jobs such as security guard. Different 
adolescents may receive different messages about the importance of postsecondary 
schooling, and this could lead to variation in perceived educational requirements. 
Deducing educational requirements from college-encouraging messages may 
lead to school-effects. There are important differences across schools in the extent to 
which they have a college focus or a work focus (Rosenbaum 2001; Schneider 
and Stevenson 1999). Some schools offer a variety of services to their students that 
might seem to promote postsecondary attendance, such as SAT courses and college 
fairs, while they fail to offer services that would assist students in making the 
transition from high school directly into the labor market, such as referring students to 
employers and conducting practice job interviews. These differences could generate 
differences across schools in the perceived educational requirements of occupations 
because a college focus may lead students to believe that postsecondary schooling is 
necessary for almost all occupations, whereas a work focus may lead students to 
believe that this is not the case. 
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Cognitive skill has been found to be positively related to occupational 
knowledge (Parnes and Kohen 1975; Ludwig 1999), although the relationship is 
poorly understood. Cognitive skill is strongly related to interests. In particular, 
cognitive skill is positively related to investigative interests (Holland 1997); therefore, 
cognitive skill may be related to the inclination to draw upon reliable information 
outside of ones own network. Cognitive skill may also be related to knowledge 
because deducing perceived requirements from relevant information involves 
reasoning. For example, two adolescents may know a retired engineer without an 
engineering degree, but only one may conclude that educational requirements for 
entrants into the occupation engineer are now higher than they once were.  
Perceptions of the educational attainment of typical incumbents are important, 
but other factors may determine how much education adolescents believe they will 
need to enter the occupation they expect. As alluded to, adolescents may make 
different forecasts of the level of education that will be required in the future when 
they attempt to enter the occupation. Also, some adolescents may think that they will 
need more or less education than the typical incumbent because they will face atypical 
barriers or will not face typical ones. Some adolescents may think that discrimination 
puts them at a disadvantage relative to typical aspirants, and they may conclude that to 
enter the occupation they expect they must acquire educational credentials superior to 
those of typical aspirants.48 Conversely, some adolescents may believe that their 
personal connections or personal characteristics (e.g., impression management skills) 
may gain them access to desirable occupations without the typical educational 
qualifications.  
                                                
48 Xie and Goyette (2003) suggest that anticipation of labor-market discrimination shapes career choice 
itself and that anticipated discrimination leads Asian-Americans to pursue careers (and corresponding 
college majors) in which they think success is based on objective indicators of skill. What I propose is a 
similar strategy that disadvantaged groups may employ conditional on career choice. 
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In the empirical analysis that follows I add substantially to our knowledge of 
adolescents beliefs about the relationship between educational and occupational 
attainment and the effects that these beliefs have on college entry. Because 
adolescents perceptions of typical incumbent educational attainment may differ from 
the education they believe they will need to enter an occupation themselves in the 
future, I focus on adolescents perceptions of the education they will need to enter the 
occupation they expect. I first document adolescents beliefs about the education 
required to enter the occupations they expect and juxtapose these beliefs with actual 
distributions of educational attainment among incumbents. I next estimate the effects 
that perceived educational requirements have on college entry. Lastly, I examine the 
determinants of perceived educational requirements, including an examination of 
school effects.  
 
DATA 
Data are drawn from the National Education Longitudinal Study, 1988 
(hereafter, NELS88). The first round was conducted in 1988 with a sample of 24,599 
eighth grade students. Follow-up interviews were conducted in 1990, 1992, 1994, and 
2000. Parents, teachers, school administrators, and librarians also completed 
questionnaires.49   
Perceived educational requirements are based on two questions asking 
students what occupation they expect to have when they are 30 years old and how 
much education they believe they will need for this occupation. The details of the 
questions are important in understanding the limitations of the data, so the complete 
questions and response options are presented. Respondents are first asked: 
                                                
49 Attrition in the first and second follow-ups was addressed by adding new students to the sample. 
These new students are included in the analysis. 
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Which of the categories below comes closest to describing the job or occupation that 
you expect or plan to have when you are 30 years old? Even if you are not sure, circle 
your best guess. 
OFFICE WORKER such as data entry clerk, bank teller, bookkeeper, 
secretary, word processor, mail carrier, ticket agent 
TRADESPERSON such as baker, auto mechanic, housepainter, plumber, 
phone/cable installer, carpenter 
FARMER, FARM MANAGER 
FULL-TIME HOMEMAKER 
LABORER such as construction worker, car washer, garbage collector, farm 
worker 
MANAGER such as sales manager, office manager, school administrator, 
retail buyer, restaurant manager, government administrator 
MILITARY such as career officer or enlisted person in the Armed Forces 
OPERATOR of machines or tools, such as meat cutter, assembler, welder, 
taxicab/bus/truck driver 
PROFESSIONAL I such as accountant, registered nurse, engineer, banker, 
librarian, writer, social worker, actor, athlete, artist, politician, but not 
including school teacher 
PROFESSIONAL II such as minister, dentist, doctor, lawyer, scientist, college 
teacher 
OWNER of a small business or restaurant, contractor 
PROTECTIVE SERVICE such as police officer, firefighter, detective, sheriff, 
security guard 
SALES such as sales representative, advertising or insurance agent, real estate 
broker 
SCHOOL TEACHER such as elementary, junior high, or high school, but not 
college 
SERVICE WORKER such as hair stylist, practical nurse, child care worker, 
waiter, domestic, janitor 
TECHNICAL such as computer programmer, medical or dental technician, 
draftsperson 
NOT PLANNING TO WORK 
OTHER 
WILL BE IN SCHOOL50 
 
Immediately after this question students are asked: 
  
How much education do you think you need to get the job you expect or plan to have 
when you are 30 years old? 
 
No high school 
Some high school 
High school diploma 
Less than two years of vocational, trade, or business school 
Two years or more of vocational, trade, or business school 
A degree from a vocational, trade, or business school 
                                                
50 The categories Full-time homemaker and Not planning to work are collapsed into a single Not 
planning to work category. 
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Some college education 
2 year college degree 
4 or 5 year college degree 
Graduate degree (Masters or PhD) 
Professional degree (JD or MD) 
Not planning to work 
Responses to this latter question are treated as measures of perceived 
educational requirements. For frequencies, refer to Table 5.1, which also includes 
means and standard deviations for all variables used in the analysis. I retain the 
categorical nature of the responses when estimating the effect of perceived educational 
requirements on college entry, but I switch to a continuous years of education 
variable for analysis of the determinants of perceived educational requirements. The 
conversion is detailed in Table 5.1.  
Surely one determinant of the education adolescents believe they need to enter 
the occupation they expect is the occupation they expect. Although perceptions are 
often inaccurate, adolescents expecting to be technicians, for example, should 
generally believe that they require more education to enter their expected occupation 
than adolescents expecting to be laborers because more education is required to 
become a technician than a laborer. Differences in beliefs that arise from differences 
in occupational expectations are not of interest in this chapter. Instead, this chapter 
addresses beliefs that exist conditional on occupational expectations; therefore, when 
modeling the effects of beliefs and the determinants of beliefs I condition upon 
occupational expectations.  
A shortcoming of the NELS88 data is that occupational expectations are 
measured using broad occupational categories, such as technician, instead of more 
detailed occupational categories such as computer programmer, medical 
technician, and draftsperson. This limits my ability to control for occupational 
expectations because each of the broad categories is comprised of a somewhat 
heterogeneous group of occupations. It is difficult to determine how serious this 
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Table 5.1. Variables Used to Analyze Beliefs About Educational  
Requirements of Expected Occupations. NELS88 19882000.
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Variable Description Mean  Stand.  
Dev. 
Section 
INDIVIDUAL 
LEVEL 
N=10,328    
Perceived 
educational 
requirements 
(categorical) 
The education respondents believe 
will need to enter the occupation 
they expect at age 30. 
 
  F2 Student 
 No postsecondary schooling 
(includes response categories 
No high school; Some high 
school; High school diploma) 
.05 .22  
 Vocational, trade, or business 
school (includes responses Less 
than two years of vocational, 
trade, or business school; Two 
years or more of vocational, 
trade or business school; A 
degree from a vocational, trade, 
or business school)  
.14 .35  
 Some college (includes responses 
Some college education and  2-
year college degree) 
.09 .28  
 4 or 5 year college degree .39 .49  
 Graduate degree (Masters or PhD) .19 .39  
 Professional degree (JD or MD) .09 .29  
Perceived 
educational 
requirements 
(continuous) 
Years of education respondents 
believe they need to enter the 
occupation they expect at age 30. 
Recoded from categorical responses 
as follows: 
No postsecondary schooling=12 
Vocational, trade, or business 
school=13 
Some college=14 
4 or 5 year college degree=16 
Graduate degree=19 
Professional degree=19 
16.13 2.23 F2 Student 
Enrollment in 
a 2- or 4-year 
college  
Respondent has been enrolled in a 
2- or 4-year college as of the 2000 
round (yes=1). Private for-profit 
colleges and vocational or business 
schools do not qualify. 
.79 .40 F3 Student 
& F4 
Student 
Enrollment in 
a 4-year  
The respondent has been enrolled in 
a 4-year college (1=yes) 
.58 .49 F4 Student 
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college     
White Student is white (yes=1) .73 .45 F4 Student 
Black Student is black (yes=1) .12 .32 F4 Student 
Hispanic Student is Hispanic (yes=1) .10 .30 F4 Student 
Asian Student is Asian (yes=1). Note that 
included in the category Asian are 
groups that do not correspond to the 
current colloquial use of the word 
Asian. For example, those who trace 
their ancestry to India, Bangladesh 
and Pakistan are coded as Asian. 
.04 .20 F4 Student 
American 
Indian 
Student is American Indian (yes=1)  .01 .11 F4 Student 
Missing 
Race/ethnicity 
Students race/ethnicity is missing.  .00 .02 F4 Student 
Female Student is female (yes=1) .50 .50 BY Student 
Cognitive skill  Composite measure that averages 
scores from math and reading tests 
taken in the 2nd follow-up. Missing 
values are filled in with composite 
scores from the 1st follow-up. Test 
scores increase from the 1st to 2nd 
follow-up, so scores for the 1st 
follow-up were increased by the 
mean difference between 1st and 2nd 
follow-up test results for all 
respondents who completed both 
sets of tests. Remaining missing 
values were filled in with base-year 
test scores using the same 
adjustment procedure. 
51.1 9.64 F2, F1, & 
BY, Test 
Batteries 
Family income Total gross family income from all 
sources. Coded as a continuous 
variable using midpoints of income 
categories and $250,000 for the 
highest category (which is $200,000 
or more). Missing values are 
replaced with responses to the same 
question that was asked on the base-
year parent questionnaire. Family 
income is higher in the 1992 round 
than the 1998 round, presumably 
because of inflation and the aging of 
parents. To adjust for these 
differences I have simply added the 
48,807.20 40,126.57 F2 Parent & 
BY Parent 
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 difference between BY and F2 
incomes to the BY incomes. 
   
Parental 
education 
Highest grade completed by the 
most-educated parent, or of either 
parent if education is missing for the 
other parent. Missing values are 
replaced with values reported by 
students. 2nd follow-up values are 
used; missing values are filled in 
with base-year responses. 
14.32 2.38 F2 & BY 
Parent; F2 & 
BY Student 
Psychic costs Summation of  how much reading 
respondents do per week not in 
connection with schoolwork, and 
agreement with the statements: I 
think the subjects Im taking are 
interesting and challenging; I get a 
feeling of satisfaction from doing 
what Im supposed to do in class. 
Responses are converted to z-scores 
before they are summed.  
.00 1.98 F1 Student 
Academic 
Self-Concept 
How the adolescent thinks of their 
ability as a student. Responses to 
the following six statements are 
summed to create a composite 
measure: 
Choose the answer that is best for 
you (1=False; 2=Mostly false; 
3=More false than true; 4=More 
true than false; 5=Mostly true; 
6=True).  
1. I learn things quickly in English 
classes. 
2. I get good marks in English 
3. I have always done well in 
mathematics 
4. Im hopeless in English classes 
5. I get good marks in mathematics 
6. I do badly in tests of mathematics 
Items 4 and 6 are reverse coded. 
12.92 5.4 F1 Student 
Occupational 
expectations 
Occupational category of the type of 
work expected at age 30. 
  F2 Student 
 Clerical .03 .16  
 Tradesperson .02 .14  
 Farmer, farm manager .01 .09  
 Laborer .01 .07  
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 Manager .05 .21  
 Military .02 .15  
 Operator .01 .10  
 Professional I .34 .47  
 Professional II .16 .37  
 Owner .05 .22  
 Protective service .04 .20  
 Sales .02 .12  
 School teacher .07 .25  
 Service worker .02 .15  
 Technical .06 .23  
 Not planning to work (includes 
response Full-time 
homemaker) 
.09 .29  
 Other .00 .05  
Importance of 
work success 
The subjective importance of 
Being successful in my line of 
work. (1=Not Important; 
2=Somewhat Important; 3= Very 
Important.). Treated as a 
continuous measure. 
2.88 .35 F2 Student 
Importance of 
money 
The subjective importance of 
Having lots of money. (1=Not 
Important; 2=Somewhat 
Important; 3= Very Important.). 
Treated as a continuous measure. 
2.26 .62  
Importance of 
being an 
expert at work 
The subjective importance of 
Becoming and expert in my line of 
work. (1=Not Important; 
2=Somewhat Important; 3= Very 
Important.) Treated as a continuous 
measure. 
2.61 .58  
Sampling 
weight 
4th follow-up questionnaire weight 
(F4QWT) 
-- --  
     
SCHOOL-LEVEL     
Academic 
track 
Percentage of students in the 
academic track. 
50.69 29.28 F2 Admin. 
College focus A measure of college focus is 38.13 5.36 F2 Admin. 
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 created by summing the number of 
the following college-encouraging 
services a school offers: programs 
on college application procedures; 
programs on financial aid; 
SAT/ACT courses; college fairs; 
meetings with college 
representatives.  
   
Job focus A measure of work focus is created 
by summing the number of the 
following pro-work services a 
school offers: Interest inventories 
(for choosing a job); job fairs; 
letters of recommendation to 
employers; practice interviews; 
arrangement of interviews with 
employers; job placement courses 
employment services; job placement 
counselor; employment readiness 
workshops. 
20.46 19.47 F2 Admin. 
Parental 
education 
Mean education of students 
parents. 
14.34 1.74 F2 & BY 
Parent; F2 & 
BY Student 
Family income Mean income of students families. 51,312.34 33,211.61 F2 Parent & 
BY Parent 
Cognitive skill Mean cognitive skill of students. 51.24 6.33 F2 Student 
Notes. Data are weighted using the 4th follow-up questionnaire weight. Statistics include imputed 
values.  
 
problem is, but examination of the issue using NLSY79 suggests that the problem is 
not serious. The NLSY79 records occupational aspirations in the detailed 1970 COC 
(see Chapter 4 for more detail on the NLSY79). Broad occupational categories like the 
ones used in the NELS88 can be constructed for the NLSY79 by grouping the 1970 
COC occupations into categories. Analysis shows that the broad occupational 
categories constructed in the NLSY79 capture 86 percent of the variance in the 
educational requirements of the detailed occupations (results not shown). This 
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suggests that the broad occupational categories used in the NELS88 capture the vast 
majority of the differences in occupational expectations. 
College entry is entry into a two or four-year college as of the 2000 round.51 I 
also examine separately entry into a four-year college, which is also measured as of 
the 2000 round. Cognitive skill, family income, and parental education are also 
included in the analysis (see Table 5.1 for more details). I want to adjust for the 
perceived ability to complete college and psychic costs to isolate the effects beliefs 
about educational requirements. There is no measure of the perceived ability to 
complete college, but a composite measure of academic self-concept is constructed 
using items in the first student follow-up on ability and performance in mathematics 
and English. Psychic costs are measured with responses to three questions, also from 
the first student follow-up questionnaire. One question asks respondents if they think 
that the subjects they are taking are interesting and challenging. Another asks if they 
go to school because they get a feeling of satisfaction from doing what they are 
supposed to in class. (These are the same questions used in Chapter 3, which used the 
ELS02 data.) There are no measures of the enjoyment of reading and mathematics, but 
in the first follow-up student questionnaire respondents report how much they read 
each week not in connection with schoolwork. These three variables are converted to 
z-scores and summed to create a measure of the psychic costs of schooling.  
School-level variables are used to determine what school characteristics predict 
perceived educational requirements. School-mean cognitive skill, parental education, 
and family income are constructed from the relevant student measures just discussed. 
                                                
51 Steps taken to ensure confidentiality in the public-use data mean that a handful of respondents may be 
incorrectly coded on this variable. In the 2000 round respondents reported up to eight postsecondary 
institutions they attended since the 1994 interview, but the public release data only lists the sector for 
the first and last postsecondary institutions attended. This should not be a major problem because most 
students (83 percent) reporting having attended any postsecondary institutions since the 1994 round 
report having attended either one or two (F4NINST), and most students have attended either a 2- or 4-
year college as of the 1994 interview, so it can be ascertained if they attended one.  
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Percentage of students in the academic track is drawn from the second follow-up 
School Administrator Questionnaire. The second follow-up School Administrator 
questionnaire is also used to measure schools college focus and job focus. College 
focus is measured as the number of the following pro-college services a school 
offers: programs on college application procedures, programs on financial aid, 
SAT/ACT courses, college fairs, and meetings with college representatives. A 
measure of work focus is created by summing the number of the following pro-work 
services a school offers: interest inventories (for choosing a job), job fairs, letters of 
recommendation to employers, practice interviews, arrangement of interviews with 
employers, job placement courses, employment services, high school job placement 
counselor, and employment readiness workshops.  
Respondents are excluded from the analysis if they responded Not planning to 
work to the perceived educational requirement question or if they have missing 
values for the college entry questions. Missing values for other regressors are imputed 
using Statas best-subset regression imputation command impute. Missing values for 
school-level variables are also imputed.  
Slightly different samples are used for (1) estimation of the effects of 
perceived educational requirements on college entry and (2) analysis of the 
determinants of perceived educational requirements. The sample used for estimation 
of the effects of perceived education requirements on college entry is limited to 
respondents enrolled in school in the 1992 round, who completed a high school 
diploma by the 2000 round, and for whom valid responses to the college entry 
questions are available; sample size is N=9,142. The sample used for analysis of the 
determinants of perceived educational requirements is limited to respondents who 
attended the same school in 1990 and 1992 (which is necessary to use second follow-
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up school administrator data with the public-use data) and for whom second follow-up 
School Administrator Questionnaire data are available; sample size is N=9,450.  
I also briefly analyze the National Longitudinal Survey of Young Men, 1966. 
Because it is used to estimate only a single regression model, I describe the data in 
Appendix B, but the most important features are discussed in the main text when the 
data are used. 
 
FINDINGS 
DESCRIPTIVE RESULTS  
Figures 5.3a and 5.3b present respondents perceptions of the education they 
will need to enter the occupations they expect. It is useful to compare these 
perceptions to objective measures based on the educational attainment of incumbents 
of the occupations. Typically, when adolescents perceptions of the education they 
will require to enter an occupation are compared to incumbents educational 
attainment, researchers use data on incumbents drawn from roughly the same time as 
adolescents responses (Ludwig 1999; Schneider and Stevenson 1999; Grotevant and 
Durrett 1980).52 However, adolescents responses are reported in 1992 when most 
were about 18, so incumbent data should be from 12 years later when most 
respondents will be about 30. I use data from the 2003 American Community Survey as 
a source of incumbents educational attainment.53 (See Appendix C for details on the 
American Community Survey.)   
                                                
52 In Ludwig (1999) adolescents responses are from 1979 and the educational attainment of 
occupational incumbents is drawn from the 1980 March CPS; in Schneider and Stevenson (1999) 
adolescents responses are from 1992 and the educational attainment of occupational incumbents is 
drawn from the 1990 Census. Grotevant and Durrett (1980) do not actually specify when or where their 
information on occupational incumbent education came from, but adolescents responses are from 1976 
and the study was published in 1980 so their data on occupational incumbents can only be from 4 years 
in the future or less.      
53 Data from 2004 would be even closer to when most respondents were age 30. However, I use the 
2003 ACS because the educational attainment question used in the 2003 is more similar to the 
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First consider the occupation category Professional I (Figure 5.3a), which is 
the most commonly selected category. The results show that the educational 
attainment of incumbents ranges from high school diploma to professional degree. 
Adolescents perceptions can be seen as remarkably accurate in the sense that they are 
distributed across the education categories in roughly the same pattern as actual 
incumbent education. The same is true for Professional II, which is the second most 
commonly selected category. Indeed, the results for all occupational expectation 
categories could be described in this way at least to an important extent.  
If adolescents obtain their information from their experiences, such as their 
association with incumbents of these occupations, it is easy to see how the distribution 
of perceptions could resemble the distribution of incumbent educational attainment. 
For example, an adolescent who thinks that they require a masters degree to become a 
technician may know a technician with a masters degree, whereas another adolescent 
who thinks that they require a high school diploma to become a technician may know 
a technician with a high school diploma.  
This is not to say that adolescents perceptions are wholly accurate. First, even 
if using similarity in the distributions of perceptions and incumbent education is 
accepted as a reasonable measure of accuracy, the results reveal substantial 
overestimations for some of the less frequently expected occupations. For example, 
the proportion of respondents believing that a vocational degree is necessary to 
become a tradesperson or a machine operator is much higher than the proportion of 
tradespersons or machine operators who have vocational degrees. Second, similar 
distributions of perceptions and incumbent education are not strong evidence of 
accuracy because although some incumbents have much more or less education than  
                                                                                                                                       
perceived educational requirement question in the NELS88 data. Specifically, the 2003 ACS question 
asks about vocational, trade and business schools while the 2004 question does not. 
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Figure 5.3a. Distributions of Perceived Educational Requirements and Educational 
Attainment of Incumbents by Occupation Expected. NELS88, 1992 (for perceived 
educational requirements) and ACS 2003 (for education of incumbents).
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Figure 5.3b. Distributions of Perceived Educational Requirements and Educational 
Attainment of Incumbents by Occupation Expected. NELS88, 1992 (for perceived 
educational requirements) and ACS 2003 (for education of incumbents).
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typical incumbents, it may be unreasonable for an adolescent to think that they will 
need much more or much less education than the typical incumbent. For example, 5 
percent of respondents expecting to have an occupation in the Professional I category 
believe that they will need a Professional degree to enter it. However, even though 
there are some incumbents in the Professional I category that have Professional 
degrees, it seems unreasonable for adolescents to think that they will need one. It 
seems more reasonable to think that they will need a bachelors degree, which is the 
modal incumbent educational attainment.  
 
THE EFFECTS OF PERCEIVED EDUCATIONAL REQUIREMENTS 
I turn next in Table 5.2 to estimation of the effects of perceived education 
requirements on college entry. Column 1 of Table 5.2 first presents unadjusted entry 
rates into two- or four-year colleges for each of the perceived education categories. 
Predictably, entry rates increase with increasing perceived requirements. Entry rates 
range from a low of .413 for those perceiving that no postsecondary schooling is 
required to enter the occupations they expect, to .941 for those perceiving that a 
professional degree is required. The effects of moving from one perceived educational 
requirement to the next highest level are presented in Column 1 below the entry rates. 
As we would expect, results show that effects are highly nonlinear. Entry rates for 
those perceiving that some college is required to enter the occupation they expect are 
over 20 percent higher than entry rates among those perceiving vocational school 
requirements. In contrast, there is essentially no effect from moving from Graduate 
degree to Professional degree, which seems logical. 
Other effects are of intermediate magnitude. This may not seem entirely 
logical. For example, the belief that training at a vocational, business, or trade school 
is required should have no effect on college entry. Similarly, adolescents who believe  
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Table 5.2. Proportion of Students at Each Perceived Educational Requirement Level 
Entering a 2- or 4-year College by 2000. NELS88 19882000. 
PANEL A. ENTRY INTO A 2- OR 4-YEAR COLLEGE   
Perceived education requirements of occupation 
expected at age 30  
 (1) Unadjusted 
Results 
(2) Matching Results 
 ENTRY RATES 
 Unadjusted entry rates Rates when balanced to 
the population 
(1) No postsecondary schoolinga  .413 .552 
 (.043) (.072) 
(2) Vocational, trade or business schoolb .512 .665 
 (.027) (.035) 
(3) Some college, but no 4-year degreec .730 .780 
 (.018) (.025) 
(4) 4- or 5-year college degree .848 .842 
 (.011) (.010) 
(5) Graduate degree (Masters or PhD) .938 .883 
 (.011) (.013) 
(6) Professional degree (JD or MD) .941 .868 
 (.024) (.027) 
   
 EFFECTS 
 Naïve Estimates 
δNAIVE 
Matching Estimates 
δATE 
(1) to (2)  .099 .113 
 (.057) (.078) 
(2) to (3)  .218 .115 
 (.020) (.039) 
(3) to (4) .118 .062 
 (.020) (.025) 
(4) to (5) .090 .041 
 (.017) (.016) 
(5) to (6) .003 .015 
 (.024) (.027) 
   
PANEL B. ENTRY INTO A 4-YEAR COLLEGE   
  
 (1) Unadjusted  (2) Matched 
 
 ENTRY RATES 
 Unadjusted entry rates Rates when balanced to 
the population 
(1) No postsecondary schoolinga .146 .329 
 (.021) (.058) 
(2) Vocational, trade or business schoolb .200 .337 
 (.022) (.032) 
(3) Some college, but no 4-year degreec .239 .427 
 (.026) (.026) 
(4) 4- or 5-year college degree .643 .635 
 (.013) (.011) 
(5) Graduate degree (Masters or PhD) .811 .688 
 (.016) (.016) 
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Table 5.2 (Continued) 
 
  
(6) Professional degree (JD or MD) .846 .733 
 (.020) (.034) 
   
 EFFECTS 
 Naïve Estimates 
δNAIVE 
Matching Estimates 
δATE 
(1) to (2)  .054 .008 
 (.030) (.058) 
(2) to (3)  .039 .090 
 (.033) (.037) 
(3) to (4) .404 .208 
 (.029) (.028) 
(4) to (5) .168 .053 
 (.022) (.020) 
(5) to (6) .035 .045 
 (.027) (.041) 
Notes. Bootstrap standard errors in parentheses. N=9,142. 
a Includes responses: No high school; Some high school; and High school diploma.  
b Includes responses: Less than two years of vocational, trade, or business school; Two years or more of 
vocational, trade, or business school; A degree from a vocational, trade, or business school. 
c Includes responses: Some college education; 2-year college degree. 
*Response groups are balanced on occupational expectations, cognitive skill, race and ethnicity, sex, 
family income, parental education, academic self-concept, and the psychic costs of schooling (see Table 
5.1 for the construction of these variables). 
 
that no postsecondary schooling is required should not enroll in college at all, yet we 
see that over 40 percent do. Note that adolescents beliefs about educational 
requirements, their occupational expectations, or both their beliefs and expectations 
could have changed since the questions were asked on the 1992 questionnaire. These 
updated beliefs and expectations may explain seemingly irrational college entry 
decisions.  
 Examination reveals marked differences among the students comprising each 
of the perceived educational requirement categories. The differences follow a familiar 
pattern in which the students who perceive high educational requirements also have 
other characteristics that would lead them to have higher college entry rates, such as 
high cognitive skill, family income, parental education, and academic self-concept. It 
is thus necessary to adjust for these pretreatment differences. As discussed, differences 
in occupational expectations are another obvious source of differences in perceived 
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educational requirements; specifically, those expecting occupations with higher 
educational requirements should perceive higher educational requirements than others. 
These types of differences were the subject of Chapter 4; I seek to control for them 
here to estimate the effects of perceptions.  
Just as I did in Chapters 2 and 3, I estimate the average treatment effects of 
moving from one category of perceived educational requirements to the next higher 
perceived requirement. In other words, I have generated balancing weights for each of 
the perceived education requirement groups that results in each group expecting the 
same distribution of occupations, cognitive skill, family income, and so on.54  
 The results (Column 2) show that balancing each category to the population 
has predictably increased college entry rates for the groups with the lowest perceived 
educational requirements and decreased college entry rates for the groups with the 
highest perceived requirements. The effects of moving from one perceived educational 
requirement to the next higher perceived educational requirement have declined 
substantially. They remain fairly large, however, especially for movements between 
the categories at the lower end of the continuum. For example, increasing perceived 
education requirements from No postsecondary to Vocational, trade, or business 
school increases the probability of entering college by about 11 percent, but the 
increase from four- or five-year college degree to Graduate degree increases the 
probability of college entry by only about 4 percent. 
 Panel A of Table 5.2 does not distinguish between entry into two-year and 
four-year colleges, but it is worthwhile to look specifically at entry into four-year 
colleges because exploratory analysis revealed important results that emphasize the 
magnitude of the effects of perceived education requirements. Panel B of Table 5.2 
                                                
54 It might be thought that doing so would result in extremely high balancing weights like the ones 
observed in Chapter 4 when I tried to use matching to estimate the effects of job values, but this turns 
out not to be the case. 
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presents results parallel to those presented in Panel A, except that now entry rates are 
for four-year colleges only. The most notable result in Column 1 is the large naïve 
estimate of the effect of moving from perceiving that some college is required to 
perceiving that a four-year degree is required, which is roughly .4. Column 2 shows 
that, even after balancing, the effect is estimated to be about .21. This effect is much 
larger than the effect for any other transitions. This is what we would expect: those 
thinking that they require four-year degrees should be decidedly more likely to enter 
four-year colleges than those perceiving lower educational requirements. 
 
A POSSIBLE SOURCE OF BIAS. I mentioned earlier that it can be difficult to 
distinguish between the effects of education-first and occupation-first satisficing. 
Estimating the effect of perceived education requirements of the occupations that 
respondents expect (rather than at occupations more generally) is an instance of this 
difficulty. The estimates presented in Table 5.2 have been interpreted within an 
occupation-first framework as the effect of perceived education requirements on 
college entry, but they can also be interpreted within an education-first framework as 
the effect of perceived educational requirements on occupational aspirations. This is 
because in an education-first framework some adolescents with high perceived 
educational requirements will lower their occupational expectations and expect a less-
than-ideal occupation, say occupation X, and this will leave them with the same 
occupational expectation as other adolescents with lower perceived education 
requirements whose first choice of occupation is occupation X. This is a complicated 
and important point that warrants a lengthy digression.  
The issue is most easily explained graphically through an example that 
assumes education-first satisficing. We have already considered in Figure 5.2 the pair 
of students A and B who would ideally like to become engineers, and who have 
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decided that they will attain education level eatt. This figure is presented again as 
Figure 5.3a. Both A and B would like to be engineers, but because A believes that they 
cannot be an engineer with education eatt, A lowers their occupational expectations to 
technician.  
Figure 5.3b presents two more adolescents, C and D, who have decided to 
obtain education eatt-2, a lower level of educational attainment. Both would like to 
become technicians. Because D believes that they cannot become a technician with 
education eatt-2, D lowers their occupational expectation to machine operator as shown 
in Figure 5.3b. The occupational expectation of C remains at technician because C 
believes that they can become a technician at a lower level of education.  
Now suppose that we examined the relationship between perceived educational 
requirements and educational plans conditional on occupational expectations. In this 
case we will look at the relationship conditional on the occupational expectation 
technician. Both A and C expect to become technicians so I examine them. Figure 
5.3c, which presents the relevant information, shows that A expects more education 
than C. However, the higher perceived educational requirements of A have not caused 
them to expect more education than C. Instead, the higher perceived educational 
requirements have caused A to lower their occupational expectations, and it only 
appears that it has caused them to increase their educational attainment.  
This may seem like a peculiar set of circumstances, but if high perceived 
educational requirements generally cause adolescents to lower their occupational 
aspirations, then perceived educational requirements should be positively related to 
educational goals and attainment conditional on educational expectations more 
generally. Therefore, using perceptions of the educational requirements of expected 
occupations will overstate the effects of perceived education requirements on college 
entry. Indeed, it is possible that perceived education requirements have no effect on  
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Figure 5.5a. Mapping Functions for Adolescents Whose Ideal Occupational is 
Engineer and Whose Inflexible Educational Goal is eAtt. 
 
 
 
Figure 5.5b. Mapping Functions for Adolescents Whose Ideal Occupation is 
Technician and Whose Inflexible Educational Goal is eatt-2. 
 
 
 
Figure 5.5c. Mapping Functions and Educational Attainment for Adolescents Whose 
Occupational Expectation is Technician.
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college entry and that education-first satisficing alone drives the results reported in 
Table 5.2.  
The crucial question is How much do perceived educational requirements 
lower occupational expectations? If perceived educational requirements lower 
occupational expectations by a great deal the effect estimates in Table 5.2 will be 
seriously biased upwards; if they lower them only slightly the effect estimates are will 
not be seriously biased (unless other omitted variables are important).  
It might be thought that the NELS88 could be used to estimate the effect of 
perceived education requirements on occupational expectations. Whether or not a 
respondent perceived high education requirements could be determined by comparing 
their beliefs about the education required to enter the occupation they expect to the 
modal attainment of incumbents of that occupation from the 2003 ACS. From this it 
could be determined, for example, if respondents are overestimators of education 
requirements. For example, the modal educational attainment of incumbents in the 
Technical category is a vocational degree, so respondents believing that more 
education than a vocational degree this is required to enter a Technical occupation 
would be overestimaters. Similarly, the modal educational attainment of incumbents 
of Professional I occupations is a bachelors degree, so respondents believing that 
more education is required to enter this occupation category would be overestimaters. 
Doing so reveals that overestimaters do tend to have lower occupational expectations. 
However, this is likely artifactual because there is a type of ceiling effect in which the 
higher the occupational expectation, the lower the probability of overestimating 
because there are fewer educational attainment categories above the modal educational 
attainment. In the most extreme case respondents with the highest occupational 
expectations (Professional II) cannot overestimate the education requirements of the 
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occupations they expect because Professional degree is the modal education level 
among incumbents.  
To avoid the ceiling effect I need a measure of perceived educational 
requirements of occupations unrelated to the occupations respondents expect. The 
National Longitudinal Survey of Young Men, 1966 (hereafter, NLSYM66) contains 
useful variables. The NLSYM66 administers a short test of occupational knowledge 
known as the Knowledge of the World of Work (hereafter, KWW). For one of the types 
of questions in the KWW, respondents are given an occupation (e.g., forklift 
operator) and are asked how much education they think that typical incumbents in 
that occupation have. There are ten of these questions asking about ten different 
occupations. The responses to these questions can give us a measure of perceived 
education requirements more generally, not just for the occupations adolescents 
expect. I take the average of the responses to the ten questions and treat this as a 
measure of respondents beliefs about educational requirements of occupations. High 
values indicate that respondents think that more education is required to enter any 
given occupation and lower values indicate that respondents think that less education 
is required.  
The NLSYM66 also includes respondents occupational aspirations for age 30 
coded in the 1960 COC. Occupational expectations are preferable to occupational 
aspirations, so to look at expected occupations I have limited the sample to 
respondents who believed that their chances of entering the occupation they aspired to 
were either Excellent, Good, or Fair (those who report Poor are dropped). 
Education-first satisficing predicts that high perceived education requirements lead 
adolescents to aspire to less-than-ideal occupations (e.g., engineering technician) with 
lower educational requirements than their most preferred occupation (e.g., engineer). I 
therefore need the educational requirements of expected occupations to test the 
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prediction of education-first satisficing. I use the 1960 Census to generate the 
educational requirements of the occupations respondents want. Using this objective 
measure of educational requirements is problematic because we know that 
adolescents beliefs about educational requirements are often inaccurate. Nonetheless, 
adolescents appear to generally know which occupations require more education than 
others, and this measure should allow us to get a sense of the effect of perceived 
education requirements on occupational expectations. 
To estimate the effect that perceived education requirements have on 
occupational expectations, I regress the years of education of the occupation 
respondents expect on mean perceived educational requirements. Also included as 
control variables are parental education, socioeconomic status of fathers occupation, 
cognitive skill, score on the KWW test, and dummy variables for gender, and race and 
ethnicity. The results, which are presented in Table 5.3, show that an increase of one 
year in perceived education reduces the educational requirements of occupations 
expected by only .026 years. An example illustrates that this is a very small effect. If 
one adolescent believed that the ten occupations in the KWW on average required a 
high school diploma and a second adolescent believed that they required a four-year 
college degree, the model does predict that the latter adolescent would change their 
occupational aspiration from an ideal occupation to a less-than-ideal occupation with 
lower education requirements. However, the model predicts that the less-than-ideal 
occupation would have education requirements only about .1 year lower (.026x4≈.1). 
To give a sense of how much of a reduction in occupational expectations this would 
be, electrical engineers have about .3 more years of education than civil engineers 
based on the 1960 Census. Thus, perceiving high educational requirements may lead 
adolescents to lower their occupational aspirations, but these results suggest that they 
do so by only a trivial amount. Therefore, the estimates of the effect of perceived 
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education requirements presented earlier in Table 5.2 are probably not grossly 
overstated as a consequence of the effect of perceived educational requirements on 
occupational expectations. More recent data or data on females may yield different 
results, but it seems sensible to tentatively accept the estimates in Table 5.2. 
 
Table 5.3. Coefficients from a Regression Model Predicting the Educational 
Requirements of Occupations Wanted at Age 30. NLSYM66, 1966. 
Outcome=Educational requirements of 
occupation aspired to 
 
Mean perceived education .026 
 (.133) 
Black .375 
 (.247) 
Hispanic .395 
 (.244) 
Other race/ethnicity .943 
 (.696) 
Socioeconomic status of fathers occupation .005 
 (.003) 
Parental education .101** 
 (.030) 
Cognitive skill .032** 
 (.006) 
Age .054 
 (.053) 
KWW score .028* 
 (.013) 
Constant 9.064** 
 (2.336) 
R2 .090 
Notes. N=1,439. Robust standard errors in parentheses. * significant at 5%; ** significant at 1% 
 
DETERMINANTS OF EDUCATION REQUIREMENT BELIEFS  
Table 5.4 examines the determinants of perceived educational requirements 
with a series of regression models. Note that I use a years of education required 
measure in this analysis rather than the categorical measure used in the estimation of 
the effects of perceived educational requirements on college entry. (See Table 5.1 for 
details on converting the categorical measure into a years of education measure.) 
Some may object that a series of ordered categories is more appropriate. However, 
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results based on a continuous measure are more intuitive, and preliminary analysis 
revealed that results are substantively similar whether perceived educational 
requirements are treated as an ordinal or a continuous variable. 
Model 1 regresses perceived educational requirements on job values and 
dummy variables for gender, race and ethnicity, and 16 dummy variables for 
occupational expectations (which are included to control for occupational 
preferences). Job values are included to control for intra-occupational aspirations. 
Although means and standard deviations in Table 5.1 are for unstandardized variables, 
work values have been converted to z-scores to assess their relative strength. The 
results (Column 1) show that valuing being successful at work and being an expert at 
work both increase perceived requirements, which may be because respondents 
reporting the same occupation categories may expect different specific occupations. 
Females perceive roughly the same education requirements as males and blacks 
perceive roughly the same education requirements as whites. Hispanics perceive lower 
educational requirements than whites, and Asians perceive decidedly higher 
requirements than whites. 
Model 2 adds family income, parental education, and cognitive skill as 
regressors; all three of these variables have been converted to z-scores to facilitate 
comparisons of their effects. Results (Column 2) show that all three predict higher 
perceived education requirements. Parental education and cognitive skill estimates are 
quite large. Note the effect that adding these regressors has had on the race and 
ethnicity estimates. Now both blacks and Hispanics perceive much higher educational 
requirements than whites. Thus we have another instance in which Hispanic-white and 
black-white differences in college-encouraging perceptions favoring Hispanics and 
blacks are induced by conditioning on cognitive skill and family background. Note 
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Table 5.4. Regression Coefficients from Multilevel Models Predicting Education 
Beliefs. NELS88, 19881992. 
Outcome=Perceived years of 
education required to enter the 
occupation expected at age 30. 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
Intercept 16.306*** 
(.022) 
16.509***   
(.018) 
16.368*** 
(.019) 
16.361*** 
(.019) 
School Level     
% in Academic Track    .072** 
(.025) 
Family Income    .061 
(.036) 
Parental Education    .102* 
(.040) 
Cognitive Skill    .067* 
(.033) 
College Focus    .039* 
(.017) 
Work Focus    .036 
(.025) 
Student Level     
Female .032 
(.039) 
.065 
(.037) 
.072 
(.038) 
.078* 
(.038) 
Black .012 
(.069) 
.583***   
(.075) 
.570*** 
(.074) 
.561*** 
(.075) 
Hispanic .124* 
(.059) 
.485***   
(.065) 
.470*** 
(.064) 
.491*** 
(.065) 
Asian .553*** 
(.065) 
.444***   
(.068) 
.432*** 
(.063) 
.426*** 
(.064) 
Family Income  .094***   
(.016) 
.087*** 
(.016) 
.040* 
(.018) 
Parental Education  .297***   
(.021) 
.292*** 
(.021) 
.261*** 
(.023) 
Cognitive Skill  .533***   
(.024) 
.533*** 
(.022) 
.523*** 
(.023) 
Success at Work .137 
(.020) 
.109*** 
(.023) 
.109*** 
(.023) 
.109*** 
(.023) 
Expert at Work .077 
(.018) 
.132*** 
(.019) 
.133*** 
(.019) 
.136*** 
(.019) 
Steady Work .024 
(.020) 
.037 
(.023) 
.037 
(.023) 
.039 
(.023) 
Money .092 
(.012) 
.000 
(.018) 
.000 
(.018) 
.003 
(.018) 
Occupational expectation 
dummy variables 
YES YES YES YES 
τ00   .213*** .184*** 
Notes. N=12,814 level-one observations (students); N=1,146 level-two observations (schools). 
Additional regressors include the race and ethnicity categories Native American, and Race missing. 
Dummy variables for occupational expectations are also included.
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also that conditioning on cognitive skill and family background reduces Asian-white 
differences (primarily because Asians cognitive skill is higher than whites cognitive 
skill), but Asians continue to perceive much higher educational requirements than 
whites. It is unclear why blacks, Hispanics, and Asians perceive higher education 
requirements than whites conditional on cognitive skill and family background 
because the relative standing logic introduced in Chapter 2 does not seem to apply 
here. Minorities may believe that they require more education than whites because 
they anticipate labor-market discrimination, but I cannot see why this mechanism 
would not lead blacks and Hispanics to perceive higher educational requirements than 
whites before conditioning on cognitive skill and family background.  
Model 3 (Column 3) is a multilevel model that models the nested structure of 
the data. It is a random-intercept model, which allows mean levels of perceived 
educational requirements to vary by school. Examination of the variance of mean 
perceived requirements across schools, which is denoted τ00 in Table 5.4, reveals 
statistically-significant variation conditional on the level-one variables in the model. 
However, a comparison of Models 2 and 3 shows that allowing mean levels of 
perceived educational requirements to vary across schools has little effect on estimates 
of the level-one effects. For example, perceived educational requirements are higher 
among blacks and Hispanics, but this appears to have little to do with the types of 
schools they attend. 
In an effort to explain the variation in mean levels of perceived requirements 
across schools, Model 4 (Column 4) adds the school-level variables percentage of 
students in the academic track, college focus, job focus, school-mean cognitive skill, 
school-mean parental education, and school-mean family income as predictors of 
level-two intercepts. All school-level variables have been converted to z-scores. The 
results show that the percentage of students in the academic track and school-mean 
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family income both increase school-mean perceived education requirements. 
Consistent with my predications, college focus appears to increase perceived 
educational requirements and job focus appears to lower them, but the effects are 
weak and fail to reach statistical significance at the p<.05 level for the latter. Other 
effects are also small and fail to reach statistical significance. Also observe that these 
variables account for only about 15 percent of variation in perceived requirements that 
exists across schools. Thus schools may influence perceived education requirements, 
but the majority of inter-school variation is unaccounted for with the variables 
considered here. 
  
CONCLUSIONS 
This chapter investigated adolescents perceptions of the relationship between 
educational and occupational attainment and the effects that these perceptions have on 
college entry. Unlike past research focusing on the accuracy of adolescents 
perceptions, this chapter addresses beliefs about the level of education required for 
occupations. Specifically, it looks at the education adolescents think they will need to 
enter the occupation they expect at age 30.  
Results show considerable variation in adolescents perceptions. For example, 
among adolescents expecting to work in a technical occupation, about 30 percent 
believe that a vocational degree is required, 13 percent believe that an Associates 
degree is required, 35 percent believe that a bachelors degree is required, 10 percent 
believe that a masters degree or PhD is required, and the remaining 22 percent of 
respondents beliefs are spread out from high school graduate to Professional degree. 
It is hard not to concur with Grotevent and Durrett (1980) who conclude that high 
school students appear to be making decisions of major consequence on less than 
adequate information (p. 180) and that providing students with reliable information 
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about the educational requirements of occupations should become a more important 
part of school counselors duties. 
Adolescents who perceive higher educational requirements are more likely to 
enter college than adolescents who perceive lower educational requirements. For 
example, adolescents who believe that the occupation they expect requires at least 
some college are about 11 percent more likely to enroll in college than adolescents 
who believe that they can enter the occupation they expect with training at a 
vocational, trade, or business school. Those who believe that a four-year degree is 
required to enter the occupation they expect are over 20 percent more likely to enroll 
in a four-year college than those who believe they can enter the occupation with only 
some college or an associates degree.  
Cognitive skill and parental education are strongly related to perceived 
educational requirements. Conditional on cognitive skill and family background 
measures blacks, Hispanics, and Asians perceive higher educational requirements than 
whites. It is unclear why whites perceive lower educational requirements than other 
groups. Blacks, Hispanics, and Asians may have better or different information about 
the education of typical incumbents or they may believe that they require more 
education to enter the occupations they expect, such as may be the case if 
discrimination in hiring or promotion was anticipated. 
Perceived educational requirements are higher in some schools than in others. 
The percentage of students in the academic track and school-mean levels of family 
income predict higher perceived educational requirements. It was hypothesized that 
when high schools appear to promote postsecondary schooling (e.g., they host many 
college representatives, offer assistance to students in the college preparation and 
application process, and so on) they would increase the perceived educational 
requirements of their students because this promotion would lead students to believe 
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that postsecondary education is required for most jobs. The evidence supports this 
conclusion, but a schools college focus has fairly effects on perceived educational 
requirements. 
Students beliefs about the relationship between educational and occupational 
attainment have not made their way into the mainstream study of social stratification, 
but the findings presented here suggest that they may be one of the most important 
determinants of postsecondary educational attainment. Perceived educational 
requirements could be a powerful way to manipulate educational attainment. It seems 
likely, however, that providing accurate information to adolescents would not increase 
college entry rates because overestimation appears to be slightly more common than 
underestimation. 
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CHAPTER 6. PREFERENCES, PERCEPTIONS, AND EMPIRICAL 
PUZZLES IN EDUCATIONAL ATTAINMENT 
 
Thomas Kuhn (1962) famously argued that opposition to dominant scientific 
paradigms develops as empirical puzzles accumulate. Paradigms are unified 
explanatory frameworks of broad scope, and a puzzle emerges when some observation 
fits poorly into the framework. In other words, a puzzle is something that should be 
within the scope of the paradigm but that it cannot explain or can explain in only an 
unsatisfactory ad hoc manner. Kuhn has been critical of the application of his ideas to 
the social sciences, but his emphasis on the role that empirical puzzles play in 
determining the fortunes of explanations seems relevant here. This is because the 
inability of investment models and the Wisconsin Model to explain numerous 
empirical puzzles has probably been seen as their most critical shortcoming.  
Most troubling have been findings of minority-white differences in the 
educational attainment process. Conditional on family background and cognitive skill, 
blacks college plans, enrollment, and attainment are higher than those of whites 
plans, enrollment, and attainment (Morgan 1996; Hoelter 1982; Hout and Morgan 
1975; Bennett and Xie 2003; Rivkin 1995; Kane and Spizman 1994; Herrnstein and 
Murray 1994:319320; Light and Strayer 2002). Results are not as well documented 
for Hispanic-white and Asian-white differences, but the weight of the evidence 
suggests that Asians (Goyette and Xie 1999) and Hispanics plans and attainment are 
higher than the plans and attainment of whites with comparable family background 
and cognitive skill (Kao and Tienda 1998). Bennett and Xie (2003) use the expression 
net-black advantage to refer to the fact that blacks have higher rates of college entry 
than whites conditional on family background and cognitive skill. I use this same 
terminology and add the expressions net-Asian and net-Hispanic advantage to 
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refer to similar findings on Asian-white and Hispanic-white differences where they 
exist.  
The traditional Wisconsin Model specifies that aspirations and attainment are 
ultimately determined by family background and cognitive skill, so clearly it cannot 
account for the high expectations and attainment of minorities that exist conditional on 
these factors. In fact, the Wisconsin Model can be seen as the paradigm that created 
the puzzles, and the decline of the Wisconsin Model has been attributed to its inability 
to account for group differences in expectations, attainments, and the link between the 
two (Morgan 1998).  
Investment models also offer little understanding of minority-white 
differences. Manski and Wise (1983) suggest that schooling has stronger effects on 
blacks earnings. However, despite scattered findings in support of this hypothesis, the 
weight of the evidence suggests that education has roughly the same returns for 
blacks, whites, and Hispanics (Barrow and Rouse 2006; Ashenfelter and Rouse 2000). 
The limited evidence available does suggest slightly higher returns for Asians among 
males (Ashenfelter and Rouse 2000). Direct costs are lower for blacks (and less so for 
Hispanics) because they receive more financial aid (Kane and Spizman 1994; Venti 
1983), and the higher probability of unemployment among young blacks lowers the 
opportunity costs of college attendance (Rivkin 1995; Manski and Wise 1983). But 
these facts cannot explain Asian-white differences and are likely of insufficient 
magnitude to explain black-white differencesespecially in college entrywhich are 
extremely large as will be seen shortly.  
Evidence on perceptions of the costs and benefits of postsecondary education 
also fails to explain race and ethnicity differences. On average, both adolescents and 
adults overestimate tuition by a factor of two or more (Avery and Kane 2004; 
Ikenberry and Hartle 1998; Post 1990; Grodsky and Jones 2006; Horn, Chen, and 
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Chapman 2003), but beliefs vary little across racial and ethnicity groups. Avery and 
Kane (2004) also found no systematic differences in beliefs about the returns to 
education across two sets of schools, one of which was composed primarily of poor 
minorities and one of which was composed primarily of affluent whites. Rouse (2004) 
also found similar perceived returns when comparing students from a Baltimore high 
school serving poor neighborhoods and a Wisconsin school serving more affluent 
neighborhoods.  
 Alongside the enduring puzzle of minority-white differences in college entry, a 
new group difference puzzle has developed. The educational expectations and 
attainment of females have historically been below those of males, but a long-term, 
strong, upward trend has led to a net-female advantage in expectations and 
attainment (National Center for Education Statistics 2006:159; Buchmann and DiPrete 
2006).55  
The secular trend in females expectations relative to males is unsurprising 
given the rise of female labor force participation, but neither the Wisconsin Model nor 
conventional investment models can account well for the fact that females attainment 
has come to exceed males attainment. The Wisconsin Model offers little guidance 
because males and females have essentially identical test scores and family resources. 
Although there is some evidence of higher returns for females (Jacob 2002; DiPrete 
and Buchman 2006), education appears to have roughly the same return for males and 
females. Females are also more apt to withdraw from the labor market to raise 
children, which lowers the time over which investments in schooling can be 
recovered. Jacob (2002) argues that females have higher noncognitive skills that may 
lower the psychic costs of college or may increase the chances of acceptance or 
                                                
55 This net-female advantage is now so great that some administrators are considering affirmative 
action admission policies for male applicants (Green and Green 2004, cited in Buchmann and DePrite 
2006). 
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financial aid offers. Jacob often operationalizes noncognitive skills as behavior (such 
as grades, problem behaviors, hours of homework, and so on), which could be 
consequences of educational decisions rather than causes of them. For example, if 
males are more likely to decide that postsecondary schooling is not a worthwhile 
investment they may subsequently put less effort into their studies.  
Jacob (2002:589, footnote 2) also mentions the possibility of gender 
differences in employment preferences, such as differences in preferences for 
employment in the military, but he does not pursue this possibility. Powers and 
Wojtkiewicz (2004) explore this possibility and find that occupational aspirations can 
explain male-female differences in high school completion, but their data are too old 
to examine the net-female advantage in postsecondary education. 
I also argue that the Wisconsin Model and investment models provide 
unsatisfactory accounts of the effects of cognitive skill and family background on 
educational attainment. In the Wisconsin Model cognitive skill affects grades, which 
affect significant others expectations, which affect students attainment (see Figure 
1.1). However, there remains a fairly strong relationship between cognitive skill and 
educational attainment conditional on both grades and significant others expectations. 
Those working in the human capital tradition often suggest or assert that this net-
cognitive skill advantage, to extend this terminology still further, arises because 
higher ability adolescents get higher returns to schooling (e.g., Frank 1985:211; 
Herrnstein and Murray 1994), but despite numerous attempts to do so this claim has 
not been convincingly shown. Others argue that cognitive skills lower psychic costs 
(Cunha, Heckman, and Navarro 2006; Garen 1985). This claim needs to be 
empirically examined and other possibilities need to be considered.  
In the Wisconsin Model family background predicts significant others 
expectations, which lead to higher attainment via students aspirations. It is never 
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clearly spelled out why the significant others, particularly the parents, of those with 
advantaged family backgrounds have higher expectations. The effect of family income 
on educational attainment is not generally seen as puzzling because it should be 
strongly related to the ability to comfortably finance college or finance it at all. What 
is more puzzling is the relationship that other measures of family background have 
with educational attainment conditional on family income. This is especially true of 
parental education; estimation always yields a net-parental education advantage in 
which parents educational attainment has a large effect on adolescent educational 
attainment conditional on family finances and other predictors of educational 
attainment. It is sometimes vaguely suggested that well-educated parents value the 
cultural or symbolic benefits of college (Raftery and Hout 1993; Boudon 1974; 
Ellwood and Kane 2000), but this has not been shown. Returns to education do not 
seem to vary systematically with family background (Altonji and Dunn 1996) leaving 
traditional investment theories with little power to explain family background effects 
that exist conditional on the ability to finance college.  
The net-female, net-black, net-Hispanic, net-Asian, net-cognitive skill, and net-
parental education advantages in college entry are empirical puzzles.56 In this chapter I 
examine the extent to which the college-encouraging preferences and perceptions 
considered in Chapters 2 through 5 can jointly account for these empirical puzzles. 
Results presented in Chapters 2 through 5 suggests that preferences and perceptions 
can explain at least part of the empirical puzzles because college-encouraging 
preferences and perceptions were shown to be (conditionally) either positively related 
                                                
56 I accept that the puzzles discussed are indeed puzzles requiring an explanation. However, some 
researchers do not see them that way or act as though they do not. For example, when examining black-
white or Hispanic-white differences in educational expectations some researchers do not condition on 
cognitive skill (e.g., Kao and Tienda 1998). Consequently, blacks and Hispanics do not have unusually 
high expectations, and they tend to have rather low attainment. Researchers taking this approach 
typically fail to explain why they omit cognitive skill and family background, so it is difficult to know 
their perspective. 
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or unrelated to cognitive skill, parental education, female, black, Hispanic, and Asian 
(and college-encouraging preferences and perceptions are never negatively related to 
these variables).  
Although reasonable conjectures have been made, it is not always clear what 
drives these relationships. For example, we do not really know why parental education 
is positively related to perceived educational requirements or to the perceived ability 
to graduate. Nonetheless, if it can be tentatively accepted that they are positively 
related then we can determine if these relationships can explain the empirical puzzles.  
 
DATA 
 Multiple datasets have been used in the previous chapters to permit superior 
measurement of key concepts. However, to examine the ability of the subjective 
rationality framework to explain the empirical puzzles it is best to use a single dataset 
that best measures the various concepts because this enables examination of the 
combined ability of preferences and perceptions to explain the empirical puzzles. The 
NELS88 offers the best opportunity to measure all of the concepts, primarily because 
it allows measurement of the perceived requirements of expected occupations, which 
appear to have strong effects on college entry. The NELS88 also allows reasonable 
measurement of psychic costs, perceived ability, and occupational preferences. The 
NELS88 sample is recent enough to address the net-female advantage, large enough to 
address the net-black advantage, and can also address the net-Hispanic and net-Asian 
advantages because it includes supplementary samples of Hispanic and Asian students.  
The NELS88 includes several self-reported job values questions, such as 
questions asking the importance of Being successful at work and Being an expert at 
work, which I use to measure occupational preferences. I also include occupational 
expectations as measures of occupational preferences. Assuming that occupational 
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expectations represent only preferences is problematic because, as I discussed in 
Chapter 4, occupational expectations likely represent some mixture of occupational 
preferences and perceived accessibility. Thus the effects of occupational expectations 
on college entry likely represent some mixture of the effects of occupational 
preferences and perceived ability. This is of less concern here than it was in Chapter 4 
because I am not trying to isolate the effects of occupational preferences; instead, I am 
trying to look at the combined ability of preferences and perceptions to explain the 
empirical puzzles. Thus it is unimportant that a single measure likely taps into several 
of the concepts.  
For more details on the variables used in this chapter see the discussion of the 
data in Chapter 5.  
 
RESULTS 
PARENTAL EDUCATION. I first consider whether or not preferences and 
perceptions can explain the net-parental education effect within the matching 
framework introduced in Chapter 1 and employed in Chapters 2, 3, and 5. Parental 
education is categorized into four treatment states: (1) a high school diploma or less; 
(2) some college, but no four-year college degree; (3) a four-year college degree; and 
(4) a graduate degree (masters degree or PhD) or professional degree. Column 1 of 
Table 6.1 presents unadjusted differences in college entry rates across these four 
categories. Column 1 shows that entry rates increase as parental education increases. 
Naïve estimates of effects, which are presented below the entry rates in Column 1, 
show that the effect of parental education is strongest for movement out of the lowest 
parental education category and weakest for movement into the highest category. In 
fact, there is almost no effect for moving from four-year degree to Graduate or 
Professional degree. 
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Table 6.1. Actual and Counterfactual College Entry Rates for Respondents in Each 
Parental Education Group. NELS88, 19882000. 
 (1) 
No matching 
(2) 
Matched on family 
income and 
cognitive skill 
(3) 
Subjective 
Rationality Model 
  ENTRY RATES  
 Unadjusted Traditional Controls Preferences and 
Perceptions 
.634 .713 .772 (1) High school diploma, or no 
high school diploma (.017) (.020) (.015) 
(2) Some college, no 4-year 
degree  
.787 
(.012) 
.813 
(.009) 
.823 
(.009) 
(3) 4-year college degree  .930 .896 .888 
 (.009) (.014) (.016) 
.948 .842 .837 (4) Graduate degree (masters or 
PhD) or Professional degree (.015) (.035) (.033) 
    
  EFFECTS  
 Naïve estimates Traditional 
Estimates 
Preferences and 
Perceptions 
(1) to (2) .153 .099 .051 
 (.021) (.022) (.017) 
(2) to (3)  .143 .083 .065 
 (.015) (.016) (.018) 
(3) to (4) .019 .054 .050 
 (.017) (.039) (.039) 
Notes. Bootstrap standard errors are in parentheses. 
 
 These effects are not the puzzle I hope to explain. Past research shows that a 
considerable portion of the unadjusted relationship between parental education and 
college entry is due to differences in cognitive skill, family income, and race and 
ethnicity. It is the effect of parental education on college entry net of its relationship 
with these other variables that I am interested in explaining. Column 2 presents results 
when each of the four parental education categories have been balanced to have the 
population distributions of cognitive skill, family income, gender, and race and 
ethnicity. Column 2 shows that much of the effect of parental education on college 
entry is due to the relationship between parental education and these other factors and 
that the effect of moving from a parental education four-year degree to Graduate or 
Professional degree is completely caused by cognitive skill and family income. In 
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fact, there is a puzzling negative effect that suggests that conditional on cognitive skill 
and family background adolescents whose parents have four-year degrees are more 
likely to enter college than adolescents whose parents have graduate or professional 
degrees. Perhaps this surprising finding is owing to the considerable measurement 
error in self-reported professional degrees revealed by Black, Sanders, and Taylor 
(2003). Many barbers, beauticians, and technologists report having professional 
degrees, presumably because their education is related to their vocation.  
The results in Column 2 are the baseline estimates I seek to explain by 
balancing on preferences and perceptions. Specifically, I balance on the perceived 
ability to complete college (which is measured in the NELS88 with academic self- 
concept), psychic costs, occupational preferences (which are measured in the NELS88 
with job values and occupational expectations), and perceived educational 
requirements of the occupation expected at age 30. Column 3 presents results when all 
four parental education categories have been balanced to the population as on all of 
these measures as well. Note that I am not balancing on preferences and perceptions 
instead of on cognitive skill, family income, and the other variables balanced upon in 
Column 2; I am now balancing on preferences and perceptions in addition to cognitive 
skill, family income, parental education, and race and ethnicity.  
Comparison of the effect estimates in Columns 2 and 3 shows that preferences 
and perceptions account for almost half of the effect of moving from parental 
education High school/no diploma to Some college and about 20 percent of the 
effect of the next transition from Some college to four-year degree. The puzzling 
negative effect for moving from four-year degree to Graduate or Professional 
degree is unexplained. Thus it appears that preferences and perceptions are capable of 
explaining a substantial portion of net-parental education effects but by no means all 
of them. 
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COGNITIVE SKILL. Table 6.2 presents results from a parallel analysis on the 
effects of cognitive skill, which is divided into fourths because no natural boundaries 
exist in measures of cognitive skill. All of the estimates are included, but in the 
interests of brevity I discuss only the effect estimates. Column 1 shows that effect 
estimates are fairly large, and, like parental education effects, they are highest for first 
quartile effects and lowest for third quartile effects. However, unlike what was 
observed for parental education, third quartile effects are fairly large. 
 I next balance each of the fourths to have the population distributions of 
parental education, family income, gender, and race and ethnicity. A comparison of 
the effects for the matched samples (Column 2) to the naïve estimates shows that 
balancing reduces effect estimates, but the effects remain large.  
I next balance on preferences and perceptions and present the results in 
Column 3. A comparison of Columns 2 and 3 reveals that preferences and perceptions 
can account for over one-third of the first quartile effects, three-quarters of the second 
quartile effects, and over 20 percent of third quartile effects. Thus, preferences and 
perceptions can explain substantial portions of the effects of cognitive skill, but they 
cannot explain the entire effect of cognitive skill. 
  
RACE AND ETHNICITY. Table 6.3 examines net-black, net-Hispanic, and net-
Asian advantages in college entry. Column 1 presents unadjusted entry rates 
separately for whites, blacks, Hispanics, and Asians. Column 1 shows that Asians 
have the highest entry rate (.922), whites have the second highest (.801), Hispanics the 
third highest (.780), and blacks have the lowest (.735). I present the naïve estimates 
for minority-white differences in college entry below entry rates in Column 1. 
Column 2 presents estimated entry rates for each of the four race and ethnicity 
groups when they have been weighted so that the distributions of cognitive skill,  
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Table 6.2. Actual and Counterfactual College Entry Rates for Respondents in Each 
Cognitive Skill Fourth. NELS88 19882000. 
 (1) 
No matching 
(2) 
Matched on family 
income and parental 
education 
(3) 
Subjective 
Rationality Model 
    
  ENTRY RATES  
 Unadjusted Traditional Controls Preferences & 
Perceptions 
1st  Fourth .593  
(.021) 
.635  
(.017) 
.724  
(.016) 
2nd Fourth   .759  
(.013) 
.787  
(.012) 
.818  
(.011) 
3rd Fourth   .870  
(.012) 
.863  
(.013) 
.837  
(.013) 
4th Fourth   .960  
(.007) 
.941  
(.012) 
.895  
(.014) 
    
  EFFECTS  
 Naïve estimates Traditional Controls Preferences & 
Perceptions  
1st Quartile Effect .166  
(.023) 
.151  
(.019) 
.094  
(.018) 
2nd Quartile Effect  .111  
(.017) 
.076  
(.017) 
.019  
(.017) 
3rd Quartile Effect .090  
(.013) 
.078  
(.016) 
.058  
(.019) 
Notes. Bootstrap standard errors are in parentheses. 
 
parental education, family income, and gender resembles the distributions in the entire 
sample. Column 2 shows a net-black advantage of .066, a net-Hispanic advantage of 
.083, and an increase in the net-Asian advantage to .124. These are the net-advantages 
I hope to explain with preferences and perceptions. 
To see if my subjective rationality approach can explain any part of the net-
black, net-Hispanic, and net-Asian advantages I next balance the distributions of the 
four preferences and perceptions to the population distributions (in addition to 
cognitive skill, parental education, family income, and gender). The results, which are 
presented in Column 3, show that the net-black advantage is reduced to .026 (a 
reduction of about 60 percent), the net-Hispanic advantage is reduced to .065 (a 
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reduction of about 20 percent), and the net-Asian advantage is reduced to .107 (a 
reduction of about 15 percent).  
 
 
Table 6.3. Actual and Counterfactual College Entry Rates for Whites, Blacks, and 
Hispanics. NELS88 19882000.  
PANEL A. BLACK-WHITE DIFFERENCES 
 (1) Base college entry 
rate 
(2) Matched to 
Population on Cognitive 
skill and Background 
(3) Matched to 
Population on 
Preferences and 
Perceptions  
  ENTRY RATES  
 Unadjusted entry rate Matched entry rate 1 Matched entry rate 2 
Whites .801 .771 .781 
 (.008) (.009) (.009) 
Blacks .735 .837 .807 
 (.038) (.030) (.018) 
Hispanics .780 .854 .846 
 (.021) (.020) (.014) 
Asians .922 .895 .888 
 (.012) (.015) (.016) 
    
  EFFECTS  
 Naïve estimate Matching estimate 1 Matching estimate 2 
.065 .066 .026 Black-White 
Difference (.040) (.033) (.020) 
.021 .083 .065 Hispanic-White 
Difference (.024) (.022) (.017) 
.121 .124 .107 Asian-White 
Difference (.015) (.018) (.019) 
Notes. Bootstrap standard errors in parentheses. 
 
GENDER. Table 6.4 addresses the net-female advantage in college entry. 
Column 1 shows a surprisingly small female advantage of only .039. Column 2, in 
which cognitive skill, parental education, family income, and race and ethnicity have 
all been balanced to the population, shows a net-female advantage of .036. Column 3 
shows that balancing on preferences and perceptions has reduced the net-female 
advantage to just .012 (a reduction of about 66 percent). 
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Table 6.4. Actual and Counterfactual College Entry Rates for Males and Females. 
NELS88 19882000.  
 (1) Base college entry 
rate 
(2) Matched to 
Population on Cognitive 
skill and background 
(3) Matched to 
Population on 
Preferences and 
Perceptions  
  ENTRY RATES  
 Unadjusted entry rate Matched entry rate 1 Matched entry rate 2 
Females .814 .813 .808 
 (.011) (.010) (.011) 
Males .775 .777 .797 
 (.012) (.010) (.009) 
    
  EFFECTS  
 Naïve estimate Matching estimate 1 Matching estimate 2 
.039 .036 .012 Female-Male 
difference  (.019) (.016) (.014) 
Notes. Bootstrap standard errors in parentheses. 
 
CONCLUSION 
 This chapter examined the extent to which college-encouraging preferences 
and perceptions can explain several empirical puzzles that have emerged in the 
educational attainment literature. These empirical puzzles are perhaps best expressed 
as questions for which as yet no good answer has been offered and empirically 
supported: 
• Why are females more likely to enter college than males? 
• Conditional on family income and cognitive skill, why is parental education 
related to college entry? 
• Conditional on family income and parental education, why is cognitive skill 
related to college entry? 
• Conditional on cognitive skill, family income, and parental education why are 
blacks, Hispanics, and Asians more likely to enter college than whites? 
The results presented in this chapter suggest that college-encouraging 
preferences and perceptions can explain substantial portions of the empirical puzzles. 
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With superior measures of preferences and perceptions I suspect that even larger 
proportions of the puzzles could be accounted for. 
Although I have presented plausible explanations for the relationships between 
preferences and perceptions on the one hand and cognitive skill, family background, 
sex, and race and ethnicity on the other, I have done little to test these explanations. 
Before college-encouraging preferences and perceptions can be accepted as credible 
explanations for the empirical puzzles it is necessary to more fully understand these 
relationships. Nonetheless, the findings represent a potentially important beginning to 
a new way of looking at many troubling findings. Certainly the findings cast doubt on 
the many speculative explanations that have been offered in the literature. 
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CHAPTER 7. CONCLUSION 
  
I have developed a subjective rationality perspective in the Weberian social 
action tradition. Entering college is treated as instrumentally-rational social action 
intended to secure desirable labor-market outcomes. My approach is within what I call 
the realistic tradition of rational choice theory because I permit nonpecuniary costs 
and benefits, interpersonal variation in preferences and perceptions, and a satisficing 
decision rule. 
This general approach has been subjected to several criticisms in the past. One 
criticism, often leveled by sociologists, is that rational choice theory makes unrealistic 
assumptions. Another criticism is that my approach is psychological reductionism 
that pays insufficient attention to social structure. A criticism often level by 
economists is that the introduction of satisficing and interpersonal variation in 
preferences and perceptions robs rational choice theory of its predictive power and 
invites post-hoc explanations of behavior. 
In Chapter 1 I outlined what I thought were logical shortcomings of these 
criticisms and evidence from existing research that supports the general approach I 
take. Instead of repeating these counterarguments, I turn now to a summary of the 
results, which I believe provides the strongest support for my approach. Chapters 3 
and 4 provide strong support for the existence of nonpecuniary preferences and 
considerable interpersonal variation in these preferences. Chapters 2 and 5 also show 
that perceptions vary a good deal interpersonally and that perceptions seem often to be 
somewhat inaccurate. For example, many adolescents appear to overestimate their 
ability to complete college and hold mistaken beliefs about the schooling required to 
enter occupations they expect. 
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Most importantly, Chapters 2 through 5 also provide considerable evidence 
that preferences and perceptions influence college entry. Chapter 2 showed that the 
perceived ability to complete college has strong effects on college entry. Chapter 3 
demonstrated that the psychic costs of schooling affect the expectation of a four-year 
degree, but the effects were not as strong as might have been expected. Chapter 4 
showed that occupational preferences have fairly strong effects on the expectation of a 
four-year degree, especially when occupational preferences are measured with 
occupational expectations or aspirations (rather than with job values). Chapter 5 
showed that adolescents who perceive high educational requirements for the 
occupations they expect enter college at higher rates than those who perceive lower 
educational requirements.  
Ignorability is always questionable, and where I have specified unidirectional 
causality reciprocal causality is often plausible. The estimates I present should 
therefore be considered provisional. This being granted, however, I think that the 
estimates strongly support the position that the roles played by the preferences and 
perceptions analyzed here are of quantitative importance in the decision to enter 
college. 
Chapter 6 explored the possibility that college-encouraging preferences and 
perceptions could explain several findings in the educational attainment literature for 
which no reasonable explanations as yet exist. These include the findings that 
cognitive skill and parents education are strongly related to college entry net of their 
relationship with family income, that females enter college at higher rates than males, 
and that blacks, Hispanics, and Asians enroll in college at higher rates than whites of 
comparable cognitive skill and family background. The results presented in Chapter 6 
demonstrated that college-encouraging preferences and perceptions may explain 
considerable portions of each of these puzzles. 
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DIRECTIONS FOR FUTURE RESEARCH 
 The empirical findings presented in Chapters 2 through 6 represent a promising 
beginning for an empirically-oriented subjective-rationality model of educational 
decisions, but more research needs to be conducted to advance this type of model. In 
this section I propose directions for future research, which I separate into three 
categories: (1) research that more carefully tests various aspects of the approach 
empirically, (2) research that extends the approach into analysis of college-
encouraging preferences and perceptions over time, and (3) research that broadens the 
approach advocated here to include other types of college-encouraging preferences 
and perceptions. 
  
EMPIRICAL TESTS. The subjective rationality approach presented here would 
benefit from data designed to measure key concepts. It is probably only with data 
designed to measure concepts in rational choice models that we can expect credible 
estimation and adjudication between competing interpretations (Edling 2000). Above 
all, we need measures of what adolescents think college is like, measures of their 
attitudes toward various occupational outcomes, and what types of outcomes they 
would expect at various hypothetical levels of education. We also need data that can 
be used to establish causal ordering, especially of psychic costs and occupational 
preferences. 
  
TREND ANALYSIS. The subjective rationality framework may be useful in 
understanding temporal changes in college entry. The last 50 years have seen large 
increases in college entry and changes in preferences and perceptions could underlie 
these trends. For example, the perceived ability to complete college may have 
increased. As noted in Chapter 2, a comparison of data from 1972 and 1980 suggests 
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that the belief that one possesses the ability to complete college increased substantially 
in just these eight years. Similarly, occupational preferences may have shifted. Trend 
analysis of female-male differences in occupational preferences may be extremely 
revealing. Shu and Marini (1998) compared females occupational aspirations in 1968 
and 1979 and found a narrowing of gender gaps in the prestige, earnings, and required 
education of occupations wanted over these years. Changes of this type could have 
occurred since 1979 that could explain increases in the female college entry rates 
relative to males. Perceived educational requirements may also have been increasing, 
although I know of no good data that could be used to examine this hypothesis. Lastly, 
psychic costs may have decreased. A movement in the 1980s towards greater course 
selection (the shopping-mall curriculum) and the longer-term movement away from 
rote learning may have led to a greater enjoyment of schooling.57  
 
A MORE COMPLETE MODEL. Although my approach is in what I call the 
realistic tradition of rational choice, probably even more realistic models are 
necessary to substantially improve our understanding of the college entry decision. I 
have focused on the effects that a college education has on occupational outcomes, but 
college entry could be motivated by its effects on other outcomes. College entry could 
be motivated by concerns over social standing (apart from the social standing of 
occupations). It is easy to image, for example, that some adolescents enter college, 
especially selective colleges in demanding majors, to show others that they are capable 
                                                
57 The NCES datasets are an obvious source of data to study trends, especially in conjunction with 
Project Talent data (which was collected in the early 1960s) where uniform variables are available. 
Although it lacks measures of cognitive skill, Monitoring the Future data is also potentially very useful. 
The majority of MTF questions have been asked of high school seniors every year from 1976 to the 
present, and variables are available that could be used to measure psychic costs, academic self-concept, 
occupational preferences, and even (implied) perceived educational requirements.  
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of doing so. Adolescents may also enter college to access a promising marriage 
market, expand their intellectual horizons, please their parents, and so on. 
Adolescents may value education for its own sake, rather than valuing 
education as a means to another end. In Webers typology, pursuing postsecondary 
schooling could be value-rational rather than instrumentally-rational social action 
(1968:24). A question in the ELS02 asking how important Getting a good education 
is to respondents, is strongly related to educational expectations conditional on a host 
of covariates, including the importance of Getting a good job and Becoming an 
expert at work. This is at least consistent with the idea that college is seen as a goal in 
itself, rather than as a means to an end. 
In addressing psychic costs, I focused on academic activities narrowly defined. 
However, there are possibly other important types of psychic costs, some of which 
have been touched upon. For example, college culture is widely seen to be liberal (i.e., 
left-wing), secular, and hedonistic. We do not know the extent to which perceptions 
of, or tastes for these aspects of college culture encourage or dissuade college entry. 
I can imagine a fruitful integration of social identity and subjective 
rationality perspectives. Some adolescents likely think of themselves as the type of 
person who enters college while others think of themselves as the type of person who 
does not. There are differences, at least in central tendencies, between the more and 
less educated. In the social sciences we focus on positive aspects of the more educated 
or interpret differences in a way flattering to the more educated (especially when 
differences are associated with desirable labor-market outcomes). Not everyone sees 
things this way. There are those that see abstract problem solving as completely 
unrelated to actual problems they might want to solve in the future. Mathematics is a 
prime example. This belief seems to be associated with a sense of superiority over 
those who engage assiduously in the solving of such problems in what is perceived to 
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be a mindless, conformist, and even obsequious manner. Casual observation reveals 
that some people think, rightly or wrongly, that nothing of value is learned at college 
and that college should consequently be avoiding as a waste of time, its effects on 
labor-market outcomes notwithstanding. I believe these feelings can have strong 
effects and that people are willing to incur costs to maintain their self-image.  
Similarly, some adolescents appear to think of studenteven collegian
as a preadult role that they seek to exit as soon as is feasible to begin what they see as 
their adult lives. My guess is that this attitude is more common among males, which 
could explain part of the net-female advantage in college entry. Just as some 
adolescents are eager to take on adult roles, other adolescents may be reluctant to take 
them on. College may also be a postponement of decisions that some adolescents are 
not yet prepared to make. 
 
POLICY IMPLICATIONS 
The Wisconsin Model argued that expectations are the proximate cause of 
educational attainment. This led to early proposals that educational attainment could 
be manipulated by manipulating students expectations. How does one raise 
expectations? The Wisconsin Model only suggests that this can be done by 
manipulating significant others expectations. 
My subjective rationality approach suggests that educational attainment can be 
manipulated by manipulating preferences and perceptions. This is more instructive 
than to argue that expectations should be increased because it gives more direction on 
specifically what should be manipulated and it gives a wider menu of alternatives for 
manipulating educational attainment. As I have mentioned in the previous chapters, 
the subjective rationality framework suggests that college entry rates can be increased 
by increasing adolescents confidence that they can complete college, decreasing the 
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perceived psychic costs of college, changing adolescents occupational preferences in 
such a way that makes them want more education, and increasing the level of 
education adolescents perceive to be necessary to enter occupations they expect.  
There are multiple ways these ends can be accomplished. The perceived ability 
to complete college can be increased by increasing academic self-concept or by 
decreasing how challenging adolescents believe college will be. Occupational 
preferences that lead to higher college entry rates can result from fostering different 
standards or higher standards for evaluating an occupations desirability or 
acceptability. The education students believe is required to enter occupations they 
expect can be increased by increasing how much education they believe current 
incumbents possess or by increasing how much they think educational requirements 
will rise by the time they attempt to enter the occupation. Psychic costs can be lowered 
by increasing the intrinsic value of academic activities (like reading and abstract 
problem solving) or by decreasing the psychic costs adolescents predict college will 
entail. 
What is more, with the possible exception of occupational preferences, the 
perceptions and preferences considered here are likely somewhat more manipulable 
than significant others expectations. This is especially true for perceptions, which can 
be changed by simply providing information to adolescents that they find credible. 
Certainly these perceptions are more manipulable than the exogenous variables whose 
effects they appear to mediate, such as cognitive skill.  
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APPENDIX A  
STEP-BY-STEP DESCRIPTION OF ESTIMATION OF AVERAGE  
TREATMENT EFFECTS FOR MANY-VALUED TREATMENTS 
 
Chapter 1 addressed estimation of the average treatment effect for the treated 
(ATT) of a binary treatment variable D. In Chapter 2 I am estimating the average 
treatment effect (ATE) of the perceived ability to complete college, which has four 
categories, known as treatment states. Thus, this example is different in two ways 
from the example in Chapter 1.  
First consider the issue of estimating ATE instead of ATT with a binary 
treatment variable. To estimate average treatment effects for the treated (ATT) with a 
binary treatment variable, one subsample in the dataset (the control group) is weighted 
to be balanced to another, mutually exclusive subsample in the dataset (the treatment 
group). Models are estimated that predict membership in one or the other of these two 
groups. When estimating ATE we want to balance each subsamplenot to another 
subsamplebut to the entire sample. Naturally, each subsample and the entire sample 
are not mutually exclusive. However, it is convenient to think of the subsample and 
the entire sample as mutually exclusive and to actually create these conditions with the 
data.  
This is done by appending the dataset to itself. (Although it is not what I have 
done, this can be visualized as opening the dataset and then pasting another identical 
copy of the dataset beneath it in a spreadsheet.) I generate a dichotomous variable P 
(for population, even though I am dealing with a sample), which equals one for the 
appended dataset and zero otherwise. With this dataset, it is straightforward to 
estimate ATE using the steps outlined in Chapter 1.  
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Step one: Estimate the probability of selection into the population. Begin with the 
control group. When considering the control group, the sample is limited to the 
appended dataset (P=1) and respondents from the original dataset in the control group 
(P=0, D=0). I first model the treatment selection mechanism with a logistic regression 
model. Using the sampling weights supplied with the data (wgt), I regress P on 
cognitive skill, grades, time spent on homework, mothers aspirations, track 
placement, family income, parental education, and dummy variables for gender and 
race and ethnicity. These regressors are represented collectively here as X. From the 
results of this model I estimate the probability of selection into the population (P=1), 
again using the sampling weights: 
 
wgtXP )|1Pr( =  
 
Recall that the superscripted wgt indicates that the variable wgt is used as a sampling 
weight. 
 
Step two: Generate balancing weights. For each respondent i in the control group, I 
generate an adjustment factor f1,D=0, which is the odds of that respondent being in 
the population (as opposed to in the control group): 
 
wgt
D XPoddsf )|1(0,1 ===  
 
For the adjustment factor f1, D=0, the subscript 1 indicates that I am performing 
the first iteration of the weighting routine; the subscript D=0 denotes the control 
group. These adjustment factors are then multiplied by the sampling weight variable 
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wgt to generate a new sampling weight variable wgt1D=0 that is intended to balance the 
pretreatment variables in the control group to the entire sample: 
 
0,101 == ⋅= DD fwgtwgt  
 
These new sampling weights are then used as sampling weights for those in the 
control group. The population retains its original sampling weights. 
I then iterate through these steps to improve balance (i.e., to make the 
distributions of the pretreatment variables in the control group more like the 
distributions in the entire sample). For the next iteration I use the sampling weights I 
just createdwgt1D=0to create a new set of sampling weights wgt2D=0. For example, 
when I model the treatment selection mechanism I use the sampling weight wgt1D=0, 
and I use the sampling weight wgt1D=0 when I generate the probability of selection 
into the population:  
 
01),,|1Pr( == DwgtIncEparCogB  
 
and when I generate then new weighting variable:  
 
0,200 12 === ⋅= DDD fwgtwgt  
 
Now wgt2D=0 is used as a sampling weight to balance the control group to the 
population. I perform 10 iterations and generate a final weighting variable wgt10D=0. 
To balance the treatment group to the population the same steps are performed 
with the treatment group substituted for the control group. The average treatment 
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effect is estimated as the difference in the outcome, which is college entry in this 
example, across the treatment and control groups using the appropriate weights: 
 
01 1010 ]0|[]1|[ == =−== DD wgtwgtATE DYEDYEδ  
 
Moving from a binary treatment variable to a treatment variable with more 
than two alternative treatment states is fairly straightforward. With a binary treatment 
variable I would have to go through the steps twice: once for the controls and once for 
the treated. For a treatment variable with J treatment states (where J>2) the steps must 
be performed J times, once for each alternative treatment state.  In the present 
example, there are four categories of perceived ability to complete college: Definitely 
not/I doubt it; Not sure; Yes, probably; and Yes, definitely.  
Once these steps have been performed for each of the alternative treatment 
groups, the average treatment effects of moving from one treatment state to another 
can be estimated as the difference in entry rates between the treatment groups. I have 
focused in the text on the effects of moving from one perceived ability level to a level 
of perceived ability directly adjacent to it, but it is possible to estimate any contrast. 
 220
APPENDIX B  
DESCRIPTION OF THE NATIONAL  LONGITUDINAL SURVEY OF YOUNG 
MEN, 1966 
 
The National Longitudinal Survey of Young Men, 1966 (hereafter, NLSYM66) 
is a household survey of civilian, noninstitutionalized males in the United States aged 
14 to 24 in 1966. The NLSYM66 administers a test battery known as the Knowledge 
of the World of Work (hereafter, KWW). Ten of the items ask respondents how much 
education they believe typical incumbents of ten occupations possess. The mean of the 
responses to these 10 questions is used to measure respondents beliefs about the 
education requirements of occupations.  
Occupational knowledge is measured as the total score on all items in the 
KWW section of the 1966 questionnaire. The NLSYM66 also includes respondents 
occupational aspirations for age 30, coded in the 1960 COC. I generate values for the 
actual educational requirements for these occupations with data from the 1960 Census. 
Family background is measured with both parental education and the socioeconomic 
status of the occupation of the household head. A test of cognitive skill is not 
administered to respondents for the NLSYM66. However, results of aptitude and 
achievement tests submitted by respondents high schools are available for the 
majority of respondents. Table B.1 presents further description of the variables and 
their means and standard deviations. 
The sample is limited to respondents aged 18 or younger at the time of the 
1966 interview who believed that their chances of entering the occupation they aspired 
to were either Excellent, Good, or Fair (those thinking their chances are Poor 
are dropped from the analysis because their responses cannot reasonably be considered 
to be expectations). Missing values for independent variables are imputed using 
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Statas best-subset imputation command impute. The resulting sample size is 
N=1,439. 
 
Table B.1. Variables Used in the Analysis. NLSYM66. 
Variable Description and NLSYM66 Variable Names Mean  Stand.  
Dev. 
Occupational aspiration Mean highest grade completed among 
incumbents of the occupation respondents 
aspire to. (R0032900) 
12.75 2.86 
Perceived educational 
requirements 
Mean educational attainment believed to be 
held by typical incumbents in the 
occupations in the Knowledge of the World 
of Work test  
13.69 .70 
White Student is white (yes=1). (R0002300) .79 .41 
Black Student is black (yes=1). (R0002300) .12 .33 
Hispanic Student is Hispanic (yes=1). (R0002300) .08 .27 
Other Race/ethnicity Nonwhite, nonblack (yes=1). (R0002300) .01 .08 
Socioeconomic status 
head of family 
Duncan index of fathers occupation when 
the respondent was 14 years old 
(R0062550). Missing values are filled in 
with SEI of fathers occupation in the last 12 
months (R0063090). Remaining missing 
values are filled in with the SEI of mothers 
occupation in the last 12 months 
(R0063290). 
37.24 24.44 
Parental education Education of the most educated parent, or 
the education of either parent if education is 
missing for the other (Father R0063100; 
Mother R0063300) 
11.70 2.99 
Cognitive skill Scores from a variety of 
aptitude/achievement tests administered by 
respondents schools. (R0171100) 
104.19 14.39 
Age Age in the 1966 interview (R0002200) 15.92 1.38 
Occupational knowledge Score on the Knowledge of the World of 
Work test items. (R0061900) 
33.06 7.19 
Notes. Imputed values included. Statistics calculated using 1966 sampling weights (R0000200).  
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APPENDIX C  
 
THE AMERICAN COMMUNITY SURVEY 
 
The 2003 American Community Survey (hereafter, ACS) is used to generate 
the educational profile of incumbents of the occupational categories used in the 
NELS88 occupational expectation question. Most respondents were about 18 in the 
second follow-up (1992), so 2004 data would be more appropriate. However, the 
educational attainment question in the 2003 data is closer to the NELS88 question on 
perceived education requirements because it includes a category Vocational, 
Technical, or Business School Degree, which is not in the 2004 ACS. The ACS 
sample was limited to respondents aged 28 to 35. Using only respondents who were 30 
years old resulted in an insufficient sample size, and exploratory analysis revealed no 
relationship between age and educational attainment within occupation categories in 
the 28 to 35 age range.  
To generate coarse occupational categories in the ACS that are similar to the 
occupational expectation categories used in the NELS88 I selected groups of 
occupations from the ACS that I believed were fairly representative of the occupations 
in the NELS88 categories. Sometimes this meant taking all occupations from the ACS 
of a certain general type (e.g., all sales occupations in the ACS are used for the 
category Sales in the NELS88), while at other times this meant selecting specific 
occupations, often from different broad categories, to generate a representative group 
of occupations. I selected occupations for the NELS88 category Laborer in this way. 
Table C.1 presents the occupational crosswalk.  
I slightly modified both the NELS88 perceived educational requirement and 
the ACS education attainment classifications into a third classification system that is 
fairly uniform across the two surveys. Table C.2 presents the educational crosswalk.  
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Table C.1. Uniform Occupation Categories for the NELS88 and 2003 American 
Community Survey. 
NELS88 2003 American Community Survey 
1. Office Worker All Office occupations (50005930) 
2. Tradesperson First-line supervisors/managers of construction trades (6200), Carpenters 
(6230), Carpet, floor, and tile installers and finishers (6240), Cement 
masons (6250), Electricians (6350), Glaziers (6360), Painters, 
construction, and maintenance (6420), Paperhangers (6430), Pipelayers, 
plumbers, pipefitters, and steamfitters (6440), Plasterers and stucco 
masons (6460), Construction and building inspectors (6660), Elevator 
installers and repairers (6700), Repair occupations (70007560), Other 
installation, maintenance, and repair workers (7620), Bakers (7800), 
Cabinetmakers and bench carpenters (8500), Jewelers and precious stone 
and metal workers (8750) 
3. Farmer All farming occupations (60006130) 
4. Full-Time 
Homemaker 
N/A 
5. Laborer Construction laborers (6260), Insulation workers (6400), Reinforcing 
iron and rebar workers (6500), Roofers (6510), Sheet metal workers 
(6520), Helpers, construction trades (6600), Fence erectors (6710), 
Hazardous materials removal workers (6720), Highway maintenance 
workers (6730), Miscellaneous construction workers, except septic 
(6760), Misc. extraction workers, including roof bolters (6940), Helpers, 
installation, maintenance, and repair workers (7610), Helpers, 
production workers (8950) 
6. Manager All managerial occupations (10430) 
7. Military All military occupations (98109830) 
8. Machine Operator Paving, surfacing, and tamping equipment operators (6300), 6320, 6740, 
6800, 6820, 6830, 6840, 7710, 7720, 7830, 78408460, 85308600, 
86208740, 88008940, 90009310 
9. Professional I 800, 1200, 1230, 13001530, 31303240 
10. Professional II 2040, 2100, 2110, 2200, 30003060, 3120, 3250, 3260 
11. Small Business 
Owner 
N/A 
12. Protective 
Service 
All protective service occupations (37003950) 
13. Sales All sales occupations (47004960) 
14. Teacher All nonpostsecondary teachers (23002340) 
15. Service Worker 36003640, 40204650 
16. Technical 
Worker 
1540, 1550, 1560, 19001960, 3110, 33003540, 8760 
17. No Plans to 
Work 
N/A 
18. Other N/A 
19. Will be in School N/A 
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Table C.2. Uniform Education Categories for the NELS88 and 2003 American 
Community Survey. 
NELS88 2003 American 
Community Survey 
Uniform Category Uniform Highest 
Grade Completed 
0. No high school 
1. Some high school 
18. No schooling 
completed to 12th 
grade, no diploma  
1. Less than high 
school 10 
2. High school 
diploma 
 
3. <2 Years of 
vocational, trade, or 
business school 
9. High school 
graduate 
2. High school 
graduate  12 
4. 2+ Years of 
Voc/Trade/Business 
School 
5. Degree from a 
Voc/Trade/Business 
School 
11. Voc/Tech/Business 
Degree 
3. Voc/Tech/Business 
Degree 14 
6. Some college 
education 
10. Some college, but 
no degree 4. Some college   14 
7. 2-Year college 
degree 12. Associate degree 5. Associate degree  14 
8. 4- or 5-year college 
degree 13. Bachelors degree 6. Bachelors degree 16 
14. Masters degree 
9. Graduate degree 
(Masters or PhD) 
16. Doctorate degree 
7. Graduate degree 19 
10. Professional degree 15. Professional degree 8. Professional degree  20 
Note. The education question in the NELS88 is Q65 in the 2nd Round Student Questionnaire, which 
asks students How much education do you think you need to get the job you expect or plan to have 
when you are 30 years old?
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